NELLIE JONES v. GEORGE SCHREIBER

Minnesota Supreme Court1926-02-11No. No. 25,130

166 Minn. 177

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the jury verdict, holding that the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, and that the question of whether the plaintiff's silence and failure to protest constituted negligence under the circumstances was properly submitted to the jury for determination.

A plaintiff passenger was injured when the defendant driver negligently operated an automobile, causing it to veer into a ditch. The plaintiff, though aware they were traveling at a dangerous speed of 45-50 miles per hour, did not verbally protest to the defendant driver, fearing she would appear meddlesome as a guest. The defendant appealed a jury verdict against him, arguing the plaintiff was contributorily negligent for failing to voice her concerns about the unsafe driving.

The court rejected the defendant's argument that silence in the face of perceived danger constitutes contributory negligence as a matter of law. The court recognized that while a guest passenger has a duty to exercise reasonable care for their own safety, a passenger who lacks physical control of the vehicle and has no superior knowledge of road hazards is not automatically negligent merely for remaining silent. The court noted that in some circumstances—such as when a passenger sees an approaching vehicle unknown to the driver—failure to warn might constitute negligence, but those circumstances were not present here.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a passenger guest is contributorily negligent for failing to protest against a driver's negligent operation of an automobile
Whether a passenger's knowledge and ability to warn affect the standard of care owed by the passenger
When silence in the face of dangerous driving constitutes contributory negligence

Procedural posture

The defendant appealed from an order denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial following a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Wilson, C. J.

This is an appeal by defendant from an order denying an alternative motion for judgment non obstante or a new trial.

Defendant and his wife invited plaintiff, her sister and husband, to take an automobile ride. Defendant drove the car, the two gentlemen occupying the front seat and the three ladies the rear. They were traveling upon a trunk highway and, as determined by the jury, the defendant so negligently operated the car that it went into a side ditch, seriously injuring the plaintiff. Was plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence? This is the sole question presented by the record.

All the parties were of mature years and on friendly terms. It was dusk and the lights were turned on. There was no other traffic on the road at the time. The car was traveling between 45 and 50 miles per hour for perhaps a mile immediately prior to the accident, during which time plaintiff did not talk. She had never driven a car, but realizing that they were traveling at a dangerous speed, became frightened. But being defendant’s guest and apparently in fear of being considered officious, she did not protest. There is no rule of law that decides where silence under such circumstances should cease. Plaintiff had no physical control of the car and no authority to direct its operation. Upon such facts it cannot be said that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Johnson v. Evans, 141 Minn. 356, 170 N. W. 220, 2 A. L. R. 891; Holland v. Yellow Cab Co. 144 Minn. 475, 175 N. W. 536; Lochhead v. Jensen, 42 Utah, 99, 129 Pac. 347.

The negligence of a person operating an automobile cannot ordinarily be imputed to his guest. Lundh v. G. N. Ry. Co. 165 Minn. 141, 206 N. W. 43; Bower A. R. Co. v. Young (Tex. Civ. App.) 274 S. W. 295; Rappaport v. Roberts (Mo. App.) 203 S. W. 676; Tonseth v. Portland Ry. L. & P. Co. 70 Ore. 341, 141 Pac. 868. The guest, of course, cannot evade his duty to use reasonable diligence in caring for himself. Thompson v. Los Angeles & S. D. B. Ry. Co. 165 Cal. 748, 134 Pac. 709; Rappaport v. Roberts, supra. The standard of care is the conduct of a reasonably prudent person under the existing conditions. White v. Portland G. & C. Co. 84 Ore. 643, 165 Pac. 1005.

Under certain circumstances, it has been held that a guest or passenger is guilty of contributory negligence in not protesting against the negligence of the driver. 20 R. C. L. § 137, p. 165. Doubtless there may be cases where the driver’s negligence is so flagrant as to require at least a verbal effort to cause it to cease. State v. Phillinger, 142 Md. 365, 120 Atl. 878. But usually it is for the jury to say whether the circumstances command such action by an ordinarily prudent person. Plaintiff possessed no knowledge superior to defendant’s as to dangers involved in the operation of the car. The situation is quite different from that in which a guest fails to advise a driver of approaching danger — such as another automobile or locomotive, the proximity of which is unknown to the driver. We cannot say upon the facts in this case that plaintiff joined the defendant in testing manifest dangers as discussed in Hardie v. Barrett, 257 Pa. St. 42, 101 Atl. 75, L. R. A. 1917F, 444. Of course it is possible for such guest to be guilty of contributory’ negligence. Powell v. Berry, 145 Ga. 696, 89 S. E. 753, L. R. A. 1917A, 306.

In this case, however, defendant’s negligence was of such character as to require the jury to determine when, if at all, plaintiff became negligent. The court properly submitted the question of plaintiff’s contributory negligence to the jury.

Affirmed.