Thomas R. KNOTT, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. Francis G. HOWARD, Warden, Respondent-Appellee

United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit1975-03-04No. No. 74-1303

511 F.2d 1060

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Holding. The judgment of the district court denying the habeas corpus petition was affirmed, as the confessions were properly admitted under the pre-Miranda voluntariness test and the defendant failed to demonstrate that his mental capacity or the tainting effects of earlier confessions rendered his statements involuntary.

A murder conviction defendant appealed the denial of his habeas corpus petition, challenging the admission of his confessions at trial. He argued primarily that his confessions should have been excluded because he was not given Miranda warnings before making incriminating statements. The court held that Miranda does not apply to retrials where the original trial began before Miranda was decided, and therefore the proper test for admissibility was the pre-Miranda "totality of the circumstances" voluntariness standard, under which the absence of warnings is merely one factor to consider.

The defendant also contended that a third confession (the Hilton confession) should have been barred because it followed two confessions that were ruled inadmissible. The court rejected this argument, finding no general principle that a subsequent confession becomes inadmissible merely because earlier confessions were excluded. Here, the district court properly determined that the Hilton confession was untainted because it was separated in time and place from the earlier confessions, was voluntary and not the product of interrogation, and the earlier confessions were inadmissible only due to a broad Escobedo prophylactic rule rather than coercion or involuntariness.

Finally, the defendant claimed mental incompetence to make a voluntary confession. The court found substantial evidence in the record supporting the trial judge's determination that the defendant had sufficient mental capacity to provide a voluntary confession.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Applicability of Miranda rights to retrials when original trial preceded Miranda decision
Admissibility of confession following earlier inadmissible confessions
Mental competency to make voluntary confession

Procedural posture

The appellant appealed the district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition challenging his murder conviction.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, convicted of murder in the Rhode Island Superior Court, see State v. Knott, 111 R.I. 241, 302 A.2d 64 (1973), appeals from the denial of his petition for habeas corpus. His primary claim is that the two confessions at issue here should have been excluded from evidence because he received no warnings about his rights prior to making the inculpatory statements. Acceptance of this argument would amount to applying Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), to his retrial. But Miranda does not apply to a retrial where the original trial commenced prior to the date Miranda was decided. Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213, 89 S.Ct. 1677, 23 L.Ed.2d 253 (1969). Thus Miranda is inapplicable here, and the correct test of the admissibility of Knott’s confessions is the pre-Miranda “totality of the circumstances” voluntariness test, see Jenkins v. Delaware, supra; Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730, 732, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966), with one factor in that test being the lack of warnings. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740-41, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 16 L.Ed.2d 895 (1966). This was the test the district court applied in its thorough and well-reasoned opinion. Knott v. Howard, 378 F.Supp. 1325 (D. R.I. 1974). Appellant’s reliance on Miranda and Miranda cases, e. g., Fisher v. Scafati, 439 F.2d 307 (1st Cir.), order modified and cert. denied, 403 U.S. 939, 91 S.Ct. 2256, 29 L.Ed.2d 719 (1971); State v. La Fernier, 37 Wis.2d 365, 155 N.W.2d 93 (1967), is thus misplaced.

The next argument is that the Hilton confession should have been held inadmissible because it followed two confessions which have been ruled inadmissible. See State v. Knott, 105 R.I. 71, 249 A.2d 421 (1969). There is, of course, no general rule that if an inadmissible confession is received, no subsequent confession can be admissible. See United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 67 S.Ct. 1394, 91 L.Ed. 1654 (1947). The appropriate inquiry then becomes whether the conditions that rendered the earlier confessions inadmissible carried over to invalidate the subsequent one. E. g., Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346, 88 S.Ct. 1488, 20 L.Ed.2d 630 (1968); Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 88 S.Ct. 189, 19 L.Ed.2d 35 (1967); Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 423 (1967). Here the district court correctly held that there was no taint connected with the Hilton confession, because it was removed in time and place from the prior inadmissible confessions, because it was voluntary and not the product of interrogation, and mostly because the prior confessions were inadmissible solely because Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), had been interpreted by the Rhode Island Supreme Court as a broad prophylactic rule, see State v. Dufour, 99 R.I. 120, 206 A.2d 82 (1965), and not because the prior confessions were coerced or involuntary. The district court carefully considered appellant’s argument that the Hilton confession was attributable to his belief that his position had been rendered hopeless by the two earlier (and inadmissible) confessions. The court determined that this was not the case, appellant having decided of his own volition to tell the complete story of the murder. This acceptance of the state court’s conclusion was proper, since the record amply supports a finding of voluntariness.

Appellant’s last argument is that he was mentally incompetent to make a voluntary confession. We have reviewed in detail the lengthy transcript in this case, particularly the transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress the two confessions, and we cannot say that the state trial judge lacked substantial evidence for his finding that appellant had sufficient mental capacity to proffer a voluntary confession. See Leavitt v. Howard, 462 F.2d 992 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 884, 93 S.Ct. 175, 34 L.Ed.2d 140 (1972).

Judgment affirmed.

Line 21 in the left-hand column of page 1339, which was incorrectly left blank, should read “Similarly, it is my considered judg-”.