MEDDERS, tax-collector, v. STEWART et al.

Supreme Court of Georgia1931-03-12No. No. 6188

172 Ga. 507

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment that the 1929 tax-collection law was unconstitutional because its narrow population classification, tied solely to the 1920 census and applying to only one county, constituted an impermissible special law lacking any reasonable relationship to its subject matter.

Stewart and other county citizens and taxpayers sought an injunction to block tax collector Medders from selling their property under a 1929 Georgia law that authorized tax collectors to act as deputy sheriffs for tax collection purposes. The plaintiffs challenged the law as unconstitutional, arguing it violated Georgia's requirement that general laws operate uniformly throughout the state and that no special law may be enacted when a general law already addresses the subject. They contended the law was impermissibly special because it applied only to counties with a population between 6,458 and 6,462 according to the 1920 federal census, and that such a narrow classification was arbitrary and unreasonable.

The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs' constitutional arguments, held the 1929 law unconstitutional and void, and granted an interlocutory injunction preventing the tax sale. On appeal, the court affirmed, concluding that the population-based classification had no reasonable relationship to the law's purpose and amounted to arbitrary discrimination. The court noted that the classification was so restrictive it effectively applied to only one county and could not adapt to future census data, making it a special or local law rather than a general one in violation of the state constitution.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a state law applying only to counties with populations between 6,458 and 6,462 according to the 1920 census violates the constitutional requirement of uniform general laws
Whether population-based classification for tax-collection authority is reasonable or arbitrary discrimination
Whether a special or local law is permissible when general law already addresses the same subject matter

Procedural posture

The trial court granted an interlocutory injunction after a preliminary hearing, holding the 1929 law unconstitutional, and the defendant tax collector appealed that judgment.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Gilbert, J.

Stewart and others, alleging that they were citizens and taxpayers of the county, brought a petition for injunction against Medders, alleging in substance, that the defendant, acting under the provisions of the act of the General Assembly approved August 21, 1929 (Ga. Laws 1929, p. 329), which act purports to empower tax-collectors to act as deputy sheriffs in stated instances for the collection of county taxes, had issued tax fi. fas. against them and levied the same on their property and advertised it for sale, and that unless enjoined their property would be sold in violation of law. The petition further expressly alleged that the said act was unconstitutional and void, because in conflict with art 1, sec. 4, par. 1, of the constitution of Georgia (Civil Code (1910), § 6391), which provides that “Laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation throughout the State, and no special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law.” It was alleged that the said act was a special enactment in a case for which there was an existing general law authorizing sheriffs and constables of the county to perform such official duties, to wit, Code sections 1151, 1156, 1165, 1167, and 1211. It is further alleged that the act of 1929, which is made applicable only to counties having a population according to the census of the United States of 1920 of not less than 6458 and not more than 6462, and that such classification is unreasonable and arbitrary and therefore void.

The defendant demurred, and answered denying the material allegations, especially denying the alleged unconstitutionality of the act. The court issued a rule nisi, and in accordance therewith held a preliminary hearing, and thereupon held the law to be unconstitutional, and granted an interlocutory injunction. The exception is to that judgment.

The court did not err in holding the act unconstitutional and void, because in conflict with the constitution, as stated. The classification has no reasonable relation to the subject-matter of the law, and furnishes no legitimate ground of differentiation. It amounts merely to an arbitrary discrimination, not permissible under the constitution. The so-called class is so hedged about and restricted that the act applies to only one county, and other counties coming within the class provided can not also come within the purview of the law; and therefore it is a local or special act, and not a general one. Stewart v. Anderson, 140 Ga. 31, 33 (78 S. E. 457), and cit.; Wilkinson County v. Twiggs, 150 Ga. 583 (104 S. E. 418); Reynolds v. Hall, 154 Ga. 623 (114 S. E. 891); Mayor &c. of Danville v. Wilkinson County, 166 Ga. 460 (143 S. E. 769); Cain v. State, 166 Ga. 539 (144 S. E. 6). The classification by population is limited to the United States census of 1920, and can not be affected by future census enumerations, and only a county having not less than 6458 and not more than 6462, under the census of 1920, falls within the classification.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.