WILLIAM R. PAYNE v. JOHN J. LEININGER

Minnesota Supreme Court1924-06-20No. No. 24,119

160 Minn. 75

Summary · law.co

Holding. The trial court did not err in submitting to the jury the question of whether the automobile was being used for a family purpose, rather than instructing as a matter of law that it was. The order denying the motion for a new trial was affirmed.

Rilla Payne was injured when an automobile owned by defendant Leininger, driven by Leininger's adult son Carl, overturned on the way to South Dakota where the young people planned to marry. Payne sued Leininger under the family automobile doctrine, which holds owners liable for injuries caused by negligent operation of a vehicle kept for family use. Leininger requested a jury instruction stating that a trip for the purpose of getting married constituted family use as a matter of law, but the trial court instead submitted the question to the jury to decide whether such use was ordinary or usual family use. The jury found Leininger not liable.

On appeal, Payne's administrator challenged the jury instruction. The court rejected this challenge, finding that the facts did not warrant a mandatory instruction as a matter of law. Because Carl was an adult and his own master, and because the trip was for his personal purpose of getting married in another state, the jury could reasonably have concluded that Carl was borrowing the car for his personal use rather than using it for a family purpose. Accordingly, the court found no error in submitting the liability question to the jury rather than deciding it as a matter of law.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether use of a family automobile for a trip to get married constitutes 'family use' under the family automobile doctrine
Whether an adult son's use of a parent's car for personal purposes makes the parent liable under agency principles
Proper allocation of factual questions to the jury versus questions of law to the court

Procedural posture

After a jury verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff's administrator appealed from the denial of a motion for a new trial.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Dibell, J.

This action was brought by Rilla Payne to recover damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. There was a verdict for the defendant. Afterwards Mrs. Payne died and William R. Payne, her administrator, was substituted. He appeals from the order denying the motion for a new trial.

The defendant Leininger conducted a hotel at Osakis in Douglas county. His son Carl, a young man 22 years of age, lived with him as a member of the household and helped about the hotel. He received his board and clothing and a weekly allowance. Mrs. Payne lived at Osakis. She had a daughter Evelyn. Carl and Evelyn kept company. The defendant owned a family automobile. On the early morning of October 10, 1922, Carl, with his father’s permission, took the car and with Mrs. Payne and Evelyn started for Milbank, South Dakota. There is evidence that the young people had in contemplation getting married there and that that was the purpose of the trip. On the way the auto overturned. Carl and Evelyn were killed and Mrs. Payne was injured. She claimed that the accident was the result of Carl’s negligence and brought suit against the defendant for her injury.

The plaintiff requested the court to instruct as follows:

“The plaintiff requests the court to instruct the jury that the use of the automobile for the purpose of going to get married, if so used, was under the evidence in this case a family purpose.”

This request was refused. The court in its general charge instructed as follows:

“If you believe that this trip to Dakota was for the purpose of getting married, it is for you to say whether or not that is such use by a family car as it is ordinarily or usually subjected to.” .

The liability of the owner of an auto for damage done by it rests upon the doctrine of principal and agent or master and servant. Mogle v. A. W. Scott Co. 144 Minn. 173, 174 N. W. 832, 7 L. R. A. 1496, and cases cited; Kayser v. Van Nest, 125 Minn. 277, 146 N. W. 1091, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 970, and cases cited. With this doctrine as a basis the liability of the head of the family for injuries occurring in the use of an auto kept for the pleasure and use of the family has been accorded a free and natural development from case to case until we have definitely adopted the family automobile doctrine. Richardson v. Weiss, 152 Minn. 391, 188 N. W. 1008, and cases cited; Plasch v. Fass, 144 Minn. 44, 174 N. W. 438, 10 A. L. R. 1446, and note thereto in 10 A. L. R. 1446, 1449; note 5 A. L. R. 226. In Johnson v. Evans, 141 Minn. 356, 170 N. W. 220, 2 A. L. R. 891, the father was held liable, the issue being submitted to the jury, for the negligence of his son, who was driving, resulting in the injury of his guest. And see Piepho v. M. Sigbert-Awes Co. 152 Minn. 315, 188 N. W. 998; note 2 A. L. R. 900.

In Johnson v. Smith, 143 Minn. 350, 173 N. W. 675, it was held as a matter of law that the auto in use at the time of the injury was a family automobile and that the owner was liable. Within the holding of this case it may be that if at the time of the accident the defendant’s auto had been in use about Osakis, as if Carl had been out riding with Mrs. Payne and her daughter, the family auto doctrine would apply as a matter of law. But the facts are different. The three people were on the way, so we must assume in considering the charge, to South Dakota, where .the young people were to be married. Carl was of age and his own master. The jury could have found that he was a borrower of the auto for his personal use on this occasion rather than the user of it for a family purpose. Under the situation before us the jury could find that the auto was not in use for a family purpose and that the relation of principal and agent or master and servant did not exist. It is urged that as a matter of law the defendant was not liable. This we need not decide, for the jury found that he was not liable with the question submitted to it as one of fact. There was in no event error prejudicial to the plaintiff in submitting the question to the jury.

We find nothing else meriting discussion in the assignments of error relative to the charge. Neither do we find anything calling for comment on the claim of newly discovered evidence.

Order affirmed.