FERGUS F. FLANAGAN, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, DEFENDANT IN CERTIORARI, RESPONDENT, v. CHARLES E. GREEN & SON, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT, PROSECUTOR IN CERTIORARI, APPELLANT

New Jersey Supreme Court1939-04-21

122 N.J.L. 424

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the employee's leg injury arose out of and occurred in the course of his employment, and that his subsequent arm injury sustained during hospital treatment for the first injury was compensable as a direct consequence of the original work-related injury.

A worker injured his leg after tripping over a stool while walking through a dimly lit area of his employer's premises to wash a milk bottle following lunch. The employer argued that because the employee was not actively eating at the moment of injury, the accident did not arise from his employment. The court rejected this argument as frivolous, finding that the injury occurred as part of the employee's work routine and fell within the scope of employment.

A complication arose when the employee sustained a second injury to his arm while hospitalized for treatment of the first injury. This second injury occurred while the employee was cooperating with nurses during routine hospital care. The employer claimed that negligence by hospital staff constituted an intervening cause that broke the causal chain to the original work injury. The court disagreed, holding that because the second injury resulted directly from treatment of the compensable first injury, the resulting disability was attributable to the original workplace accident.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether an injury occurring during post-lunch activity on employer premises arises out of and in the course of employment
Whether a second injury sustained during medical treatment for a compensable injury is itself compensable
Whether negligence by medical personnel constitutes an intervening or superseding cause breaking the causal connection to the original workplace injury

Procedural posture

The workers' compensation bureau awarded benefits to the employee, the Common Pleas Court affirmed, the Supreme Court affirmed with modification as to the measure of compensation, and the employer appealed on further review.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Per Curiam.

This is a workmen’s compensation case. The bureau found for the petitioner and the Common Pleas affirmed. On certiorari the Supreme Court affirmed the Common Pleas except as to the measure of compensation, and the employer appeals.

The first point urged is that there was no proof of an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. This claim is untenable. It rests on a factual distinction that is obviously frivolous. The employe, as had been the custom, had his lunch on the employer’s premises. When he had finished, he proceeded towards another part of the room fox the purpose of washing a milk bottle. The power having been turned off, there was a lack of sufficient lighting and while walking through the room he tripped over a stool and fell to the floor, suffering a fracture of the leg. Granting that an employe injured while taking his lunch on the employer’s premises in accordance with custom, suffers an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, the employer here points out that the employe was not so engaged, but was walking through an unlighted portion of the room at the time he sustained his injury. We think this distinction is so obviously unsound as to merit no discussion.

The second point deals with another accident which happened to the employe while confined in the hospital under treatment for the first injury. While the employe was co-operating with the nurses in the removal of bed clothing, he suffered a fracture or dislocation of one of his arms, whereby permanent injury was sustained, and compensation was awarded on the theory that it was directly connected with the first compensable injury. Claiming that the second injury was the result of the negligence of the nurses the employer invokes the principle of intervening and superseding cause in support of its claim that the consequences of this accident are not compensable. It is true, as pointed out by the employer, that most, if not all of the cases cited by the employe, relate to negligence in the treatment of the original injury, and the employer finds a distinction between such cases and the instant one, where the second injury had no relation to the first, except that it was sustained while he was under treatment for the first. While the question is fairly debatable, we incline to the view that whether the negligent treatment of the injury results in its aggravation or a wholly independent injury, the disability consequent on the second accident is classable as resulting from the first injury, in that it came about through treatment of the compensable injury and was directly connected therewith. In this respect we can see no distinction between the instant case and one in which, through negligent treatment, the disability was increased.

Other grounds for reversal were argued in the Supreme Court and disposed of in the opinion. While content with the reasoning in so far as those grounds are concerned, we deem it proper to point out that here we have dealt only with the questions presented on this appeal.

The judgment is affirmed, with costs.

For affirmance — The Chancelloe, Chiee Justice, Paekee, Bodine, Hehee, Peeskie, Heteield, Deae, Wells, WolesKeil, Raeeeety, Hague, JJ. 12.

For reversal — None.