MASSACHUSETTS v. WESTCOTT

Supreme Court of the United States1977-05-23No. No. 75-1775

431 U.S. 32252 L. Ed. 2d 34997 S. Ct. 17551977 U.S. LEXIS 93SCDB 1976-111

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for reconsideration in light of federal preemption principles established in a companion case, without deciding the constitutional question.

Westcott, a nonresident of Massachusetts, was charged with violating a state law that prohibited nonresidents from using certain fishing methods in Vineyard Sound during specified months. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the charges, ruling that the statute violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review to reconsider this constitutional ruling.

Rather than address the constitutional question, the Supreme Court identified an alternative basis for relief based on federal law. A companion case decided the same day established that federal law preempts states from restricting federally enrolled and licensed fishing vessels from operating in state waters on equal terms with resident vessels. Because Westcott's vessel held the same federal license for mackerel fishing at issue in that case, the Court found he could obtain relief through federal preemption doctrine without reaching the constitutional issue.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a state law restricting nonresident fishing violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause
Whether federal law preempts state restrictions on federally licensed fishing vessels
Avoidance of constitutional questions when statutory grounds for relief are available

Procedural posture

After the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court granted direct review and dismissed the complaint on constitutional grounds, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Per Curiam.

Respondent Westcott was arrested for violating a Massachusetts statute that prohibits nonresidents of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts from dragging for fish by beam or otter trawl in Vineyard Sound during July, August, and September. After he was found guilty, he pursued his right to de novo review and filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court granted direct appellate review and ordered the complaint dismissed on the ground that the statute violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 344 N. E. 2d 411. We granted certiorari. 429 U. S. 815 (1976).

Our decision today in Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., ante, p. 265, suggests that there may be a statutory basis to provide respondent the relief he seeks, thereby making it unnecessary to decide the constitutional. question presented. Douglas holds that federal law pre-empts the States from denying vessels that are federally enrolled and licensed for the fisheries the right to fish in state waters on the same terms as state residents. Respondent’s vessel is federally enrolled and licensed “to be employed in carrying on the mackerel fishery,” .the same license that was held by appellees in Douglas. In accordance with our longstanding principle of deciding constitutional questions only when necessary, Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 543 (1974); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), we decline to decide the privileges and immunities question presented in this case, and vacate the judgment and remand the case for further consideration in light of Douglas. See McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 309 U. S. 430 (1940).

It is so ordered.

Justice Rehnquist concurs in the judgment on the authority of Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., ante, p. 265.

The Act of Feb. 20, 1923, c. 35, 1923 Mass. Acts 17, as amended by the Act of Mar. 13, 1962, c. 219,1962 Mass. Acts 107:

“It shall be unlawful during the months of July, August and September for any person who has not been a legal resident of this commonwealth during the preceding year to use beam or otter trawls to drag for fish in that part of the waters of Vineyard Sound lying in the towns of Chilmark, Gay Head and Gosnold, and included between an imaginary line running from the extreme western point of Gay Head to the extreme western point of Nashawena island and another imaginary line running from Cape Higgon to Tarpaulin Cove Light. Violation of this act shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred nor more than one thousand dollars.”

The fact that respondent holds such a license has been ascertained from the records of the Merchant Vessel Documentation Division of the Coast Guard. These records may be judicially noticed. See, e. g., Bowles v. United States, 319 U. S. 33 (1943); Tempel v. United States, 248 U. S. 121 (1918); Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202 (1890); cf. Fed. Rule Evid. 201 (b) (“A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is . . . capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”). The parties were given, an opportunity to comment on the propriety of our taking notice of the license, and both sides agreed that we could properly do so. See supplemental briefs filed by the parties.