Frank HORTON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit1963-04-18No. Nos. 17261, 17540

317 F.2d 595

Summary · law.co

Holding. The conviction is reversed and remanded for a new trial because the judge's disclosure to the jury of the hospital's competency finding violated the statutory prohibition and, given the centrality of the insanity defense to the case, the judge's curative instruction could not reasonably be presumed to erase the prejudicial effect.

Frank Horton was convicted of narcotics violations and raised an insanity defense based on drug addiction. Medical testimony was conflicted, with some psychiatrists testifying he had no mental disease while others testified his conduct resulted from mental illness, creating a jury question on criminal responsibility that should have been decided by the jury alone.

Before trial, Horton underwent a mental competency examination at St. Elizabeths Hospital pursuant to federal statute. The hospital concluded he had no mental disease and was competent to stand trial. Federal law explicitly prohibits using a competency finding to prejudice an insanity defense and forbids introducing such findings as evidence to the jury. However, during trial the judge stated in the jury's presence that the hospital had certified Horton was competent and showed no mental disease. Although the judge later instructed the jury to disregard this statement and explained that competency to stand trial differs from the insanity standard, the court concluded the error was not harmless.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a competency-to-stand-trial finding may be disclosed to a jury hearing an insanity defense
Whether a trial judge's curative instruction can remedy disclosure of statutorily protected competency information
The relationship between competency to stand trial and criminal responsibility for insanity purposes

Procedural posture

Horton appealed his narcotics conviction, raising the issue of whether trial error in disclosing a hospital competency report warranted a new trial.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was convicted on both counts of an indictment alleging violations of the narcotics statutes. On trial his sole defense was insanity based on drug addiction. Two psychiatrists testified that appellant was without mental disease, three psychiatrists testified that appellant’s acts were the product of mental disease, and one psychiatrist testified simply that appellant was mentally ill. Thus a jury issue was presented on the issue of criminal responsibility. McDonald v. United States, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 120, 312 F.2d 847 (1962).

However, we find error which requires a new trial. Prior to trial appellant, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4244, was committed to St. Elizabeths Hospital for mental examination. Based on the hospital report of the examination which concluded: “We find no evidence of mental disease existing at the present time nor on or about December 15, 1961,” the court found appellant competent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. § 4244, in addition to authorizing hospital commitment to determine mental competence, provides:

“ * * * A fin(jing by the judge that the accused is mentally competent to stand trial shall in no way prejudice the accused in a plea of insanity as a defense to the crime charged; such finding shall not be introduced in evidence on that issue nor otherwise be brought to the notice of the jury.”

During the trial, in the presence of the jury, the court, in answer to defense counsel’s objection to the prosecutor’s line of cross-examination of a defense psychiatric witness, stated:

“It is a fact that the hospital has certified and you have a copy of it, I know, Mr. Arens, that this man is competent to stand trial and there is no mental disease.”

Immediate motion for mistrial was made and denied. The court, then and later in its charge, instructed the jury to dis regard its statement since “the standard for legal competency to stand trial and the test of sanity for criminal responsibility are two entirely different and unrelated matters.”

While it is true generally that a court’s instruction to the jury to disregard irrelevant information is presumed obeyed, in the peculiar circumstances of this case we cannot with assurance say that the error here was thus made harmless. The claim of narcotics addiction as a mental illness was appellant’s principal defense. On this issue the testimony was in conflict and was, therefore, properly submitted to the jury. In this context the court’s well intended and repeated efforts to overcome the effect of the inadvertent reference to competency to stand trial would tend to emphasize rather than eradicate what 18 U.S.C. § 4244 commands the jury must not be told.

Remanded for a new trial.

. 68A Stat. 550, as amended, 68 Stat. 1004, 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a), and 35 Stat. 614, as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 174.

. See Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 3 L.Ed.2d 1250 (1959). See also Taylor v. United States, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 373, 378, 222 F. 2d 398, 403 (1955), and Durham v. United States, 99 U.S.App.D.C. 132, 237 F.2d 760 (1956). Compare Lyles v. United States, 103 U.S.App.D.C. 22, 28-29, 254 F.2d 725, 731-732 (1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961, 78 S.Ct. 997, 2 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1958).

. Compare Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1, 10, 81 S.Ct. 941, 6 L.Ed.2d 84 (1961).