Ben A. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. Victor G. WALKER, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, Angola, Louisiana and the State of Louisiana, Appellees

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit1963-05-17No. No. 19616

317 F.2d 418

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief, holding that federal civil rights statutes do not authorize federal courts to grant habeas petitions without requiring exhaustion of available state remedies, as mandated by federal statute.

Ben Johnson was convicted in 1954 of marijuana possession and sentenced to ten years hard labor. Louisiana's highest court initially overturned his conviction but then reversed itself on reconsideration, reinstating the conviction and sentence. Johnson subsequently filed for federal habeas corpus relief, raising five constitutional challenges to his conviction.

The federal district court rejected Johnson's first four grounds for relief on their merits, finding no constitutional violations. As to the fifth ground—an illegal search and seizure claim—the district court dismissed it because Johnson had not exhausted available state remedies, despite the fact that the jury had already found he had consented to the search. On appeal, Johnson argued that federal civil rights statutes allowed him to bypass the state exhaustion requirement, but the court rejected this argument, holding that such an interpretation would effectively repeal the federal habeas statute's exhaustion requirement.

The appellate court affirmed the dismissal, emphasizing that Congress deliberately codified the exhaustion doctrine and that circumventing it through civil rights statutes would contradict legislative intent.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether federal civil rights statutes permit bypass of state exhaustion requirement for habeas corpus
Whether framed evidence and illegal search and seizure violated constitutional rights
Whether state appellate procedures were adequate
Scope of congressional intent in codifying the exhaustion doctrine

Procedural posture

Johnson appealed the federal district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition challenging a state marijuana conviction.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

AINSWORTH, District Judge.

This is an appeal from the District Court’s denial of an application for a writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.

On October 23, 1954, a State Court jury found the appellant, Ben A. Johnson, guilty of possessing marijuana in violation of Title 40, Section 962, et seq., LSA-Revised Statutes of Louisiana. Johnson was sentenced to 10 years at hard labor in the Louisiana State Penitentiary. The Louisiana Supreme Court set aside the conviction and sentence, and the case was remanded for a new trial, State v. Johnson, 228 La. 317, 82 So.2d 24 (1955). On rehearing the prior decision was reversed by the State Supreme Court and the conviction and sentence were affirmed. State v. Johnson, 228 La. 317, 82 So.2d 24, 27 (1955).

In the habeas corpus proceedings in the Federal District Court, from which this appeal arises, five grounds for the petition were presented:

(1) The State “framed” the defendant by having knowingly used “planted” evidence.

(2) The bill of information on which the defendant was tried was defective.

(3) The appellate procedures of the Louisiana State Court did not afford the defendant a full consideration of his contentions.

(4) No evidence upon which a conviction could be based was offered at the trial.

(5) The evidence used against the defendant was obtained by an illegal search and seizure.

The grounds numbered 1 through 4 above were decided adversely to the petitioner on the merits by the Federal District Court below on the basis that no deprivation of constitutional rights had been shown. Through an abundance of caution the District Court denied the State’s motion to dismiss the application for writ of habeas corpus for failure of petitioner to exhaust State Court remedies “ * * * in order to feel satisfied that petitioner has been given the full benefit of a complete review of his case by this Court * * *." The recent Supreme Court decision of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837, supports the District Court’s cautious approach. Also, the Federal District Court in deciding this case on the merits met the requirements announced by the Supreme Court in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed. 2d 770, in finding that the State trier of fact had resolved all the factual disputes after a full and fair hearing and that these findings were supported by the record as a whole. It would serve no useful purpose to restate the opinion of the District Court which gave a thorough and exhaustive analysis of all contentions raised by the petitioner.

The fifth ground (the illegal search and seizure allegation) had not been raised in any of the various State proceedings after the trial and it appears that State remedies are still available and have not been used. However, the Federal District Court was careful to point out that “ * * * [this] question was thoroughly explored before the jury, and it was found, as a matter of fact, that petitioner had consented to the search and seizure now complained of.” Johnson v. Walker, E.D.La. B.R.Div., 1961, 199 F.Supp. 86, 97. The District Court correctly dismissed this claim on the jurisdictional ground of failure to exhaust State remedies. See United States v. Cormier, 5 Cir., 1960, 279 F.2d 37.

On appeal, Johnson raises the contention that his alleged unconstitutional detention by a State official is a violation of the Civil Rights Statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and therefore this court has jurisdiction without the necessity of exhausting State remedies.

The courts developed the requirement of exhausting State Court remedies as a prerequisite to a Federal habeas corpus writ. Congress later codified this principle in 28 U.S.C. § 2254, “* * * [Habeas Corpus] shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State * *

Use of the Civil Rights Statutes to secure release of persons imprisoned by State Courts would thus have the effect of repealing 28 U.S.C. § 2254; of course, such was not the intent of Congress. Surprisingly enough, this argument has been advanced twice before, In re Ryan, E.D.Pa., 1942, 47 F.Supp. 1023, and United States v. Bibb, 7 Cir., 1957, 249 F.2d 839. In both cases the courts rejected this attempt to circumvent the requirement of exhausting State Court remedies. We agree.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment dismissing the petition for habeas corpus must be

Affirmed.

. Johnson v. Walker, E.D.La., B.R.Div., 1961, 199 F.Supp. 86, 93.

. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837, requires that State remedies must still be available at the time Federal habeas corpus is filed in order to justify a dismissal for failure to exhaust State remedies.

. For the historical development of the court developed doctrine see Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 404, 405, 79 S.Ct. 825, 3 L.Ed.2d 900; Fay v. Noia, 372 U. S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837, and Bator, Finality in Criminal. Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 Harv.L.Rev. 441 (1963).

. For the Legislative History see H.R. Rep. No. 2646, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., p. A172; H.I. 3214, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R.Rep. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. A180; S.Rep. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 9-10.