Moore v. Prudential Insurance Company of America

Supreme Court of Georgia1933-02-20No. No. 9100

176 Ga. 489

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment directing a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in fi. fa. (Prudential Insurance) was affirmed. A security deed holder acting in good faith receives the same protection as a bona fide purchaser for value, and where the security holder had no actual notice of a prior voluntary conveyance, the property remains subject to a judgment foreclosing the security deed.

Moore claimed title to land through a voluntary deed executed by one of the defendants before that defendant granted the same property as security for a loan to Prudential Insurance. When Prudential sought to execute on the judgment foreclosing the loan, Moore filed a claim to prevent the levy. At trial, the judge directed a verdict in favor of Prudential, finding the property subject to the foreclosure judgment. Moore appealed, arguing the voluntary deed should take precedence.

The court held that although voluntary deeds are generally protected against subsequent purchasers without notice, a grantee under a security deed who acts in good faith receives the same protection as a bona fide purchaser for value. Here, Prudential had no actual notice of Moore's voluntary deed when it took the security deed. Moore's own claim of title through a voluntary deed from the defendant constituted an admission that the defendant held title at the time Prudential acquired its security interest. Because Prudential was a good-faith security holder and had no actual knowledge of Moore's earlier conveyance, the evidence established that the property remained subject to Prudential's foreclosure judgment.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a voluntary deed is effective against a subsequent security deed holder without actual notice
The status and protections afforded to security deed grantees compared to bona fide purchasers
Sufficiency of evidence to establish title in the defendant at the time a security deed was executed

Procedural posture

Moore filed a claim to prevent levy of an execution on land, challenging Prudential's foreclosure judgment based on a security deed, and appealed after the trial court directed a verdict against her and denied her motion for a new trial.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Atkinson, J.

A statutory claim was interposed to the levy of an,execution upon land. The claimant asserted title under a recorded voluntary deed from one of the defendants in fi. fa., who with his codefendants, subsequently to the execution and record of the voluntary deed to claimant, conveyed the land to the plaintiff in fi. fa. as security for a loan. At the conclusion of evidence introduced by both sides, the judge directed a verdict finding the property subject to the fi. fa. based on the judgment foreclosing tire loan deed. Hie claimant’s motion for a new trial was overruled, and the exception is to this judgment. Held:

No. 9100.

February 20, 1933.

1. Every voluntary deed or conveyance made by any person shall be void as against subsequent bona fide purchasers for value without notice of such voluntary conveyance. Civil Code (1910), § 4110. To sustain a voluntary conveyance against a subsequent bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration, notice to the purchaser must be actual. Waters v. Wells, 155 Ga. 439 (9) (117 S. E. 322), and cit.

2. A grantee in a security deed who acts in good faith stands in the attitude of a bona fide purchaser, and is entitled to the same protection. King v. Mobley, 150 Ga. 256 (4) (103 S. E. 237).

3. On the trial of a claim interposed to the levy of a. fi. fa., based on a judgment foreclosing a loan deed, although the evidence may not show possession in the defendant at the time of the levy, the plaintiff may successfully carry the burden of proof by showing affirmatively that the defendant was vested with title at or before the time the plaintiff acquired his loan deed. See American National Bank v. Lee, 124 Ga. 863 (53 S. E. 268). In the instant case it appears that the claimant claims title by voluntary deed from the defendant in fi. fa., executed prior to the security deed. This is an admission of title in the defendant at that time. Garbutt Lumber Co. v. Wall, 126 Ga. 172 (2) (54 S. E. 944). There was no evidence that the plaintiff had actual notice of the voluntary deed at the time of taking the security deed.

4. Any error in the admission of secondary evidence as to recitals in a paper tending to show an admission by the claimant that would be against her in the instant case, as complained of in the fourth special ground of the motion for new trial, would not be cause for reversal.

(а) Nor would any conflict of evidence as to possession at the time of the levy, as referred to in the first and second special grounds, be cause for reversal.

(б) Nor would it affect the case that after the voluntary deed to the claimant she reconveyed the property for a valuable consideration back to the grantor, who was her husband, and afterwards was one of the makers of the security deed and a defendant in the fi. fa. involved in the case; and that such conveyance to the husband -was not authorized by the judge of the superior court.

5. Applying the above principles, the evidence demanded the verdict in favor of the plaintiff in fi. fa., and the judge did not err in refusing a new trial.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

James R. Davis, for plaintiff in error.

L. P. Goodrich, Claude Christopher, and W. M. Dallas, contra.