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City of Douglas v. South Georgia Grocery Co. et al.

Supreme Court of Georgia1934-03-13No. No. 9823
178 Ga. 657

Summary

Holding. The judgment granting an interlocutory injunction against the city's threatened prosecutions and executions was reversed because the case presented no special circumstances justifying equitable intervention in ordinary municipal tax enforcement proceedings.

The City of Douglas sought to enforce a municipal license tax against South Georgia Grocery Co. through threatened criminal prosecution and execution proceedings. The grocery company petitioned a trial court for an injunction to stop these enforcement actions, which the trial court granted. On appeal, the court examined the established principles governing when equity courts may intervene in criminal or quasi-criminal municipal proceedings.

The court held that equity courts ordinarily cannot enjoin criminal or quasi-criminal prosecutions except in narrow circumstances involving special facts—such as when prosecutions are a pretext to unlawfully seize or destroy property or prevent exercise of a state-granted franchise. The court found that mere multiplicity of prosecutions, threats of arrest alone, or general harassment do not justify equitable intervention. Additionally, when equity jurisdiction is absent, a court will not assume jurisdiction merely to examine the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance or the validity of a tax enforcement scheme.

Because the city was pursuing ordinary tax collection through standard municipal enforcement, no irreparable injury had been demonstrated, and no property had actually been seized. The court determined the case fell squarely within the general prohibition against enjoining such proceedings and therefore reversed the trial court's injunction.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • When equity courts may enjoin municipal prosecutions or quasi-criminal proceedings
  • Whether mere threat of repeated arrests or prosecutions justifies injunctive relief
  • Whether actual irreparable injury to property must be shown to warrant equitable intervention
  • Whether equity courts may examine constitutionality of municipal ordinances absent independent equitable jurisdiction

Procedural posture

The trial court granted an interlocutory injunction against the city's enforcement of a municipal license tax; the city appealed.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Gilbert, J.

1. “The general rule is that courts exercising equitable jurisdiction will not enjoin criminal prosecutions; and this rule is ordinarily applicable to proceedings to punish for violations of municipal ordinances, which are quasi criminal in their character. In some cases, involving special facts, injunction may be granted against the unlawful enforcement of municipal ordinances, although they are penal in character, for the protection of property or property rights or franchises against irreparable injury; as, for instance, where, under the guise of enforcing a penal ordinance, it is manifest that prosecutions and arrests are threatened for the sole purpose of unlawfully taking or destroying property, or preventing the exercise of a franchise granted by the State.” Mayor & Council of Shellman v. Saxon, 134 Ga. 29 (2) (67 S. E. 438, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 452). Under the pleadings and the evidence in the present case, it is manifest that the threatened prosecutions and threatened issuance of executions are not for the sole purpose of unlawfully taking or destroying property or the business of the plaintiffs.

2. “In eases where courts of equity have granted injunctions against prosecutions under municipal ordinances, it will usually be found that this was ancillary to the exercise of some acknowledged equity jurisdiction for the protection of property or property rights against irreparable damage, resting upon grounds other than the mere harassment arising from prosecutions, though repeated.” Mayor &c. v. Saxon, supra.

3. Mere multiplicity of prosecutions alone, without other grounds for equitable interference for protection of property, will not require injunction against criminal prosecutions. Otherwise every person prosecuted for conducting a business illegally could protect himself with an injunction so as to continue to violate the law while the single case in equity was being appealed from court to court. Georgia Railway &c. Co. v. Oakland, City, 129 Ga. 576 (59 S. E. 296).

4. Neither a threat of arrest nor threats of repeated arrests will take the case out of the general rule forbidding the interference of equity in criminal prosecutions. Pope v. Savannah, 74 Ga. 365; Paulk v. Sycamore, 104 Ga. 24 (30 S. E. 417, 41 L. R. A. 772, 69 Am. St. R. 128). City of Bainbridge v. Reynolds, 111 Ga. 758 (36 S. E. 935) ; Salter v. Columbus, 125 Ga. 96 (54 S. E. 74) ; Georgia Ry. &c. Co. v. Oakland City, supra.

5. Where a court of equity, under the well-recognized principles stated above, has not jurisdiction, it will not assume jurisdiction for the purpose of inquiring into the constitutionality of a legislative act or the validity or reasonableness of a municipal ordinance making penal the act or acts for which the prosecutions are threatened. Paulk v. Sycamore, supra; City of Bainbridge v. Reynolds, supra; Jones v. Carlton, 146 Ga. 1 (90 S. E. 278) ; Volunteers of America v. Atlanta, 152 Ga. 461 (110 S. E. 282). “An individual act causing irreparable damage is one thing; the prosecution of a person charged with an offense, in the courts provided for the trial of such proceeding, is a different thing.” Georgia Ry. &c. Co. v. Oakland City, supra.

6. Under the pleadings and the evidence in this. case no irreparable injury was shown. It is merely a ease where the municipality was undertaking in the usual way to collect a license tax laid upon a certain class of business by a municipal ordinance. No property has been levied on. The petition merely alleges “threatened” issuance of execution and threats of repeated arrests. The case falls within the general rule. national Linen Service Corporation v. Milledgeville, 177 Ga. 826 (171 S. E. 568) ; Howard v. Briarcliff Zoological Corporation, 178 Ga. 595.

No. 9823.

March 13, 1934.

7. It follows from the foregoing rulings that the court erred in granting an interlocutory injunction.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Russell, C. J., disqaulified.

B. G. Sapp and II. G. Barnes, for plaintiff in error.

Harrell & Lilly and Qmncey & Qvincey, contra.