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MARY POWERS v. OLE O. WILSON

Minnesota Supreme Court1917-11-30No. Nos. 20,592
138 Minn. 407

Summary

Holding. The court affirmed the judgment on the condition that the plaintiff consent to a reduction of the verdict from $12,500 to $10,000 within 10 days, or a new trial would be ordered. The court found sufficient evidence of the son's negligence and rejected the defendant's arguments regarding insufficient evidence of negligence, plaintiff's contributory negligence as a matter of law, and instructional error, but concluded the damages award was excessive.

A pedestrian was struck by an automobile driven by the defendant's teenage son while crossing a street on a rainy night. The plaintiff sustained serious injuries including a hip fracture that left her permanently disabled with one leg shorter than the other. She was hospitalized for 17 weeks and required several additional weeks of bed rest, after which she could only move about on crutches. She obtained a jury verdict of $12,500 in her negligence action.

The defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence of negligence was insufficient, that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, and that the damages were excessive. The defendant also claimed error in the trial court's jury instructions regarding statutory requirements for automobile lights and warning signals. The court found ample evidence supported the jury's finding that the defendant's son drove negligently—the vehicle's headlights were dim, the windshield was obscured by mist, the horn was not sounded, and the car was traveling at 20 to 25 miles per hour when it struck the plaintiff who had looked both ways before crossing.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether evidence of driver negligence was sufficient for jury determination
  • Whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law
  • Whether the damage award was excessive
  • Whether jury instructions regarding statutory vehicle lighting and warning requirements were proper

Procedural posture

The defendant appealed from an order denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial following a jury verdict in the plaintiff's favor.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Bunn, J.

Plaintiff sustained personal injuries by being run down by defendant’s automobile, driven by his son, and in this action to recover damages for such injuries, received a verdict of $12,500. The case is before us on defendant’s appeal from an order denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial.

There is no claim that defendant is not responsible for the negligence of his son. It is contended that the evidence of negligence on the part of the son was not sufficient to take that issue to the jury, that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, and that the damages are excessive. There is also a claim of error in the court’s charge.

A brief statement of the facts follows: Plaintiff was employed at a factory on the south side of University avenue just west of Syndicate avenue in St. Paul. On September 6, 1916, at about 9 p. m. she left her work to go to her home which was north of University avenue, crossing that street near the west side of Syndicate avenue. Other employees of the factory left at the same time. As plaintiff came to University avenue she looked both ways, saw lights in both directions some distance away, and proceeded to cross the street. She succeeded in crossing the two street car tracks in safety, and was then struck by defendant’s automobile coming from the east; driven by defendant’s son, a young man of 17. It was a rainy night. The wind shield of the car was in place, so covered with mist that the driver could see little through it. The lights of the automobile were dim, and not qf much assistance to the driver in his view ahead, or much of a warning to pedestrians. There was evidence that the car was being driven at a speed of 20 or 25 miles an hour. The driver testified that he did not see plaintiff or any of the people on or near the crossing, though there were several there. The horn was not sounded. The force of the impact threw plaintiff violently to the pavement; the ear ran some 80 feet before it was stopped.

The evidence was amply sufficient to make the question of the driver’s negligence one for the jury, and to justify the verdict on this issue. We reach the same conclusion on the question of contributory negligence.

The question of damages is troublesome, as it frequently is in these cases. Plaintiff was 29 years of age, and was earning $30 per month. Her injuries were serious. She was confined to the hospital for 17 weeks and to her bed at home 3 or 4 weeksmore. After this and up to the time of the trial some 8 months after the accident plaintiff was able to get about on crutches. She sustained a spiral fracture of the upper end of the right femur near the hip. There was a union, but one leg is an inch and a quarter shorter than the other, and plaintiff will limp through life. She has suffered much pain. But we do not understand that she is incapacitated from earning a living at the work she was accustomed to do. We think the verdict is too large, and that it ought to be reduced.

Error is assigned in the court’s giving to the jury the statutory provisions as to lights on automobiles at night, and as to slowing down and giving signals when approaching pedestrians. It is claimed that there was no evidence that the statutes or any of them had been violated. We do not sustain this contention.

The order appealed from is affirmed on condition that plaintiff, within 10 days after the remittitur goes down files her consent to a reduction of the verdict to $10,000. If such consent is not filed, a new trial is ordered.