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Charles M. Evans vs. Maurice H. OConnor; Same vs. Same & another

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court1899-09-21
174 Mass. 287

Summary

Holding. The exceptions to the trial court's evidentiary ruling were sustained. The wife should have been allowed to testify about the 1893 incidents without forfeiting her privilege to refuse testimony about the separate 1894 and 1895 incidents.

A husband brought two cases against men he alleged committed adultery with his wife in 1893, 1894, and 1895. The key issue concerned whether the wife could testify about only the 1893 incidents without being subjected to cross-examination about 1894 and 1895. The trial judge ruled that if she testified about 1893, she must submit to full cross-examination on all years, leading her to decline testifying altogether.

The court held that the wife should have been permitted to testify about the distinct 1893 transaction separately without waiving her privilege against self-incrimination regarding the separate transactions in 1894 and 1895. The court clarified that when a witness agrees to disclose one criminal act, she waives her privilege only as to that particular act and matters directly connected to it through legitimate cross-examination, not to wholly unconnected criminal acts.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Right of witness to testify about one distinct transaction without waiving privilege as to separate, unconnected criminal acts
  • Scope of cross-examination and waiver of self-incrimination privilege
  • Basis of alienation-of-affections action (loss of consortium rather than alienation per se)

Procedural posture

The cases came before the court on exceptions to the trial judge's evidentiary ruling and jury instructions.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Lathrop, J.

In these cases the plaintiff relied upon acts of adultery committed by the wife of the plaintiff with the defendant in the first case, in the years 1893, 1894, and 1895. The evidence as to the act in 1893 was as to one occasion only, and was very slight, though the evidence was abundant as to the acts of 1894 and 1895.

The first exception relates to the ruling of the presiding judge in regard to the right of the wife of the plaintiff to testify. She was called by the defendants, and desired to testify as to her relations with O’Connor in the year 1893, but not as to those in the years 1894 and 1895. She was instructed by the judge that if she testified as to matters in 1893, she could be cross-examined fully as to 1894 and 1895. The witness then declined to testify. We are of opinion that the defendants had a right to the testimony of the witness as to a distinct and separate transaction relied upon by the plaintiff, and that the witness ought to have been allowed to testify as to the year 1893, without waiving her privilege as to the years 1894 and 1895. Low v. Mitchell, 18 Maine, 372. In this case the law is thus stated by Mr. Justice Shepley: “ The rule, that a witness is not obliged to criminate - himself is well established. It is contended, however, that if the witness waives that privilege when testifying to one fact in the cause, he cannot claim it while testifying to any other fact material to the issue. If he consents to testify to one matter tending to criminate himself, he must testify fully in all respects relative to that matter so far as material to the issue. If he waives the privilege, he does so fully in relation to that act. But he does not thereby waive his privilege of refusing to reveal other unlawful acts, wholly unconnected with the act, of which he has spoken, even though they may be material to the issue. His consent to speak of one criminal act cannot deprive him of that protection, which the law affords him so far as respects other criminal acts not connected with it.” See also Lombard v. Mayberry, 24 Neb. 674, 690. If, however, within the legitimate limits of cross-examination as to the fact testified to, an inquiry is started as to other facts, the witness must be considered as having waived his privilege as to the latter so far as the inquiry as to them is within such limits, and he must answer even though his answers may tend to criminate him. We do not understand the ruling to have been thus limited by the presiding justice.

As the exception applies to both cases, the exceptions must be sustained in each case. It may be well, however, to say a few words on other points in the case. The jury were instructed that the basis of the action was the alienation of the wife’s affections. This question was fully considered in Bigaouette v. Paulet, 134 Mass. 123, where it was held that alienation of affections is not the gist of the action, but is merely a matter of aggravation; that the husband’s right of action is based upon his loss of consortium, — “ the right to the conjugal fellowship of the wife, to her company, co-operation, and aid in every conjugal relation.” We are of opinion, however, that this point is not open to the defendant Merrill. There was no instruction requested in regard to it, and the exceptions to the instructions given were only so far as they varied or modified the instructions requested. See Commonwealth v. Walsh, 162 Mass. 242; Fairman v. Boston & Albany Railroad, 169 Mass. 170, 174.

The second case was originally brought against both the defendants, and charges them with unlawfully conspiring together to debauch the plaintiff’s wife, and to induce her to com mit adultery with the defendant O’Connor. During the trial the plaintiff discontinued as to O’Connor. Whether the plaintiff could recover against Merrill, under those circumstances, we need not consider, as no objection was made. See May v. Wood, 172 Mass. 11, 13, and cases cited.

Nor need we consider whether the evidence was sufficient to warrant the jury in finding against Merrill, as it may be different on another trial. Exceptions sustained.