BOWEN v. THE STATE

Supreme Court of Georgia1935-11-14No. No. 10948

181 Ga. 427

Summary · law.co

Holding. The trial court did not err in refusing the requested jury instructions on individual juror decision-making, the irresistible impulse test as framed by defendant, or circumstantial evidence law, and the judgment was affirmed.

A trial court properly refused the defendant's requested jury instruction that each juror should decide the verdict individually without yielding to fellow jurors or the majority. Juries must function as unified bodies, and courts need not charge instructions that discourage collective deliberation or emphasize individual juror independence. The defendant also sought a specific instruction on the irresistible impulse test for insanity, but the trial judge's charge adequately addressed the relevant law by explaining that criminal responsibility requires the ability to distinguish right from wrong, with an exception when a mental disorder or delusion so overmasters a person's will that there is no criminal intent. The court properly refused the defendant's requested language because the charge as given was sufficient.

The trial court also properly permitted jury instructions on conspiracy based on evidence presented at trial. The defendant's admission of shooting the deceased constituted direct evidence of his participation, which meant the court correctly declined to instruct the jury on circumstantial evidence law. The jury's verdict was supported by the evidence presented.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether jury instructions must emphasize individual juror independence or may encourage collective deliberation
Proper formulation of insanity instruction based on irresistible impulse doctrine
Whether direct evidence of admission to participation in a shooting eliminates need for circumstantial evidence instruction

Procedural posture

The defendant appealed from a conviction, challenging multiple aspects of the jury instructions and the trial court's refusal to grant a new trial.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Bell, Justice.

The court did not err in refusing a request to charge “that each juror should decide for himself upon his oath what his verdict should be, and that no juror should yield his deliberate conscientious convictions as to what his verdict should be, either by the instance of a fellow-juror or of the majority; that no juror should yield his honest convictions for the sake of unanimity, or to avert the disaster of a mistrial.” The jury are to act as a body, and should be charged as a body. The individual jurors are not to be- addressed in a way to discourage mental harmony and concert, and it is not incumbent on the court to stimulate their individuality by charging that each juror should decide for himself what his verdict should be. Smith v. State, 63 Ga. 170; Fogarty v. State, 80 Ga. 450 (3), 454 (5 S. E. 782).

The defendant assigned as error the refusal of a request to charge as follows: “I charge you that the accused would not be guilty if the killing was done under some irresistible -impulse, the result of a diseased and disordered mind, which overcame his will and took away his power of self-control, provided the act itself was connected with the particular delusion, if any, under which he was laboring at that time.” The judge charged the jury as to insanity, in part, as follows: “Now, gentlemen, on the question of insanity, the general rule is that if a man has mind enough, has mind and reason sufficient to distinguish between right and wrong in relation to a particular act about to’ be committed, he is criminally responsible. An exception to this rule, however, is where a man has reason to distinguish between right and wrong as to a particular act about to be committed; yet, in consequence of some delusion or some disorder of the mind, his will is overmastered and there is no criminal intent, provided that the act itself is connected with the particular delusion or disorder under which the person is laboring.” In view of the charge as thus given, the court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury as requested. See Roberts v. State, 3 Ga. 310 (3); Carr v. State, 96 Ga. 284 (22 S. E. 570); Mars v. State, 163 Ga. 43 (4), 51 (135 S. E. 410); Hargroves v. State, 179 Ga. 722 (3) (177 S. E. 561).

A conspiracy may be shown by direct as well as circumstantial evidence. The evidence authorized the charge .on the law of conspiracy. Chance v. State, 156 Ga. 428 (3a) (119 S. E. 303), and cit.; Weldon v. State, 158 Ga. 140 (5) (123 S. E. 217).

An admission of participation in a shooting which resulted in the death of another person is to be taken as direct, and not as mere circumstantial evidence. Eberhart v. State, 47 Ga. 598 (8); Perry v. State, 110 Ga. 234 (3), 238 (36 S. E. 781); Greer v. State, 159 Ga. 85 (6), 94 (125 S. E. 52). The State introduced evidence of statements by the defendant in which he admitted shooting the deceased. There being thus some direct evidence of the defendant’s guilt, the court did not err in omitting to charge the jury on the law of circumstantial evidence. See Strickland v. State, 167 Ga. 452 (145 S. E. 879); Cole v. State, 178 Ga. 674 (173 S. E. 655).

The evidence authorized the verdict, arid the "court did not err in refusing a new trial.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concw.