Richard SYLVIA, Defendant, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee

United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit1963-01-22No. No. 6021

312 F.2d 145

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment of conviction is affirmed. A defendant's testimony that he did not commit the charged crime cannot establish entrapment, and when a jury rejects such testimony by convicting, no basis for an entrapment defense remains.

Sylvia was convicted of heroin trafficking based on evidence that he sold drugs to a government agent on two occasions. Sylvia testified in his own defense, claiming he unknowingly delivered packages for the agent as a favor without knowledge of their contents, and argued this constituted entrapment. The jury rejected his testimony by returning a guilty verdict, which necessarily meant they found he knew the packages contained heroin and was not deceived by the government.

The appellate court held that Sylvia's testimony—which denied committing the crime itself—could not support an entrapment defense. Because the jury's guilty verdict implicitly rejected his entire account, no factual basis for entrapment remained. The court noted that while the trial judge should not have instructed the jury on entrapment given the evidence, any error was harmless because allowing an additional defense could not prejudice the defendant.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a defendant's denial of guilt can raise an entrapment defense
Whether jury rejection of a defendant's complete testimony eliminates the factual predicate for entrapment
Whether an erroneous entrapment instruction constitutes harmless error

Procedural posture

Sylvia appealed his conviction for heroin trafficking, arguing the trial court erred by instructing the jury on the entrapment defense and by placing the burden of proving entrapment on the defendant.

Authorities cited

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Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

ALDRICH, Circuit Judge.

Sylvia was found guilty by a jury of violating 26 U.S.C. § 4705(a) and 21 U. S.C. § 174 in connection with the sale of a small quantity of heroin. He appeals, not on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction, but because the court placed upon him the burden of proving the defense of entrapment.

The government’s evidence warranted a finding that Sylvia was approached by one Gibson, a government agent, and asked if he knew where a certain individual, Chandler, could be found. Sylvia stated that he did not know, but asked if he could help him. Gibson replied that he was interested in a “$5 bag.” Sylvia replied that he could help him, and upon receipt of $5, produced a small paper bag from his pocket and gave it to Gibson. A conversation ensued indicating that Sylvia knew the contents to be heroin, which, in fact, it proved to be. A similar transaction was repeated the following day. On this evidence, of course, a conviction was warranted and there was no issue of entrapment. See Masciale v. United States, 1958, 356 U.S. 386, 388, 78 S.Ct. 827, 2 L.Ed.2d 859; Sandoval v. United States, 10 Cir., 1960, 285 F.2d 605.

In his defense Sylvia took the stand and testified that he met Gibson in a cafe; that Gibson asked him to go to a street corner and meet a man with a goatee and pick up two packages; that he did so; that Gibson reimbursed him for what he paid for the packages and that he delivered the packages to Gibson; that he did this as a favor to Gibson and without knowledge of what was in them. This testimony, he asserts, warrants a finding of entrapment. We hold it did not, at least in view of the other instructions given to the jury, to the effect that if the government had failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Sylvia knew there was heroin in the packages he did not have “possession” and could not be convicted. The defendant’s testimony was to a single, indivisible episode, and was either to be accepted or rejected in its entirety. The jury’s verdict of guilty necessarily indicated its rejection. There was no basis left, in other words, for a finding of entrapment. This case falls under the settled principle that a defendant’s testimony to the effect that he did not commit the crime cannot raise an issue of entrapment. United States v. Di Donna, 2 Cir., 1960, 276 F.2d 956; Rodriguez v. United States, 5 Cir., 1955, 227 F.2d 912; Eastman v. United States, 9 Cir., 1954, 212 F.2d 320.

The court should not have charged on entrapment at all. Even if, which we need not determine, the charge was legally inaccurate as well, we cannot see that the defendant was harmed. It cannot be prejudicial to permit him an extra defense. Cf. Samson v. United States, 1 Cir., 1928, 26 F.2d 769.

Judgment will be entered affirming the judgment of the District Court.

. While a jury normally may accept a witness’ testimony in part and reject it in part, there comes a point where “fragmentation” becomes illogical. Beradi v. Menicks, 1960, 340 Mass. 396, 400, 164 N.E.2d 544; see Hannon v. Hayes-Bickford Lunch System, Inc., 1957, 336 Mass. 268, 273, 145 N.E.2d. 191. We think this is such a case. If Sylvia’s testimony about not knowing what was in the packages is not credited, his whole story of deception amounting to entrapment collapses.