EVA GREENBERG v. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF KNIGHTS AND LADIES OF SECURITY

Minnesota Supreme Court1916-01-14No. Nos. 19,604—(202)

132 Minn. 84

Summary · law.co

Holding. The appeal is dismissed because the order granting a new trial was not granted exclusively for errors of law occurring at trial, and statutory language retained in the 1915 re-enactment did not implicitly repeal the 1913 statute's restriction on appealability of such orders.

Eva Greenberg, as beneficiary under a life insurance certificate issued to Shina Greenberg, sued to recover benefits owed under the policy. The defendant society denied liability, claiming Shina Greenberg had been expelled during her lifetime and acquiesced to that expulsion. A jury returned a verdict in Greenberg's favor, but the trial court granted a new trial and denied the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The defendant appealed, raising the question of whether it had the right to do so under applicable appellate statutes.

The court examined the relevant statutory framework governing appeals from orders granting new trials. Under the 1913 statute, appeals from orders granting new trials were permitted only when the order expressly stated the new trial was granted exclusively for errors of law occurring at trial. Previous case law had established that orders denying judgment notwithstanding the verdict were not independently appealable. The defendant argued that a later 1915 statutory re-enactment effectively repealed these restrictions by retaining language allowing appeals from orders denying motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

The court rejected this argument, holding that mere legislative retention of statutory language from an earlier version could not be construed as an implicit repeal of the 1913 restrictions on appealability. To hold otherwise would grant defendants an asymmetrical advantage by permitting appeals in all cases while plaintiffs lacked equivalent appellate rights. The court concluded the legislature did not intend such an unequal outcome.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Appealability of trial court orders granting new trials
Whether statutory re-enactment with retained language implicitly repeals prior restrictions
Proper interpretation of legislative intent regarding appellate rights

Procedural posture

The defendant appealed from a trial court order granting a new trial and denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Schaller, J.

The plaintiff, beneficiary under a life insurance certificate issued by the defendant to Shina Greenberg, began an action to recover the sum due under the terms thereof.

Defendant answered, denying liability, alleging Shina Greénberg’s expulsion from the society during her lifetime and her acquiescence in such expulsion.

The action was tried to a jury. Plaintiff had a verdict. Defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. The court entered an order granting a new trial and denying the motion for judgment. Defendant appealed.

The new trial was not granted exclusively for errors occurring on the trial.

The statute, chapter 474, p. 699, Laws 1913 (G. S. 1913, § 8001, subd. 4), provides that an appeal may be taken to this court from an order granting a new trial based exclusively upon errors occurring on the trial when it is so expressly stated in the order or memorandum of the trial court, and that an appeal can be taken in such case only. It has been held that an order denying judgment notwithstanding the verdict is not appealable. We th,us have the same question presented in Kommerstad v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 125 Minn. 297, 146 N. W. 975, in which it is held that an appeal may not be taken from an order granting a new trial, except where the new trial is granted for errors of law occurring at the trial and in such case only, and that an order denying judgment notwithstanding the verdict is not appealable. It follows that this appeal must be dismissed unless chapter 31, p. 37, Laws 1915, repeals pro tanto chapter 474, p. 699, Laws 1913. Chapter 31, p. 37, Laws 1915, is a re-enactment in haec verba of section 4362, E. L. 1905, which was itself a codification of chapter 32Ó, p. 729, Laws 1895, and which, so far as this inquiry is concerned, is original legislation.

Section 4362, E. L. 1905, was amended in 1913 by chapter 245, p. 336, Laws 1913. The amendment consists of the requirement that, where a motion for a directed verdict is made, the same shall be denied if objected to by the plaintiff. This act (chapter 245, p. 336, Laws 1913), retains the provision of section 4362, E. L. 1905, that “if the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict be denied, the supreme court, on appeal from the judgment, may order judgment to be so entered, when it appears from the testimony that a verdict should have been so directed at the trial; and it may also so order, on appeal from the whole order denying such motion when made in the alternative form, whether a new trial was granted or denied by sncli order.” This provision is retained unchanged in chapter 31, p. 37, Laws 1915. The question arises whether the legislature, by continuously retaining this provision in the act, intended to grant an appeal from orders which, by the decision of this court in Kommerstad v. Great Northern Ry. Co. supra, had expressly been held to be nonáppealable. If it should be decided that an appeal lies in such a case, the result would be that chapter 474, p. 699, Laws 1913, (so far as it makes an order granting a motion for a new trial nonappealable), has been repealed by implication. To so hold would give to the defendant an undue advantage. He could appeal in every case and compel this court to review an order denying judgment notwithstanding the verdict whether the motion for a new trial had been granted or denied. We do not think that the legislature intended to grant to the defendant and deny to the plaintiff a right to which both parties ought to be equally entitled.

The mere fact that the legislature by chapter 31, p. 37, Laws 1915, retained in the statute the language of section 4362, R. L. 1905, cannot be construed to repeal that part of chapter 474, p. 699, Laws 1913, which provides that an order granting a new trial may be appealed from in the case therein specified and in none other.

Appeal dismissed.