John K. LEVINER, Respondent, v. SONOCO PRODUCTS COMPANY, Petitioner

Supreme Court of South Carolina2000-04-03No. No. 25102

339 S.C. 492530 S.E.2d 127

Summary · law.co

Holding. The appellate court's reversal of the circuit court's February order and reinstatement of the January remand order was affirmed as modified; the circuit court lost jurisdiction to issue the February order because it failed to comply with the ten-day deadline under Rule 59(e), and no timely motion to clarify or amend the January form order was filed.

A worker's compensation case proceeded through the commission system, where a single commissioner determined the employee had reached maximum medical improvement and awarded permanent disability benefits. The full commission affirmed this decision. When the employee appealed to circuit court, the judge issued a form order on January 10, 1997, remanding the case to the single commissioner without providing detailed findings or instructions. Neither party sought clarification of this order within the required timeframe. More than thirty days later, the circuit judge issued a second, fuller written order purporting to vacate the commission's decisions and instead finding the employee totally disabled. The employer appealed this second order.

The appellate court reversed the second order, finding the circuit judge had exceeded its authority and remanding pursuant to the original January order. The state Supreme Court granted review to address the jurisdictional issues raised. The Supreme Court held that because neither party filed a timely motion to clarify or amend the initial form order, that order became a final judgment after ten days. The subsequent written order issued more than thirty days later was void, as the circuit judge had lost jurisdiction to modify it. Accordingly, the proper final order was the original January remand, and the Court of Appeals' decision to reverse the void February order and reinstate the January remand was correct in practical effect.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a circuit court judge retains jurisdiction to modify or clarify a form order after the ten-day period prescribed by Rule 59(e)
Effect of a party's failure to file a Rule 59 motion challenging the adequacy of findings in a form order
Whether an untimely order issued after a form order has matured into final judgment is void

Procedural posture

The case began as a worker's compensation claim before a single commissioner, was affirmed by the full commission, appealed to circuit court which issued a remand order in January 1997 and then a substantive second order in February 1997, appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the February order, and then reviewed by the state Supreme Court on a grant of certiorari.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

PER CURIAM:

We granted certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals remanding this worker’s compensation case to the single commissioner for a de novo hearing. Leviner v. Sonoco Products Co., Op. No. 98-UP-280 (S.C.Ct.App. refiled August 28, 1998). We now affirm as modified.

The single commissioner found respondent had reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) and awarded him permanent disability. The full commission affirmed. Respondent appealed to the circuit court, which issued a form order on January 8, 1997, remanding the case to the single commissioner. This form order was filed on January 10, 1997. Neither party filed a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion within the ten day period allowed by that rule.

On February 10, 1997, the circuit court issued a full written order purporting to vacate the commission orders and finding respondent totally disabled. Employer (petitioner) appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the February order, holding the circuit court exceeded its appellate jurisdiction in finding respondent totally disabled, and remanded the matter to the single commissioner pursuant to the January form order. We granted certiorari.

The form order, titled “Judgment in a civil case”, was filed on January 10, 1997, remanding the case back to the single commissioner. Admittedly, this order does not contain adequate findings of facts or conclusions of law to enable the commissioner to know exactly what acts he was to perform on remand. None-the-less, neither party filed a Rule 59(e) motion within the 10 day period allowed asking for a clarification. Compare Vespazianni v. McAlister, 307 S.C. 411, 415 S.E.2d 427 (Ct.App.1992) (appeal from form order must be affirmed where no Rule 59 motion made). Further, the trial judge’s full written order filed February 10, 1997, more than thirty days later, was patently untimely. Under Rule 59(e), SCRCP, the trial judge has only ten days from entry of judgment to alter or amend an earlier order on his own initiative absent a “reservation” of jurisdiction in the form order. Cf, Rule 203(b)(1), SCACR, “when a form or other short order or judgment indicates that a more full and complete order or judgment is to follow, a party need not appeal until receipt of written notice of entry of the more complete order or judgment.” There was no such reservation in the January form order. When no timely Rule 59 motion was made nor timely sua sponte order filed under Rule 59(e), the January form order “matured” into a final judgment. The order filed on February 10 was a nullity because the trial judge no longer had jurisdiction over the matter. See Doran v. Doran, 288 S.C. 477, 343 S.E.2d 618 (1986) (in appeal decided under predecessor to SCRCP, court held judge lost jurisdiction to issue supplemental order after end of term, and noted in footnote that under Rule 59(e), judge would have jurisdiction to alter or amend order for a 10 day period after entry of judgment).

Since the February order was a nullity, the final order here was the January remand order. While final, this order was not directly appealable since it remanded the matter to the single commissioner for further proceedings. Montjoy v. Asten-Hill Dryer Fabrics, 316 S.C. 52, 446 S.E.2d 618 (1994). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals should have dismissed this appeal from the void February order, leaving intact the January remand order. This is effectively the result reached by the Court of Appeals. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.