BROWN v. LOWRY, sheriff

Supreme Court of Georgia1938-02-19No. No. 12075

185 Ga. 539

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment denying habeas corpus relief was affirmed. A paroled prisoner who departs the sentencing state before completing his full term of imprisonment becomes a fugitive from justice within the meaning of the Extradition Clause and applicable federal law, and may be lawfully detained and extradited back to that state.

Michael Brown was convicted of a felony in New York in 1932 and sentenced to two and a half to ten years imprisonment. After serving the minimum sentence, he was paroled to North Carolina with New York's consent. In 1935, New York's Board of Parole issued an order to retake him, alleging parole violations. Brown was subsequently arrested in Georgia while on federal parole from a separate conviction, and Georgia sought to detain him under a warrant to return him to New York.

Brown petitioned for habeas corpus relief to challenge his detention in Georgia pending return to New York. The court held that a paroled prisoner who leaves the state where he was convicted before completing his full sentence becomes a fugitive from justice under the U.S. Constitution and federal law, regardless of whether he left voluntarily or involuntarily. Because Brown had not completed his New York sentence when he departed that state, he qualified as a fugitive from justice subject to extradition, and Georgia properly could hold him for return.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a paroled prisoner who leaves the sentencing state before completing his sentence is a fugitive from justice
Validity of interstate extradition based on parole violation
Application of the Extradition Clause to parolees versus convicted escapees

Procedural posture

The case was submitted on an agreed statement of facts, the trial court denied the habeas corpus petition, and the petitioner appealed.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Atkinson, Presiding Justice.

Michael Brown filed his petition against J. I. Lowry, sheriff of Fulton County, for the writ of habeas corpus. The case was submitted to the court on an agreed statement of facts, which, taken with the petition as amended, was substantially as follows: The petitioner was tried on an indictment charging a felony in the State of New York. Upon a plea of guilty he received in 1932 a sentence of imprisonment of from two and one half to ten years. He served the minimum sentence of two and one half years. He was then paroled and authorized to go to the State of North Carolina. He left the State of New York with the consent of the parole authorities of that State. On December 4, 1935, an order was granted by a member of the Board of Parole of New York, commanding that the prisoner be retaken and returned to the institution in which he had been confined. This order contains the recital that the prisoner has been conditionally paroled, and has “violated his parole and has lapsed or is probably about to lapse into criminal ways or company.” The prisoner was arrested in Georgia, where he was tried and convicted of transporting a stolen automobile from North Carolina to Georgia, receiving a sentence of three years in the Federal penitentiary in Atlanta. He was paroled from the Federal penitentiary at Atlanta on July 31, 1937. He was immediately arrested on the above order from the Board of Parole of New York. On August 2, 1937, on affidavit of an arresting officer of Georgia, made in pursuance of the Code, § 44-304, the Governor of Georgia issued a warrant for arrest of the prisoner, and that he be held for a period of twenty days. He had committed no crime in the State of New York since his parole. On the hearing the writ of habeas corpus was denied, and the petitioner excepted.

1. Where a person is convicted of felony committed by him in one State, and he goes into another State, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, before serving the full term for which he was sentenced, he thereby becomes a fugitive from justice, within the meaning of section 2 of article 4, of the constitution of the United States, and the act of Congress February 12, 1793 (TJ. S. Comp. St. section 10126). Code, §§ 44-301, 44-302.

2. The case of Hyatt v. People, 188 U. S. 691 (23 Sup. Ct. 456, 47 L. ed. 657), differs on its facts and is not controlling in this case. That decision had reference to flight before conviction in a case where the person was not in the demanding State when the crime was committed; and it was held that in such circumstances the person could not be a fugitive from justice for the purpose of interstate extradition.

3. On application of the principle -first above stated, the judge did not err, under the facts of this case, in refusing to discharge the prisoner on habeas corpus. Kelly v. Mangum, 145 Ga. 57 (88 S. E. 536); Hart v. Mangum, 146 Ga. 497 (91 S. E. 543); Bartlett v. Lowry, 181 Ga. 526 (182 S. E. 850). See generally, on the subject: Hughes v. Pflanz, 138 Fed. 980 (1, 4); Drinkall v. Spiegel, 68 Conn. 441 (36 Atl. 830, 36 L. R. A. 486); Ex Parte Williams, 10 Okla. Crim. 344 (136 Pac. 597, 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 668); Ex Parte Carroll, 86 Tex. Cr. 301 (217 S. W. 382, 8 A. L. R. 901), and note.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.