Norris v. The State

Supreme Court of Georgia1937-05-14No. No. 11702

184 Ga. 397

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment is reversed. The trial court erred in refusing timely written requests to charge the jury regarding the defendant's right to defend his home and property under the applicable statute, as well as the relevance of prior disputes and warnings to the lawfulness of the defendant's actions on the night of the incident.

Norris was convicted of murder and filed a motion for a new trial arguing that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter. The trial court rejected requests to charge the jury, some of which were oral and others that lacked sufficient specificity. The court also refused to instruct the jury on the defendant's right to use force to defend his home and property under state law, which permitted justifiable homicide when necessary to prevent a forcible attack or invasion of one's dwelling.

The appellate court identified several errors. First, while vague assignments of error in a motion for new trial are generally too indefinite to warrant review, the court found that the trial judge committed reversible error by refusing properly framed written requests to charge. Specifically, the judge should have instructed the jury on the defendant's right to order a trespasser from his home and the circumstances under which such an order, combined with prior conflicts, could inform whether the defendant lawfully defended his property and person.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether refusal to instruct jury on justifiable homicide in defense of home and property constituted reversible error
Procedural requirements for requests to charge the jury
Relevance of prior quarrels and warnings to defendant's right to exclude trespasser from his home

Procedural posture

Defendant appealed from a conviction for murder after the trial court denied his motion for a new trial, which raised challenges to the jury instructions.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Hutcheson, Justice.

1. A ground of a motion for new trial, after conviction for murder, that the court did not instruct “the jury on the law of voluntary manslaughter,” and “failed to submit to the jury the issue als to whether or not defendant was guilty of the offense of voluntary manslaughter,” is too vague and indefinite an assignment of error to raise any question for determination by this court. Smith v. State, 125 Ga. 300 (54 S. E. 124); Spence v. Morrow, 128 Ga. 722 (58 S. E. 356); Burney v. State, 142 Ga. 812 (83 S. E. 937); Livingston v. State, 148 Ga. 686 (97 S. E. 854); Wilson v. State, 156 Ga. 42 (118 S. E. 427); Burley v. State, 158 Ga. 849 (3) (124 S. E. 532); Harris v. State, 178 Ga. 746 (3) (174 S. E. 240); Parham v. State, 180 Ga. 233 (2) (178 S. E. 648); Bryant v. State, 180 Ga. 238 (178 S. E. 651).

2. A request to charge the jury must be perfect in form; and it is not perfect when an inference is required to make it correct. There is no error in refusing such a request. Scroggs v. State, 147 Ga. 737 (3) (95 S. E. 226); Head v. Bridges, 67 Ga. 227 (4); Carter v. Brown, 4 Ga. App. 238, 241 (61 S. E. 142). The request, in the present case, that the court “charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter, on the theory that the deceased was proposing to fight defendant,” falls within the above rule.

3. The court did not err in refusing the oral requests to charge. Requests to charge should be in writing (Code, § 81-1101), and there is no exception to the rule that a refusal to give an oral request to charge is not ground for a new trial. Shedden v. Stiles, 121 Ga. 637 (49 S. E. 719); Johnston v. Gulledge, 115 Ga. 981 (42 S. E. 354).

4. The Code, § 26-1013, declares: “If. after persuasion, remonstrance, or other gentle measures used, a forcible attack and invasion on the property or habitation of another can not be prevented, it shall be justifiable homicide to kill the person so forcibly attacking and invading the property or habitation of another; but it must appear that such killing was absolutely necessary to prevent such attack and invasion, and that a serious injury was intended, or might accrue to the person, property, or family of the person killing.” In view of the evidence and the defendant’s statement, the above principle was applicable to the present case; and the court erred in refusing timely written requests to give the following in charge to the jury: “I charge you that any previous fuss or quarrel between the deceased and the defendant, if you find that they had had a previous fuss or quarrel, would not justify the defendant in killing the deceased; but you will ascertain as to whether or not the defendant had told the deceased not to come back to his place. If in fact the deceased and the defendant had quarreled and fussed at some previous time, and if because of that fact the defendant had told or ordered the deceased not to return to his place, then you should consider these circumstances in determining whether or not the defendant had a right to order deceased to leave on the Sunday evening the killing occurred, if you find the defendant did order him to leave on said occasion.” And “If this killing took place at the home of the defendant, then I charge you that he had the right to request the deceased to leave when the deceased first arrived at said place, provided he did this in. a • reasonable -manner. When the defendant wak in his own home he had the right to forbid deceased from coming into his home, even if there had been no bad feeling or trouble between them prior to this time; and if defendant did request deceased to leave, and not to come in, it was the duty of deceased to do so.”

No. 11702.

May 14, 1937.

Joe M. Lang, for plaintiff in error.

M. J. Yeomans, attorney-general, J. H. Pas chalí and John 0. Mitchell, solicitors-general, P. J. Glower, and 0. PL. Dulces, contra.

5. The judge erred in overruling the motion for new trial.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur.