Brown v. The State

Supreme Court of Georgia1937-04-14No. No. 11728

184 Ga. 305

Summary · law.co

Holding. The trial court properly refused the defendant's requested jury instruction seeking to negate the presumption of malice, because the defendant's self-defense explanation was coupled with an admission of robbery that itself indicated malice. The judgment was affirmed.

When a defendant admits to killing someone with a deadly weapon, the law ordinarily presumes malice. However, this presumption does not automatically apply if the defendant offers an explanation that could negate malice, such as claiming self-defense. A trial judge should generally grant a timely written jury instruction requesting this qualification, even if the judge has already correctly instructed the jury on the state's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This exception to the malice presumption does not apply, however, when the defendant's exculpatory explanation is accompanied by other admitted facts that themselves demonstrate malice.

In this case, the trial judge properly refused the defendant's requested instruction about the presumption of malice. The defendant's self-defense claim was coupled with his admission that he had robbed the deceased at the time of the homicide—a fact indicating malice. The judge had not charged the general malice presumption rule in the first instance, had fairly instructed the jury on murder, manslaughter, and justifiable homicide, and had properly presented the defendant's self-defense theory while maintaining that the presumption of innocence remained with the defendant throughout trial unless guilt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a presumption of malice arises when a defendant admits a deadly weapon killing but offers an exculpatory explanation
Whether a trial judge errs in refusing a requested instruction negating the malice presumption when additional facts admitted by the defendant indicate malice
Whether the trial court's charge on murder, manslaughter, justifiable homicide, and the presumption of innocence was proper

Procedural posture

The defendant appealed a murder conviction without recommendation, challenging the trial judge's refusal to grant a requested jury instruction regarding the presumption of malice.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Jenkins, Justice.

1. If the accused admits the killing with a deadly weapon, a presumption of malice will ordinarily thereupon arise, but such is not the ease where he adds an exculpatory explanation which might negative malice. Accordingly, where the judge has given in charge to the jury such general rule- as to the presumption of malice, it would ordinarily be error to refuse a timely written request embodying the qualification thereto that such admission with such an explanation would not create a presumption that the accused was actuated by malice; and this is true even though the charge may have correctly instructed the jury that the burden of proof was upon the State to prove every material allegation of the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. Futch v. State, 90 Ga. 472 (8), 480 (16 S. E. 102); Manning v. State, 153 Ga. 184 (2), 196 (111 S. E. 658); Gordon v. State, 163 Ga. 388, 399 (136 S. E. 144); Ricketson v. State, 134 Ga. 306 (67 S. E. 881); Green v. State, 124 Ga. 343 (4), 348 (52 S. E. 431); Mann v. State, 124 Ga. 760 (53 S. E. 324, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 934); Perkins v. State, 124 Ga. 6 (52 S. E. 17); Delk v. State, 135 Ga. 312 (69 S. E. 541, Ann. Cas. 1912A. 105); Hudgins v. State, 2 Ga. 188. The rule just stated would not have effect, however, where, as here, the exculpatory explanation is itself accompanied by additional admissions of facts which themselves indicate the existence of malice.

2. Accordingly, it was not error to refuse a request to charge, by which the defendant sought to be relieved from the presumption of malice, where, as in the instant case, the request to charge not only embodied the defendant’s statement to the jury wherein he admitted the killing under circumstances of self-defense, but also embodied a previous statement, made before the trial, in which the defendant admitted the killing under the same contention of self-defense, but further admitted that at the time of the homicide he had committed a robbery by taking the pocket-book and money of tile deceased. Especially would the refusal to charge such exception to the general rule as to the presumption of malice not be error, where, under the particular facts governing the request in this case, the judge had not charged the general rule that a presumption of malice will ordinarily arise upon the proof of the homicide, and where it appears that he correctly and fairly charged the law of murder, voluntary manslaughter, and justifiable homicide, gave proper instruction as to the statement of the accused, with the full benefit of his contention that the killing was in self-defense, and charged that the presumption of innocence in his favor remained with him throughout the triad until his guilt was established beyond all reasonable doubt.

No. 11728.

April 14, 1937.

3. The evidence supported the verdict of murder, without recommendation.

Judgment (affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except

Russell, Chief Justice, who took no part in the opinion or the judgment.

Henry Q. Howard, for plaintiff in error.

M. J. Yeomans, attorney-general, George Sains, solicitor-general, E. J. Glower, and Dame M. Pa/rker, contra.