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STATE v. DEONE CARLE BAILEY AND DONALD EUGENE BESTE

Minnesota Supreme Court1951-11-30No. No. 35,476
235 Minn. 204

Summary

Holding. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the victim's identification testimony was properly submitted to the jury and sufficiently supported the guilty verdict, and that the trial court properly rejected the defendants' proposed jury instructions regarding the absence of the blood-stained shirt and the weight of circumstantial evidence.

Two defendants were convicted of first-degree grand larceny after attacking and robbing a man on a St. Paul street in the early morning hours. The victim testified that he was jumped from behind by two men who beat him, and he identified the defendants as his attackers. Police apprehended the defendants shortly after receiving a radio description, found them wearing clothing consistent with the victim's description, discovered one defendant had cuts on his hands and wore a blood-stained shirt, and located the victim's wallet and identification papers near a house to which the defendants directed officers.

The defendants challenged the conviction on several grounds, arguing that the victim's identification was unreliable due to darkness at the crime scene and an error in the victim's testimony about distance from the corner. They also requested that the court instruct the jury that the state's failure to introduce the blood-stained shirt as evidence suggested it would not have helped the prosecution. The court rejected these contentions and permitted the case to proceed with both direct evidence of identification and circumstantial evidence.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Sufficiency of eyewitness identification evidence under low-light conditions
  • Whether trial court must instruct jury to infer missing evidence favors the defendant
  • Proper instructions on the weight of circumstantial evidence when direct evidence exists
  • Admissibility and weight of corroborating physical evidence

Procedural posture

The defendants appealed their conviction for grand larceny in the first degree from the district court for Ramsey County.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Loring, Chief Justice.

Defendants were convicted in the district court for Ramsey county of the crime of grand larceny in the first degree. Appeal was taken from the judgments.

At the trial, the prosecuting witness testified that he was attacked and robbed as he was walking west on College avenue in St. Paul from Wabasha street toward St. Peter street. It was about one o’clock in the morning of July 28, 1950. The witness testified that it was dark but not cloudy. At the intersection of Wabasha street and College avenue there are four street lights, but only two are left burning all night. Testimony in the record is to the effect that there is no light in the middle of the block on College avenue, but that there are lights at the intersection of St. Peter street and College avenue.

The witness testified that the attack took place about 15 or 20 feet from the corner of Wabasha street and College avenue near a driveway west of the St. Paul City Railway Company building. An employe of the St. Paul department of public works testified that this driveway is over 90 feet from the intersection.

The prosecuting witness testified that as he was walking two men jumped on him from behind; that one held him while the other slugged him; and that they continued beating him until he pretended to be knocked out. He said:

“A. I know he wore dark clothes. I looked at him so long from his slugging me; I had to recognize him.

“Q. Did the first man, Beste, strike you at all?

“A. Only when they had me down on the ground, it was all hands and feet and fists, and I don’t know who was kicking and hitting me.”

The witness had not known defendants prior to the time of the crime, but he testified that one of the men was wearing dark trousers and a yellow T shirt, and that the other wore dark clothes. After the crime, the witness went to the public safety building, where he gave the police a description of the two men. At the trial, the witness pointed out the defendants as the .persons who committed the crime.

A police officer testified that he picked up the defendants the morning of the crime, after he had received a police radio broadcast describing the criminals. He said that defendants were both wearing T shirts and dark trousers; that one of the shirts was spattered with blood; and that one of the defendants had cuts on his hands. A detective lieutenant of the police force testified that the bloody shirt was returned to defendant to wear.

Other police officers testified that the defendants directed them to a house in front of which a billfold and identification papers, taken from the victim, were found in a clump of weeds, knee-high or a little higher. A 13-year-old boy testified that he had pulled the weeds from in front of the house a few days to a week and a half after July á and that only a few little weeds were left. A witness who lived in the house testified that there were some weeds left and indicated their height to the jury, saying, “About so high.”

In their assignments of error, defendants urge that the verdicts are not sustained by the evidence. It is contended that, because the night was dark and because the prosecuting witness testified erroneously as to the distance from the corner, his testimony and identification were not worthy of belief.

The testimony of the prosecuting witness identifying defendants was properly submitted to the jury. Courts are liberal in deciding whether such testimony is sufficient to uphold a conviction. See, e. g., State v. Findling, 123 Minn. 413, 144 N. W. 142, 49 L.R.A. (N.S.) 449; State v. Mason, 152 Minn. 306, 189 N. W. 452; State v. Farmer, 179 Minn. 516, 229 N. W. 789. Defendants requested an instruction as to the credibility of the prosecuting witness. The court charged as follows: “The defense contends that Mr. Duerr is mistaken in his identification of defendants.” Defendants could not reasonably ask for more.

Defendants contend that the court should have instructed the jury that it was the duty of the state to produce all the evidence in its possession, and that from any inferred failure to produce evidence the jury should reason that such evidence would not have helped the state’s case. Defendants cite no authority for this rule, and we find none. Rather, it would seem that such instruction would be improper for a court to make.

In this connection, defendants urge that the state should have introduced the blood-stained shirt in evidence. A police force detective testified that the shirt was returned to one of the defendants so that he would have something to wear. This was not refuted.

The credibility of the testimony as to the finding of the wallet was properly for the jury to decide.

Defendants contend that the court should have given an instruction on the weight to be given the circumstantial evidence. Where there is direct evidence of guilt, as well as circumstantial evidence, in the absence of a request, it is not error to omit such a charge. State v. Colcord, 170 Minn. 504, 212 N. W. 894.

The following proposed instruction, refused by the court, was the only one offered concerning circumstantial evidence:

“If any theory or hypothesis of the State is as consistent with innocence as with guilt, then you are to give the defendants the benefit since the State must prove the guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and under those circumstances, you should bring in a verdict of not guilty.”

This request to charge was properly denied because there was sufficient direct evidence to justify a verdict of guilty, and the requested instruction directed a verdict of not guilty if any part of the circumstantial evidence was found to be consistent with innocence. Blanton v. United States (8 Cir.) 213 F. 320, 326; cf. State v. Grunewald, 211 Minn. 74, 300 N. W. 206; State v. Schueller, 120 Minn. 26, 138 N. W. 937.

The judgments are affirmed, and the sentences imposed by the district court are ordered executed.