OPINION OF THE COURT
ROSENN, Circuit Judge.
This appeal raises questions concerning the guidelines formulated by this court in United States v. Barber, 442 F. 2d 517 (3d Cir. 1971), for jury instructions on identification. Appellant, Claude Lamott Wilford, Jr., was tried to a jury and convicted of one count of unlawful distribution of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He was sentenced to a term of eight years plus a special parole term of three years. On appeal, he contends that the failure of the trial judge to specifically instruct the jury on eyewitness identification constitutes reversible error. We affirm.
On the afternoon of December 18, 1972, Agents Britt and Malloy of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and James Vaughn, a paid Government informer, met and formulated plans to purchase narcotics from an individual known to Vaughn as “La-mott” living at 2606 Bowers Street, Wilmington, Delaware. About 5:15 that afternoon, after searching Vaughn to assure that he had no narcotics or money on his person, the agents provided Vaughn with $40 and drove him to a housing project located near the intersection of 24th and Bowers Streets. The two agents remained in the car and observed Vaughn as he walked to 2606 Bowers Street, knocked on the front door, and talked to a man at the doorway. The agents then observed Vaughn leave the residence and return to the car where he turned over four glassine packages containing white powder. Field testing and chemical analysis showed that the substance was heroin. Wilford was arrested on January 4, 1973, and tried on May 4.
On direct examination Vaughn testified that on two or three prior occasions he had purchased narcotics from Wilford. He- positively identified Wilford in court as the person from whom he purchased narcotics on December 18. Vaughn further testified that he purchased the narcotics as he and Wilford stood in the open doorway of the Bowers Street residence, after Wilford came downstairs in response to his knock.
During the transaction, Agents Britt and Malloy remained in the parked car, approximately 150-200 feet from the Bowers Street residence. Although both testified that they observed two men at the doorway and could identify one as Vaughn, neither was able to positively identify the individual with whom Vaughn was talking. Malloy, however, testified that just prior to his observations of the two men at the doorway he saw a Negro male leaning out of a second floor window of the residence. Mal-loy definitely identified the individual as Wilford and he adhered to this positive identification on cross-examination.
Wilford took the stand in defense. He admitted that he, together with his mother, two brothers and a sister, lived at 2606 Bowers Street. He denied, however, ever having met or seen James Vaughn prior to his arrest on January 4. In addition, he denied that he sold Vaughn anything on December 18 or at any time. Although he did not deny that he could have been at his residence on December 18, he testified that he could not recall where he was at that time. Concerning Malloy’s positive identification at the second story window, Wilford asserted that screens on the window prevented him from looking out and that even had he leaned out, poor lighting at the housing project would have made identification impossible.
Relying on our recent decision in United States v. Barber, Wilford’s sole assignment of error is the trial court’s failure to sua sponte instruct the jury that identification testimony should be “received with caution and scrutinized with care.” He maintains that the evidence introduced on that issue, the testimony of Vaughn and Malloy, failed to meet the four criteria outlined in Barber. . Under such circumstances, he contends that under Barber, the trial court was compelled, on its own motion and absent a request, to give an appropriate cautionary instruction.
In Barber we dealt with a special set of facts. Seven defendants were charged in four counts of an indictment with assaulting FBI agents, conspiring to commit such assaults, and assisting a federal prisoner to escape from custody. Fifteen men had approached the two FBI agents, Snyder and Grant, and three to four persons had assaulted each agent. Thus, the confusion surrounding the short-lived episode could easily result in misidentification. Many of the eyewitnesses were unclear as to what had occurred and were often self-contradictory. As Judge Aldisert noted:
An affray of such short duration, involving so many participants, affords but limited opportunities for witnesses to observe and to make positive identifications.
442 F.2d 525. Our concern in Barber was with the crucial problem of mistaken identification — a problem which is frequently presented when the prosecution relies on eyewitness testimony to establish the identity of the defendant. We noted the often “skeletal” instructions given on this question and sought to insure that where appropriate, cautionary instructions should focus the jury’s attention to the possibility of mistaken identification with sufficient particularity. To achieve this goal, we took occasion, under our supervisory power, to provide trial courts with guidelines that were “require [d]” to be satisfied when cautionary instructions were given.
We first address the contention that Barber requires a cautionary jury charge even absent a request from counsel. We do not read Barber to require this result. Barber involved a case where a specific charge was requested. In that context we stated that instructions with sufficient particularity were required. We did not direct, as Wilford here contends, that in every case, even absent a request, such instructions are required. Our inquiry, therefore, is limited to the question of whether the trial court’s failure to sua sponte instruct the jury that the testimony concerning identification should be “received with caution and scrutinized with <?are” constitutes plain error. F.R. Crim. P. 52(b).
In the case sub judice, the issue of good faith mistake in identification did not play such a central role that the failure to give cautionary instructions requires reversal. The identification of Wilford by the Government’s central witness Vaughn clearly met the four criteria outlined in Barber, and accordingly, required no’ cautionary instruction. The thrust of Wilford’s cross-examination of Vaughn, moreover, was directed not to Vaughn’s inability to observe the seller or remember the transaction but rather to Vaughn’s basic credibility. The cross-examination developed that at the time of the alleged transaction Vaughn was a paid informer compensated by Government agents for “useful information,” that he was a heroin addict, and that he was obtaining funds from his activities with the Government as a means of feeding his drug habit. The court accordingly cautioned the jury that the testimony of the informer must be examined and weighed with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness. The suggestion that Vaughn was not worthy of belief and had strong motivation to lie, reinforced by Wilford’s denial of the sale, was the central and crucial issue in the case.
The contrast to that of Vaughn, Malloy’s testimony concerning his identification of Wilford at the second story window and uncertain identification at the door did raise an issue of the possibility of mistaken identification. Both in his cross-examination of Malloy and in his testimony on direct examination, Wilford raised questions concerning Malloy’s opportunity to observe the figure at the second floor. Malloy’s testimony, however, was not persuasive standing alone. At best, it merely placed Wilford on the premises near the time of the sale and provided some slight support for the credibility of Vaughn on the crucial point of the identity of the man at the door. The issue of mistaken identification, therefore, was at most tangential to the central question in the case, i. e., Vaughn’s credibility. We do not believe that under such circumstances the failure of the trial judge on his own motion to give special cautionary instructions on the issue of mistaken identification was reversible error.
We share the concern expressed by Judge Adams in his dissent on the shortcomings of eyewitness identification testimony. We do not minimize “the vagaries of eyewitness identification” or the hazards such testimony often raises. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967). When convictions obviously turn on the testimony of eyewitnesses who are uncertain, unclear, or inconsistent, the difficulties raised by such evidence are manifest. In such circumstances, a cautionary instruction will help to obviate the danger of erroneous conviction.
The dissent apparently believes that an identification charge should have been given in the case sub judice because Malloy’s testimony may have strengthened the Government’s case in the minds of the jury. As we have indicated, we believe that when the Government’s case rests chiefly on the credibility of an actual party to the alleged transaction, and at best only minimally on the identification testimony of another witness, absent a request by counsel, the failure to give a cautionary identification instruction does not constitute plain error.
The facts of every case vary, and the spectrum of the identification issue may range from the obvious to the obscure. In view of the many variations of fact and circumstance which must be considered in determining whether a special cautionary instruction should be given, we are reluctant to impose the responsibility for making this determination upon the trial judge. This is and should remain the responsibility of defense counsel. Counsel knows his case, his witnesses, and his strategy. He should have the duty to alert the court to the identification issue, especially when the issue is less than obvious. To hold that it is plain error to fail to give a special charge in the circumstances of this or similar cases would only encourage lethargy on the part of counsel, and would permit counsel to sow the seeds of error by remaining mute until after the verdict is returned.
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed.
. Britt stated that he “couldn’t positively identify the individual on the steps.” Mal-loy’s testimony as to the episode on the steps was somewhat more equivocal. Malloy testified on direct examination :
Q. . . . [w]hy don’t you state in your own words what you saw at the door of 2606 Bowers?
A. Well, as I said, the next time we saw Mr. Vaughn or anybody else was maybe thirty seconds later at the door of 2606. It was Mr. Vaughn and a Negro man, who had the physical appearances of Mr. Wilford.
I couldn’t see his face clearly so I cannot be absolutely sure if it was him. It appeared to be to me, but it was too dark at the doorway to get a clear look at his face.
On cross-examination Malloy testified:
A. . . . Down at the doorway I couldn’t see his face. All I saw was the physical shape, I guess you would say. There wasn’t enough light in the doorway to be able to see his face.
Q. So that what you are saying is the figure that was in the door you cannot identify.
A. Right. The figure in the door I cannot definitely say was Mr. Wilford.
. Q. You stated that when Mr. Vaughn first rang the bell you saw a face, I believe, at the second—
A. Yes. An individual leaned out of the second story window at the 2606 address. It was a Negro male that leaned out of the window.
Q. Do you see in the courtroom today the individual who leaned out of the window?
A. Yes sir. It is the defendant, Claude Lamott Wilford.
Q. Is there any question in your mind about the identity of this individual?
A. No. That is the individual that was at the window.
. Q. [Defense Counsel] : Now, how much of a figure did you see?jn the window?
A. Leaning out the window, from about the chest level up.
Q. And you are absolutely sure that that person was Mr. Wilford.
A. Yes sir. It was Mr. Wilford. I could see his face. There are street lights up and down both streets and there are, what I would call, lights in through this walkway. I don’t know exactly where they are, but it is lighted so that when the window was open and he was leaning out, there was light from both behind him and you could see the windows.
. Wilford cites the following language from B wrier:
In any case raising the question whether the defendant was in fact the criminal actor, the jury will be instructed to resolve any conflict or uncertainty on the issue of identification. The jury will be instructed that identification may be made through the perception of any of the witness’ senses, and that it is not essential that the witness himself be free from doubt as to the correctness of his opinion. The identification testimony may be treated by the jury as a statement of fact by the witness : (1) if the witness had the opportunity to observe the accused; (2) if the witness is positive in his identification; (3) if the witness’ identification testimony is not weakened by prior failure to identify or by prior inconsistent identification; and (4) if, after cross-examination, his testimony remains positive and unqualified. In the absence of any one of these four conditions, however, the jury will be admonished by the court that the witness’ testimony as to identity must be received with caution and scrutinized with care. The burden of proof on the prosecution extends to every element of the crime charged, including the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime for which he stands charged.
442 F.2d at 528.
. The appellant urged in United States v. Barber “that the entangled circumstances of this case compelled a more exacting charge to underscore the critical nature of the identification issue — the commingling of participants and passersby in the vortex of a sudden mob scene rendered arduous and crucial the task of determining who did what to whom.” 442 F.2d at 525.
. An examination of the trial record does not reveal, nor does Wilford’s counsel on appeal argue, that a request for such a cautionary instruction was made. We note that at the conclusion of his charge the trial judge asked counsel whether there was any objection to the charge as given. Wilford’s counsel responded, “No, sir.”
. Because the trial court in Barber had relied on prior decisions holding that the trial court is under no obligation to grant a defendant’s request for an instruction emphasizing the possibilities of mistake in identification, see United States v. Moss, 410 F.2d 386 (3d Cir. 1969), we held that the refusal to give the requested instruction did not require reversal in that case.
. We did state in Barber, as Wilford points out,
In any case raising the question whether the defendant was in fact the criminal actor, the jury will be instructed to resolve any conflict or uncertainty on the issue of identification.
442 F.2d at 528. However, this sentence does not require the construction that Wilford urges upon us. Implicit is the notion that the jury “will be instructed” only where the question is appropriately “raised” both by the testimony in the case and by a request from counsel. See United States v. McCarthy, 301 F.2d 796, 803 (3d Cir. 1962). To the same effect is our reference to “mandatory jury instructions” in United States ex rel. Reed v. Anderson, 461 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1972).
Similarly, in Barber we wrote:
Where identity is placed in issue, the trial court is required to charge the jury on this high degree of proof. United States v. Levi, 405 F.2d 380 (4 Cir. 1968) ; Jones v. United States, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 83, 361 F.2d 537 (1966) ; Gregory v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 140, 369 F.2d 185, 190-191 (1966).
442 F.2d at 527 n. 16. However, neither that sentence nor the cases cited to support it appear to require an instruction absent a request. In both Levi and Jones the court indicated that if requested a special charge should he given. Gregory, which reversed on other grounds, did not decide this point.
The case of Macklin v. United States, 133 U.S.App.D.C. 139, 409 F.2d 174 (1969), cited by Wilford, was decided by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia under its supervisory power and was not cited by this court in Barber.
. Wilford argues that “identification” was the sole issue in the case, chiefly because the only contested issue was his participation in the transaction. “Identification” in the sense in which Wilford uses it here refers to the broad aspect of “identification,” that is, the identity of the criminal actor. This question is present in every case unless the defendant chooses to admit participation in the act and plead an affirmative defense. Although not as clearly as the charge given in United States v. Telfaire, 152 U.S.App.D.C. 146, 469 F.2d 552 (1972), the charge given here, read as a whole, sufficiently directed the jury’s attention to the Government’s burden of proving this broad aspect of “identification,” that the defendant was the criminal actor, beyond a reasonable doubt. The court stated, for example:
The defendant here has been charged in a one-count indictment with a crime of distributing heroin ....
% .i¡ % %
In order to meet the burden of proof under the indictment, the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following three essential elements: One, that the defendant distributed the substance; two, that the substance, in this case, was heroin; and three, that the distribution was done knowingly and intentionally.
* * * * *
If the Government fails to prove all of the three essential elements of the charge, then you, must acquit the defendant of the charge. [Emphasis supplied.]
Our reference in the text is to the somewhat narrower aspect of “identification,” the possibility of good faith mistake in identifying an individual due to faulty perception or recollection. It was this narrower aspect of “identification,” present in some, but not all cases where the Government must prove the identity of the defendant as the criminal actor, see United States v. Cary, 152 U.S.App.D.C. 321, 470 F.2d 469 (1972) ; Comm. v. Johnson, 433 Pa. 34, 248 A.2d 840, 842 (1969), which was the central concern of this court in Barber.
. Both in his brief and at oral argument, Wilford’s counsel argued that because Vaughn initially referred to Wilford as “La-mott” or “Lamott Williams” rather than Claude Lamott Wilford, his courtroom identification was unreliable. While this may indicate lack of close familiarity with Wilford, it does not indicate an inability to recall the physical identity of the individual from whom Vaughn allegedly purchased drugs on this and three prior occasions.
Wilford additionally argues that Vaughn’s in-court identification required a cautionary instruction because Vaughn was shown three photographs after the alleged purchase. Vaughn did not testify on direct examination to the photographic identification. It came out in the cross-examination of Agent Mal-loy. Trial counsel neither requested discovery of the photographs nor objected to the pre-trial or in-court identification. The pho tographs were not offered in evidence and are not in the record on appeal. Wilford’s contention is without merit absent substantiation in the record that the witness was unable to identify the defendant at the pretrial procedure, see United States v. Barber, supra, 442 F.2d at 528 (criterion 3), or that the identification procedure was “suggestive.”
. The court charged :
Now, a word about the testimony of Mr. Vaughn, who was an informer.
The testimony of an informer who provides useful information against a defendant for pay must be examined and weighed by the jury with greater care than the testimony of an ordinary witness, because the jury must determine whether the informer’s testimony has been affected by his interest or by his prejudice against the defendant.
. See note 1 supra.
. Because there was no request we need not decide whether, had a request been made, a failure to grant a request in this case would constitute harmless error.