Palmer et al. v. Atwood et al., trustees

Supreme Court of Georgia1939-05-09No. No. 12775

188 Ga. 99

Summary · law.co

Holding. The deed conveyed a life estate to the grantor's wife and children with remainder to the grandchildren or their representatives, who take absolute fee ownership. The judgment was affirmed.

This case involves the interpretation of a property deed dated August 4, 1866, that conveyed land to named trustees for the benefit of the grantor's wife and children for their lifetimes, with the property to pass to the grantor's grandchildren or their representatives upon the death of the wife and children. The plaintiffs argued that language in the deed created a fee-tail estate, which would vest absolute ownership in the wife. The court rejected this argument, holding that the deed's clear language limited the wife and children to a life estate only, and the rule against fee-tails was not implicated because a life estate is not an estate of inheritance.

Under Georgia law, courts must interpret property conveyances to give effect to the grantor's intent while respecting lawful limitations on estates. Because the deed expressly limited the estate to the wife and children "for life," the court was bound to honor that limitation and could not expand it into an absolute fee merely because the grantor may have used language associated with fee-tail conveyances. The grandchildren therefore took the property as absolute owners upon the death of the life-estate holders.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether language of entailment in a conveyance creates a fee-tail or absolute title despite express limitation to life estate
Whether a life estate with remainder violates the rule against fee-tail estates
Proper construction of property conveyances to reflect the grantor's intent regarding duration and succession of estates

Procedural posture

The trial judge directed a verdict in favor of the defendants, which the plaintiffs appealed.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Duckworth, Justice.

1. A grant to A and the heirs of his body, or his heirs by a particular person, or his issue, and similar expressions, conveys the absolute fee to A. Code, § 85-505; Craig v. Ambrose, 80 Ga. 134 (4 S. E. 1); Griffin v. Stewart, 101 Ga. 720 (29 S. E. 29); McCraw v. Webb, 134 Ga. 579 (2) (68 S. E. 324); Stamey v. McGinnis, 145 Ga. 226 (88 S. E. 935).

2. A grant to A and B for life, with remainder to a named person or class of persons, does not violate the rule against fee-tail estates. Ewing v. Shropshire, 80 Ga. 374 (7 S. E. 554); Rainey v. Spence, 185 Ga. 763 (196 S. E. 416), and cit.

3. “Every conveyance, properly executed, shall be construed to convey the fee, unless a less estate is mentioned and limited in such conveyance. If a less estate is expressly limited, the courts shall not, by construction, increase such estate into a fee, but, disregarding all technical rules, shall give effect to the intention of the maker of the instrument, as far as the same is lawful, if the same can (m gathered from its contents; and if not, the court may hear parol evidence to prove the intention.” Code, § 85-503. Where property was conveyed to named persons in trust for the use of the wife of the grantor “ and, her children by said ” grantor, “for life,” and on their decease to grantor/s grandchildren or their representatives, it is clear that the grantor intended to expressly limit the estate granted to the wife and children to a life-estate; and the courts must give effect to that intention, if the property could legally be so conveyed. It is contended that the grantor used words of entailment when he conveyed the property to his wife “and her children by said” grantor for life, and therefore vested absolute title in the wife. Even assuming that the words used were words of entailment, there is no merit in this contention. A fee-tail is an estate of inheritance; and since the estate granted to the wife “and her children by the said” grantor was expressly limited to a life-estate, which is not an estate of inheritance, the rule against fee-tails was not violated. Story v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 115 Fla. 436 (156 So. 101, 107); 1 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (Rawle’s 3d ed.), 1200; 19 Am. Jur. 507, § 47.

4. Where by a deed dated August 4, 1866, a grant of property was made to named persons in trust for the use of the wife of the grantor “and her children by said” grantor, for life, “and on their decease to such child or children or representative of child or children as his said children may leave in life,” such deed conveyed a life-estate to the wife and children of grantor, with remainder to the grandchildren of grantor or their representatives, as the case may be, who take as purchasers the absolute fee. It follows that tbe verdict directed by the judge was not erroneous for any reason assigned.

No. 12775.

May 9, 1939.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

Tyson <& Tyson, for plaintiffs.

Pchuin A. Cohen and Paul J. Varner, for defendants.