Shafer v. The State

Supreme Court of Georgia1941-03-15No. No. 13480

191 Ga. 722

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment was reversed because the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the law of voluntary manslaughter as based on mutual combat, even though the evidence presented a jury question on whether the defendant and the deceased engaged in a rencounter with mutual intention to fight.

The defendant was charged with killing a police officer in his home in December 1939. At trial, the state introduced evidence of a threat the defendant made in 1936 against police officers and evidence that he possessed multiple firearms and ammunition. The trial court admitted both categories of evidence, and the defendant was convicted. On appeal, the defendant challenged the admissibility of these evidence categories and argued the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on mutual combat.

The court held that the 1936 threat was admissible and relevant because the victim identified himself as a police officer before the killing, allowing the jury to infer the threat related to police officers generally. Similarly, evidence of the defendant's weapons and ammunition was properly admitted to show his intent, state of mind, and purpose. However, the court found a significant instructional error: although the evidence could support a finding that the parties engaged in a mutual combat scenario with a mutual intention to fight, the trial judge failed to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter under that specific theory, instead providing only a general charge on voluntary manslaughter.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Admissibility of prior threats made years before the homicide
Admissibility of evidence regarding defendant's possession of firearms and ammunition
Proper jury instructions on voluntary manslaughter in mutual combat scenarios
Whether evidence supported a mutual combat theory despite the victim being a police officer

Procedural posture

The defendant appealed his conviction following denial of his motion for a new trial.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Bell, Justice.

1. Although the killing occurred in December, 1939, the evidence relating to a threat made by the defendant in 1936, as set forth in the motion for a new trial, was not inadmissible on the ground of remoteness; nor was the evidence irrelevant, it appearing that the person slain was a police officer and that he so informed the defendant before he was killed, and the jury being authorized to infer that the threat so made by the defendant related to police officers as a class. Nor was the evidence subject to objection for other, reason urged. See McDaniel v. State, 100 Ga. 67 (27 S. E. 158) ; Willingham v. State, 169 Ga. 142 (5) (149 S. E. 887); Ethridge v. State, 163 Ga. 186 (5) (136 S. E. 72); Frank v. State, 141 Ga. 243 (2) (80 S. E. 1016); Williams v. State, 152 Ga. 498 (110 S. E. 286).

2. The evidence relating to possession by the defendant of several guns and pistols, a cartridge belt, and ammunition was admissible for the limited purpose to which the judge in his charge restricted it, that is, for the purpose of “showing, if it does, the intent, scheme, design, purpose, and state of mind of the defendant.” Burgess v. State, 93 Ga. 304 (4) (20 S. E. 331); Crumbly v. State, 141 Ga. 17 (80 S. E. 281); People v. Dale, 355 Ill. 330 (189 N. E. 269) ; 30 C. J. 160, § 376.

3. If a person kills “in self-defense, or in defense of habitation, property, or person, against one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony on either; or against any persons who manifestly intend and endeavor, in a riotous and tumultuous manner, to enter the habitation of another for the purpose of assaulting or offering personal violence to any person dwelling or being therein,” such homicide is justifiable. Code, § 26-1011. If the killing be not under the circumstances just stated, or other circumstances of justification (Code, §§ 26-1011 to 26-1017), but in the course of a rencounter in which the participants engage with a mutual intention to fight, the offense may be voluntary manslaughter as related to mutual combat. If the evidence, as distinguished from the prisoner’s statement before the jury, authorizes an inference that the killing occurred in the circumstances last mentioned, it is the duty of the judge, even without request, to give in charge the law of voluntary manslaughter as related to mutual combat. Bailey v. State, 148 Ga. 401 (96 S. E. 862) ; Ison v. State, 154 Ga. 408 (114 S. E. 351).

4. Although in this ease the deceased was a police officer, and the killing occurred in the home of the defendant, in the circumstances shown by the evidence it was a question for the jury as to whether they engaged in the rencounter with a mutual intention to fight. The judge charged the jury generally upon the subject of voluntary manslaughter, but omitted to charge the law of that offense as based upon the theory of mutual combat or mutual intention to fight. Such omission was erroneous, and for this reason a new trial should have been granted. Waller v. State, 100 Ga. 320 (28 S. E. 77) ; Hart v. State, 135 Ga. 356 (69 S. E. 530); Wilson v. State, 176 Ga. 198 (2) (167 S. E. 111); Hall v. State, 177 Ga. 794 (4) (171 S. E. 274).

No. 13480.

March 15, 1941.

5. There is no merit in the contention that the charge as given placed upon the defendant the burden of proving that the deceased was the aggressor, and deprived the defendant of the law applicable to mutual combat.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except

dissent opinion

Jenkins and Duckworth,

who dissent from the ruling in the fourth division of the decision.

Howard, Tiller & Howard, for plaintiff in error.

Ellis G. Arnall, attorney-general, John A. Boykin, solicitor-general, J. W. LeCraw, E. E. Andrews, Marshall L. Allison and Victoria Wilbanks, assistant attorneys-general, contra.