CITY OF ABBEVILLE v. RENFROE

Supreme Court of Georgia1941-06-14No. No. 13744

192 Ga. 467

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment granting an interlocutory injunction against criminal prosecution is reversed because courts may not enjoin criminal prosecutions as a general rule, and the present facts do not fall within recognized exceptions to that rule.

The City of Abbeville adopted an ordinance in January 1941 regulating wine sales, including restrictions on business hours between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. After obtaining a retail wine license in February 1941, the plaintiff was convicted of violating the hours provision and fined $50. Fearing repeated prosecutions that would harm his business, he sought a court order to prevent the city from prosecuting him further and to declare the ordinance void. The trial court granted an interlocutory injunction in his favor.

The appellate court reversed, holding that Georgia law generally prohibits courts from using injunctions to stop criminal prosecutions, regardless of whether the underlying ordinance is valid or invalid. The court noted that this case involved only the threat of criminal prosecution and did not present the exceptional circumstances present in prior cases where injunctions had been allowed. The court found no basis for departing from the established rule against enjoining prosecutions.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether an injunction may be issued to restrain threatened criminal prosecutions
Whether an ordinance regulating business hours for wine sales is subject to injunctive challenge
Applicability of exceptions to the general prohibition on enjoining criminal proceedings

Procedural posture

The trial court overruled the city's demurrer and granted an interlocutory injunction on verified pleadings; the city appealed.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Bell, Justice.

The petition alleged that on January 22, 1941, the defendant municipality adopted an ordinance regulating the business of dealing in wine, providing, among other things, that no such place of business should be kept open except between the hours of eight o’clock a. m. and four o’clock p. m. On February 1, 1941, the plaintiff obtained a license from the city for the sale of wine .at retail within the corporate limits, for which he paid a stated license fee. On the same day a case was made against him for a violation of the provision of the ordinance as to hours, and on February ■3 he was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of $50. It was not alleged that he had paid the fine, or that he had applied for a writ of certiorari. He has been advised and believes that he will be prosecuted under said ordinance for each and every time that he heeps his place of business open and sells wine before eight o’clock ■a. m. or after four o’clock p. m. Such repeated prosecutions will injure and destroy his property and property rights and interfere with and destroy his lawful business. He further alleged that the ordinance was void for various reasons stated, and prayed that the ■defendant be enjoined from “arresting or making cases against petitioner for selling wine, or keeping his place of business open after said hour; that said ordinance be declared null and void; that petitioner have such other relief as to the court may seem proper.” The city filed a general and special demurrer, and an answer. The ■court overruled the demurrer, and, after considering the case on the verified pleadings, granted an interlocutory injunction.

1. The case falls within the general rule that injunction will not issue to restrain criminal prosecutions. Accordingly, whether the ordinance be valid or invalid, the court erred in overruling the general demurrer and in granting an interlocutory injunction. Code, § 55-102; Phillips v. Stone Mountain, 61 Ga. 387; Mayor &c. of Moultrie v. Patterson, 109 Ga. 370 (34 S. E. 600); City of Bainbridge v. Reynolds, 111 Ga. 758 (36 S. E. 935); Salter v. Columbus, 125 Ga. 96 (54 S. E. 74); Georgia Railway & Electric Co. v. Oakland City, 129 Ga. 576 (59 S. E. 296); Mayor &c. of Shellman v. Saxon, 134 Ga. 29 (67 S. E. 438, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 452); Mayor &c. of Jonesboro v. Central of Georgia Railway Co., 134 Ga. 190 (67 S. E. 760); Corley v. Atlanta, 181 Ga. 381 (182 S. E. 177); Hodges v. State Revenue Commission, 183 Ga. 832 (190 S. E. 36); Powell v. Hartsfield, 190 Ga. 839 (11 S. E. 2d, 33); Anthony v. Atlanta, 190 Ga. 841 (11 S. E. 2d. 197); City of Atlanta v. Miller, 191 Ga. 767 (13 S. E. 2d, 814).

3. The present case differs materially on its facts from City of Atlanta v. Gate City Gas-Light Co., 71 Ga. 106, 126; Georgia Railroad & Banking Co. v. Atlanta, 118 Ga. 486 (8) (45 S. E. 256); Mayor &c. of Savannah v. Cooper, 131 Ga. 670 (63 S. E. 138); McKown v. Atlanta, 184 Ga. 221 (190 S. E. 571); Walker v. Carrollton, 187 Ga. 237 (200 S. E. 268); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Columbus, 189 Ga. 458 (6 S. E. 2d, 320). In each of these cases there was more than mere criminal prosecution.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Atkinson, P. J., who dissents.