WORTHY v. THE STATE

Supreme Court of Georgia1941-07-09No. No. 13818

192 Ga. 620

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment of conviction is affirmed. The trial court properly admitted the victim's statements as part of the res gestae, and the court did not err in declining to charge the jury on manslaughter.

The defendant was convicted of a crime after the State presented evidence supporting all elements of the charge. The defendant did not call witnesses but testified himself, admitting he caused the killing while claiming he acted in self-defense due to fear of the victim and without intent to kill. The conviction was supported by the evidence presented at trial.

The defendant challenged the admission of statements made by the deceased immediately after the incident—first asking "What did you cut me for?" right after the act, and again about a minute later. The court ruled these statements admissible as part of the res gestae (circumstances surrounding the act) because they occurred so close in time to the event that there was no opportunity for fabrication or planning. The defendant also argued the trial court should have instructed the jury on the lesser offense of manslaughter, but this objection was deemed insufficient and without merit because the defendant failed to specify which form of manslaughter was at issue, and the evidence did not warrant such an instruction in any event.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Admissibility of victim's statements made immediately after the alleged crime as res gestae evidence
Time proximity requirement for declarations to qualify as res gestae under state law
Whether trial court must charge jury on lesser-included offense of manslaughter absent proper request

Procedural posture

The defendant appealed his conviction, raising special grounds challenging the admission of certain testimony and the trial court's failure to instruct on manslaughter.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Duckworth, Justice.

The State’s evidence proved every element of the crime charged in the indictment. The defendant offered no witnesses, and relied on his own statement, in which he admitted the killing and claimed justification because he feared the deceased, and did not intend to kill him. The verdict of guilty is supported by the evidence, and the general grounds of the motion for new trial are without merit.

Special grounds 1 and 2 complain of the court’s overruling motions by defendant’s counsel to exclude testimony of State’s-witnesses, who were present at the place of the crime, that the deceased said, “What did you cut me for?” and that, after walking a distance of from the witness-stand to the court-room window, the deceased turned and walked back and said, “What did he cut me-for?” The ground of objection to this testimony was that the-statements of the deceased were neither dying declarations nor a part of the res gestae, and were prejudicial to the defendant. It is declared in the Code, § 38-305, that “Declarations accompanying an act, or so nearly connected therewith in time as to be free from all suspicion of device or afterthought, shall be admissible in evidence as part of res gestae.” Under this rule the nearness of a declaration to the act in point of time is limited to the extent only that it must be “free from all suspicion of device or afterthought.” The first statement complained of was evidently made instantly after the act, and was addressed to the defendant. The last statement must have been made within about a minute after the act.. In neither case is there ground for suspicion of device or afterthought. Tested by a long chain of decisions of this court, both statements were parts of the res gestae and constituted legal evidence. Mitchum v. State, 11 Ga. 615 (4, 5); Dumas v. State, 65 Ga. 471 (2); Stevenson v. State, 69 Ga. 68 (2); Thornton v. State, 107 Ga. 683 (33 S. E. 673); Cason v. State, 134 Ga. 786 (5) (68 S. E. 554); Mack v. State, 164 Ga. 250 (138 S. E. 153); O’Neal v. State, 172 Ga. 526 (158 S. E. 51); Luke v. State, 184 Ga. 551 (2) (192 S. E. 37). These grounds are without merit.

The remaining ground complains because “the court failed* to charge the law of Georgia on manslaughter, and under the evidence in the case a charge of manslaughter was demanded, and the court erred in failure to charge the statute of the State of Georgia covering manslaughter.” In Troup v. State, 150 Ga. 633 (104 S. E. 421), it was said: “An exception to the charge of the court, on the ground that the presiding judge ‘should have charged the jury the full law in reference to the different grades of manslaughter’ (the defendant contending that the law of manslaughter was involved), is not a sufficient assignment of error, because of the failure to indicate whether it is contended that the charge should have been upon the subject of voluntary manslaughter or involuntary manslaughter; and if the latter, what branch of involuntary manslaughter. Knight v. State, 148 Ga. 41 (95 S. E. 679).” To the same effect see Johnson v. State, 146 Ga. 190 (5) (91 S. E. 42); Armstrong v. State, 181 Ga. 538 (3) (183 S. E. 67); Miles v. State, 182 Ga. 75 (4) (185 S. E. 286); Harris v. State, 183 Ga. 574 (2) (188 S. E. 883). Under the cases cited this ground is insufficient and presents no question for decision. But if the assignment be sufficient to present a question for decision, the complaint is without merit, for the reason that no evidence authorized or required a charge on any branch of manslaughter. If such a charge was authorized at all, it was by virtue of the defendant’s statement; and in such a case the court is required to give such charge only when properly requested by the defendant. Felder v. State, 149 Ga. 538 (101 S. E. 179); Jenkins v. State, 153 Ga. 305 (111 S. E. 915); Carter v. State, 171 Ga. 406 (155 S. E. 670); Davis v. State, 178 Ga. 203 (172 S. E. 559); Turner v. State, 190 Ga. 316 (9 S. E. 2d, 270); Massey v. State, 191 Ga. 44 (11 S. E. 2d, 186). This ground is without merit.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.