William Reece JOHNSTON, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit1961-06-06No. No. 6639

292 F.2d 51

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment denying Johnston's motion to vacate his sentence on grounds of mental incompetency during trial was affirmed, as the trial court's finding that Johnston was not impaired by drugs or medication at the time of trial was supported by adequate evidence and the court did not abuse its discretion in managing the proceedings.

William Johnston was convicted along with a co-defendant of two bank robberies in Kansas and received consecutive sentences totaling thirty years. After his conviction and direct appeal were affirmed, Johnston filed a motion under federal habeas law to vacate his sentences, arguing that he was mentally incompetent during trial because he had been administered drugs that prevented him from assisting in his own defense. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Johnston was not actually impaired by medication or drugs at the time of trial and that he had the ability to participate fully in his defense.

On appeal, the court addressed the proper procedural mechanism for challenging mental competency at trial. The court distinguished between two categories of mental impairment claims: those involving ongoing or substantial mental disease that can be evaluated through post-trial psychiatric examination (which require use of a specific federal statute), and those alleging temporary mental disability during trial due to medication (which may be raised through habeas motions). Because Johnston claimed only temporary drug-induced incapacity, his motion was properly considered under habeas law rather than the alternative statute. The trial court's factual finding that Johnston was not under the influence of impairing substances received deference on appeal because it was supported by adequate evidence and not clearly erroneous.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Proper procedural mechanism for raising mental incompetency claims after conviction
Temporary drug-induced incapacity versus substantial mental disease at trial
Deference to trial court factual findings on mental state
Appointment of counsel in habeas proceedings

Procedural posture

Johnston appealed the denial of his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to set aside his sentences for bank robbery, challenging the trial court's finding that he was mentally competent during trial.

Authorities cited

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Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

BRATTON, Circuit Judge.

A bank in Kansas was robbed on two separate occasions. William Reece Johnston and Fred Charles Riley were indicted jointly for each offense; the cases were consolidated; both defendants were convicted for each offense; and each was sentenced to imprisonment for pei’iods aggregating thirty years. The judgments were affirmed, Johnston v. United States, 10 Cir., 260 F.2d 345, and certiorari was denied, 360 U.S. 935, 79 S.Ct. 1454, 3 L.Ed.2d 1547. Proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Johnston filed a motion to set aside the sentences imposed upon him on the single ground that during the trial he was mentally incompetent, due to the administration of drugs, and for that reason was unable to cooperate with his attorney in his defense. The motion was denied, and the cause came here on review.

It is the general rule that in ordinary circumstances after a defendant has pleaded guilty or has been convicted and sentenced in a criminal case, judicial inquiry and determination of the question of his mental condition in respect to being insane at the time of such plea or conviction can be determined only in the manner provided in 18 U.S.C. § 4245, not by motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Gordon v. United States, 10 Cir., 250 F.2d 676; Hereden v. United States, 10 Cir., 286 F.2d 526.

Section 4245 provides in substance that when the Director of the Bureau of Prisons certifies that a person convicted of an offense against the United States has been examined by a specified board of examiners and that there is probable cause to believe that he was mentally incompetent at the time of his trial, provided the issue of mental competency was not raised before or during the trial, the court shall conduct an inquiry in the manner therein specified and if the court finds that the accused was mentally incompetent at the time of the trial, the judgment of conviction shall be vacated and a new trial granted. But the statute has application to instances in which the accused suffered mental impairment or disease of substantial duration in time which enables psychiatrists To predicate skilled opinion based upon •observation, examination, and tests of him after the trial as to whether he was insane at the time of the trial. Cases of that kind adapt themselves to the statute. NTo condition of that pattern was pleaded ■even inartfully in the motion in this case. Instead, it was pleaded only that Johnston suffered temporary mental disability during the trial, due to the administration of ■drugs. And inquiry respecting a temporary disability of that kind does not ■come within the procedural range of section 4245. Instead, it is open to presentation by motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Gregori v. United States, 5 Cir., 243 F.2d 48; Smith v. United States, 9 Cir., 267 F.2d 210; Alexander v. United States, 5 Cir., 290 F.2d 252.

The burden rested on Johnston to establish by evidence his asserted mental incompetence at the time of the trial •of the criminal case. Johnston and •others testified and documentary evidence was adduced. The court found among -other things that Johnston was not under the influence of medicines or drugs at The time of the trial of the criminal case ■which in any way impaired his faculties .so as to prevent him from participating fully in his defense. The finding is supported by adequate evidence and is not ■plainly erroneous, due regard being had for the opportunity of the trial court to -observe the witnesses and weigh their Testimony. Accordingly, it must stand on ■review.

The court appointed as counsel ■for Johnston in connection with the proceedings on the motion the attorney who had represented him in the criminal case. No objection was made to such appointment at the outset. At one juncture during the proceedings, objection was interposed and the suggestion was made that another attorney be named. The selection of court-appointed counsel for indigent parties rests in the sound judicial discretion of the trial court. The record makes it clear that the attorney represented Johnston with ability and efficiency throughout the proceedings on the motion. His appointment did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

One contention remains. It is that the court erred in declining to grant Johnston a continuance or postponement of the hearing for a specified purpose. The application for such continuance or postponement was addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the court, and no abuse of such discretion appears.

The judgment denying the motion is affirmed.