THERESIA LOCKWAY v. MODERN WOODMEN OF AMERICA

Minnesota Supreme Court1913-04-18No. Nos. 17,972—(52)

121 Minn. 170

Summary · law.co

Holding. The trial court properly denied the insurer's motion to dismiss and motion for a new trial because the widow presented sufficient evidence rebutting the statements in the proofs of death, making the cause of death a jury question, and the jury's verdict was amply supported by the evidence. The order is affirmed.

The widow of a benefit certificate holder sued to recover $2,000 in death benefits. The insurer defended by claiming the insured died from delirium tremens caused by alcohol abuse, which fell within an exception clause voiding the certificate. Although the proofs of death submitted by the widow and the attending physician initially stated delirium tremens as the cause, the widow testified that this was an honest mistake made without full understanding of the term, and that her husband actually died from a ruptured blood vessel. She further testified that her husband was not an excessive drinker. The jury found in the widow's favor and returned a verdict for the full benefit amount.

On appeal, the insurer challenged the trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss and motions for directed verdict and new trial. The appellate court found that while the initial statements in the proofs of death could have seemed conclusive, the widow presented sufficient evidence to rebut them, making the matter appropriate for jury consideration. Multiple witnesses testified to the insured's moderate drinking habits, and expert witnesses offered opinions that the symptoms did not indicate delirium tremens. The court rejected all of the insurer's contentions and affirmed the judgment.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether statements in proofs of death are conclusive against the beneficiary or may be rebutted
Whether the cause of death was delirium tremens or a ruptured blood vessel
Who bears the burden of proof in establishing that death falls within a contractual exception clause
Whether the evidence presented sufficient grounds for a directed verdict in favor of the insurer

Procedural posture

The case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and the insurer appealed from the trial court's denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Bunn, J.

This action is to recover $2,000 on a benefit certificate issued by defendant to John O. Lockway and payable on his death to his widow, the plaintiff. The defense was that Lockway died of delirium tremens, caused by the intemperate use of alcoholic drinks; the certificate providing that in such case it should be null and void. The case was tried to a jury, and a verdict for plaintiff returned. It reaches this court on defendant’s appeal from an order denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.

The first error assigned is the denial by the trial court of defendant’s motion to dismiss, made at the close of plaintiff’s case. The claim is that it conclusively appeared from the evidence as it then stood that Lockway died from delirium tremens. This claim is based upon the proofs of death furnished hy plaintiff, in which it was stated that Loekway’s death resulted from delirium tremens and a “bursted artery.” This statement was made in an affidavit signed by the beneficiary. In the affidavit of the attending physician, he stated that the remote cause of death was delirium tremens, and the immediate cause a ruptured artery.

These statements were not conclusive against plaintiff. Had there been no evidence tending to show that the statements were made by mistake, and were not true in fact, it is perhaps correct that they would preclude a recovery. But it was open to plaintiff to show that she and the attending physician had made an honest and unintentional mistake in stating the cause of death, and that in fact the insured did not die from delirium tremens. The proofs were prepared by her neighbors on blanks furnished by defendant. Her testimony, fairly construed, tended to show that she did not understand what was meant by the term “delirium tremens,” and understood at the time that her husband died from a ruptured blood vessel. She also testified that Loekway was not addicted to the excessive use of intoxicants, and denied that his death was due to this cause. If, as contended by-counsel, it was necessary to give defendant notice before the trial that plaintiff claimed the proofs of death did not correctly state the* cause of death, such notice was given by the pleadings in the case. We hold that any prima facie case as to the cause of death made by the statements in the proofs of death was sufficiently rebutted by the-evidence to justify the denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss. Bentz v. Northwestern Aid Assn. 40 Minn. 202, 41 N. W. 1037, 2 L.R.A. 784; Bachmeyer v. Mutual Reserve, 82 Wis. 255, 52 N. W. 101; Insurance Co. v. Newton, 22 Wall. 32, 22 L. ed. 793.

The contention that defendant was entitled to a directed verdict: cannot be sustained. Indeed, the only evidence that Lockway died of alcoholism, or delirium tremens, was the statement to that effect-in the proofs of death, if we except the testimony of the attending physician, who was willing to admit the delirium, but was in doubt as to-the “tremens.” Many witnesses testified to the mildness of Lockway’sdrinking, and none testified to ever having seen him intoxicated. There were also expert witnesses who gave their opinions, based upon his symptoms, that he did not suffer, from delirium tremens. The-issue was clearly for the jury, and the verdict is amply sustained.

There was no error in the instruction to the jury that the burden of proof was upon defendant. Undoubtedly the statements in the-proofs of death were entitled to be considered as in the nature off admissions on the part of plaintiff, and though, if unexplained, they perhaps would have been conclusive against her, yet this did not. operate to change the well-understood rule that the burden of proof’ is upon the insurer to show that death was from a cause within, the exceptions of the contract.

The court refused an application by defendant to be allowed the-closing argument to the jury. Granting that defendant was entitled to this, having the burden of proof on the only question in controversy, we fail to see any probability that defendant was prejudiced by not having the last word.

There was no error in granting an amendment to the complaint, or in refusing to strike out certain allegations of the reply. Nor do we find any ground for reversal in the numerous assignments of error ffchat challenge rulings on the admission of evidence or instructions to ¡the jury.

Order affirmed.