Brown v. Farkas

Supreme Court of Georgia1943-04-13No. No. 14414

195 Ga. 653

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that a separation settlement establishing alimony as a fixed lump sum payable in installments creates an unconditional obligation that survives the wife's remarriage after divorce, and the wife's remarriage does not bar enforcement of the promissory notes or the power of sale under the security deed.

A husband and wife who were separated entered into a contract to settle alimony obligations in their divorce proceeding. The agreement specified a total of $1,400 to be paid in monthly installments of $50, with the payments evidenced by negotiable promissory notes secured by a deed to land. When the wife later remarried after obtaining the divorce, the husband argued that this remarriage should bar enforcement of the remaining unpaid installments.

The court held that when parties to a separation settlement agree upon a fixed sum payable in installments and document it through promissory notes and security, their manifest intent is to establish an unconditional lump-sum obligation. The husband remains liable for the full amount regardless of installment payment arrangements. Critically, the wife's remarriage following the divorce does not serve as a defense to payment or prevent enforcement through the security deed. The trial court properly rejected the husband's attempt to obtain an injunction blocking the note holder from exercising the foreclosure power granted in the security instrument.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Enforceability of contractual alimony settlements between separating spouses
Effect of wife's remarriage on alimony obligations paid through installments
Characterization of installment payments as unconditional lump-sum liability
Enforcement of promissory notes and security deeds in alimony disputes

Procedural posture

The trial court refused to grant an interlocutory injunction restraining enforcement of a security deed, and the husband appealed that denial.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Bell, Presiding Justice.

1. Where a husband and a wife were living in a state of separation and the wife was suing the husband for divorce and alimony, they could enter into a valid and enforceable contract settling the issue as tb alimony. Chapman v. Gray, 8 Ga. 341; McLaren v. McLaren, 33 Ga. Supp. 99; Sumner v. Sumner, 121 Ga. 1 (3) (48 S. E. 727); Watson v. Burnley, 150 Ga. 460 (104 S. E. 220); Gore v. Plair, 173 Ga. 88 (159 S. E. 698); Caudle v. Caudle, 181 Ga. 144 (181 S. E. 669); Hayes v. Hayes, 65 Ga. App. 222 (15 S. E. 2d, 626).

2. Where such a contract was entered into for the purpose of settling the question of alimony, its meaning and effect should be determined according to the usual rules for the construction of contracts, the cardinal rule being to ascertain the intention of the parties. Code, § 20-702. Compare Hayes v. Hayes, 191 Ga. 237 (11 S. E. 2d, 764).

3. Where in such case the parties agreed upon a sum of money, “to wit, $1400 payable in monthly installments of $50 per month beginning” on ■ a later date specified, the several installments being represented by negotiable promissory notes payable to the wife and secured by a deed to land, the manifest intention of the parties was to fix a lump sum, for which the husband would be unconditionally liable; and this is true notwithstanding the feature as to installment payments. Accordingly, marriage of the wife to another man after obtaining a divorce would be no defense against payment of the notes, and would not prevent the holder from enforcing payment as provided in the security deed. Melton v. Hubbard, 135 Ga. 128 (68 S. E. 1101); Wise v. Wise, 156 Ga. 459 (2) (119 S. E. 410); Heflinger v. Heflinger, 161 Ga. 867 (6) (132 S. E. 85); McDowell v. Engel, 31 Ga. App. 428 (120 S. E. 674); Narregang v. Narregang, 31 S. D. 459 (139 N. W. 341); Jones v. Jones, 216 Ky. 810 (288 S. W. 737); Spear v. Spear, 158 Md. 672 (149 Atl. 468).

4. While the decisions in Buffington v. Cook, 147 Ga. 681 (95 S. E. 214), by five Justices, and White v. Murden, 190 Ga. 536 (9 S. E. 2d, 745), by four Justices, dealing -with decrees for alimony, did not expressly rule upon the significance or effect of the lump sum awards, yet if they are in conflict with what is here ruled as to the effect of a contractual lump-sum settlement, they will not be followed as to such matter. The present case is controlled in principle by the unanimous ruling in Melton v. Hubbard, 135 Ga. 128 (supra), that, “In such an agreement where the husband promises to pay a lump sum for the wife’s support, payable in installments, and the wife dies before all the installments are paid, her executor may sue for the unpaid installments as they severally mature.”

No. 14414.

April 13, 1943.

5. The conclusion above stated accords with the decision in Meltan v. Hubbard, 144 Ga. 18 (85 S. E. 1016), where it was shown that the wife elected to abandon the contract as to alimony, and it was held that in such case the contract would not be enforceable by .her executrix after her death.

6. Under the above rulings, the judge did not err in refusing an interlocutory injunction to restrain the transferee of the notes from exercising the power of sale contained in the security deed.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

E. L. Smith, for plaintiff.

Faricas & Burt, for defendant.