Hicks Executors v. Pouncey

Johnson, J.

In this case I am of opinion, that the time which .elapsed between 1784 and 1788, is to be added to the time subsequent to the act of 1791, so as to make up the necessary time for supporting the plea of limitation. It is only necessary to recur to the literal signification of the words of the two acts of 1784, and 1788, on this subject. The act of 1784 declares, that the limita tioii shall commence from that time ; but alter running nearly four years, the act of 1788, to use the words of it, suspends its fur. ther operation. The hand óf the clock was arrested at the eleventh, but not put back to the first, hour.

Griiukb, J.

On examination of the limitation acts, relative to personal actions, I think the word “ suspend,” does • not destroy such time as began to run, and which continued to run, between any of the said acts. The act of 1784 declares that no time past shall be Counted; but the remaining acts only declare the time which has begun to run, to be suspended. Between the. acts of 1784, and 1788, there intervened a space of three years, eleven months, and three days, so that only twenty.seven days were wanting, after the expiration of the 25th March, 1793, when all these suspensions of the limitation of personal actions expired. More than these deficient days expired before the commencement of the action ; and, therefore, the two periods of time, taken together,: making more than four years, the party is barred.

Judgment affirmed.

The judges delivered their opinions seriatim :

Brevarp, J.

I am of opinion that judgment should be for the defendants. The 26th of March, 1784, was fixed by act of assem. bly for the commencement of.the operation of the act of limitations. This act began to run against <the plaintiffs’ right of action from that day until the 29th of February, 1788, when its operation was suspended, until the 28th of March, 1791, by an act of February, 1788 ; and in February, 1791, an act passed, which further suspended its operation until the 25th day of March, 1793 ; then its operation .revived, and it ran on to complete the time necessary to bar the plaintiff’s right of action, before the writ was sued out. I conceive that the true sense and sound construction of the acts pf assembly, .relative .to this subject, require that the time which passed prior to the first, and subsequent to the last, act, suspending the operation of the limitation act, must fee reckoned in computing the time, the limitation act has run against the plaintiffs’ right of action, before he commenced his suit; and that the suspending acts .operated only to interrupt and stay the course of the act of limitations for the times respectively mentioned by them, and did not establish any other period than was before, established for the com. .menceraent of its operation. And, therefore, I am of opinion the defendant’s rejoinder and plea are good, and the demurrer, naught.

Trezevanít, J.

I concur in the opinion just delivered. The ■time which ran from the 26th March, 1784, to the 29th February, .1788, viz., three years, eleven months, and three days, must be added to the time which again began to run from the 25th of March, 1793: and agreeably to this opinion, the executors of Loocock v. Nathaniel Russell, was decided by me, in Charleston, last May. Bax, J., concurred;

Waties, J.,

presided in the district court, and decided the question in favor of the defendant, on the same ground as above stated, He gave no opinion now.