Harry LIKE et al., Appellants, v. Proctor CARTER et al., Appellees

United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit1973-11-01No. No. 73-1091

486 F.2d 552

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, finding no abuse of discretion in denying injunctive relief and agreeing that the Eleventh Amendment bars an award of retroactive or past due welfare benefits for delays in state processing of applications.

Harry Like and other public assistance applicants sought retroactive welfare benefits and injunctive relief against Missouri officials for failing to process applications within the 30-day period mandated by the Social Security Act and its implementing regulations. On remand from an earlier appellate decision, the district court granted a declaratory judgment requiring that eligible applicants receive payment within 30 days and be entitled to retroactive benefits if delayed beyond that period, subject to exceptions where the state could justify the delay. However, the district court denied injunctive relief and declined to award retroactive or past due benefits, reasoning that such monetary relief would constitute a suit against the state barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

The appellants challenged both the denial of injunctive relief and the refusal to award retroactive payments. The circuit court found no abuse of discretion in denying the injunction, as the state had by that time come into compliance with the 30-day processing requirement. On the question of retroactive benefits, the court agreed with the district court that the Eleventh Amendment bars any award for past due benefits resulting from the state's delay in processing claims within the prescribed timeframe.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether injunctive relief is appropriate when state officials have achieved compliance with federal processing requirements
Whether the Eleventh Amendment bars suits for monetary relief against a state for unpaid welfare benefits due to processing delays
Scope of remedies available to welfare applicants denied timely processing under federal law

Procedural posture

This appeal came on remand from the circuit court's earlier decision directing the district court to reconsider whether appellants were entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief and retroactive benefits for delayed welfare claim processing.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

In this sequel to the remand which we originally ordered in Like v. Carter, 448 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1971), Harry Like, for himself and similarly situated public assistance applicants, seeks the payment of welfare benefits on a retroactive basis to qualified applicants whose applications had not been promptly processed and paid as provided by law. He also requested injunctive relief against Missouri state officials who allegedly failed to process welfare claims within 30 days of filing as required by provisions and regulations of the Social Security Act. District Court Judge Meredith declined to afford appellant these forms of relief for reasons set out in an opinion reported as Like v. Carter, 353 F.Supp. 405 (E,D.Mo.1973). This appeal followed.

The underlying facts and circumstances of this litigation are related in our original decision and need not be repeated. In remanding for further proceedings in the district court, we said:

We are satisfied that the plaintiffs as a minimum are entitled to a declaratory judgment determining that the applications of members of the classes here involved for welfare benefits must be acted upon and the first payment made to eligible applicants within thirty days of the filing of the application and that eligible applicants whose claims have not been passed upon within thirty days are entitled to have retroactive benefits from the thirty-first day following the filing of their applications, subject however to a provision that the foregoing shall not apply to instances where the state establishes that the delay is excused or justified by the provisions of Handbook Part IV, § 2300(b) (6).

Whether the injunction prayed for should be granted should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court for determining after such further hearing as he may deem appropriate on remand. By reason of the dismissal the court did not reach the injunction issue. Defendants have expressed a desire to comply with the thirty-day requirement and have indicated that they are taking steps to meet the requirement. The HEW pending investigation mentioned in footnote 1 may also aid in bringing about conformity with the federal laws and regulations.

By way of caveat, we state that the issue of the bar of the Eleventh Amendment to a suit against the state for accrued past due benefits was not reached by the trial court and is not reached by us. Similarly, the issue of whether the state has waived immunity from suit by accepting the federal grant is not determined. These issues are separate and distinct from our holding that jurisdiction exists under Ex parte Young [209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714], supra. [Like v. Carter, 448 F.2d at 805.]

Judge Meredith in further considering the case on remand granted a declaratory judgment:

[T]o the effect that applications of members of the classes here involved for welfare benefits, must be acted upon and the first payment made to eligible applicants within thirty days of the filing of the application and that eligible applicants whose claims have not been passed upon within thirty days are entitled to have retroactive benefits from the thirty-first day following the filing of their applications, subject, however, to a provision that the foregoing shall not apply to instances where the state establishes that the delay is excused or justified by the provisions of the Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, and particularly Part IV, § 2300(b)(6). [Like v. Carter, 353 F. Supp. at 405-406.].

However, on remand the court denied any injunctive relief on the grounds that the appellees were then in compliance with requirements of law and refused to award retroactive (or past due) benefits to those applicants who had earlier been denied prompt payment of their welfare claims. The district court construed this demand for monetary relief as constituting a suit against the State of Missouri in federal court and declined to exercise jurisdiction on Eleventh Amendment grounds. The appellants claim that the trial court erred on both issues.

Our independent review of the record discloses no abuse of the trial court’s discretion in denying injunctive relief to plaintiffs. See United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 433 F.2d 421, 429 (8th Cir. 1970). We agree with the district court’s view that on jurisdictional grounds, the Eleventh Amendment bars any award for lost welfare benefits because of the failure of the state to pay claims within the prescribed time period of 30 days. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of Judge Meredith’s opinion.

. In denying any award for payment of past due welfare benefits, the district court relied on Rothstein v. Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 411 U.S. 921, 93 S. Ct. 1552, 36 L.Ed.2d 315 (1973). The Seventh Circuit has come to a contrary conclusion, Jordan v. Weaver, 472 F.2d 985 (1973). The Seventh Circuit decision is now before the Supreme Court as Edelman v. Jordan, No. 72-1410, cert, granted, 412 U.S. 937, 93 S.Ct. 2776, 37 L.Ed.2d 398 (1973).