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Hibberd versus Bovier

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania1855
1 Grant 266

Summary

Holding. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the purchaser took the property subject to the life estate and support provisions because he had notice of an instrument that conveyed interests beyond a typical mortgage—interests that could not be discharged by a judgment sale and therefore bound any purchasing party with knowledge of them.

An unrecorded mortgage cannot take priority over a subsequent judgment lien, and a purchaser at a judgment sale is therefore protected from such a mortgage. However, this rule applies only to mortgages that could have been discharged by a sheriff's sale under the pre-1830 law. When a mortgage conveys more than a simple security interest—such as a life estate with possession rights and uncertain maintenance obligations—it operates differently. Such an interest cannot be eliminated by a judgment sale and instead binds any purchaser who has notice of it. In this case, the instrument was more than an ordinary mortgage; it granted Ralph and his wife a life estate in part of the property along with uncertain support provisions. Because the purchaser had full notice of these rights, he took the property subject to them.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Priority of unrecorded mortgages against subsequent judgment liens
  • Whether notice to a purchaser substitutes for recording when an instrument conveys a life estate
  • Whether a life estate with maintenance obligations can be discharged by a sheriff's sale under a judgment

Procedural posture

The plaintiff in error appealed from a judgment entered against him regarding his purchase of land at a sheriff's sale, challenging whether he took the property free of prior interests.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court, delivered by

Lewis, C. J.

— An unrecorded mortgage to secure the payment of a siim of money, is not a lien against a subsequent judgment; and it follows, as a necessary consequence of this principle, that a purchaser under the judgment must also be protected from the mortgage, otherwise the judgment would be indirectly defeated. In such a case notice of the mortgage is not material; and without regard to it the judgment takes the proceeds, and the purchaser of the land discharged of the mortgage. Semple v. Burd, 7 S. & R. 290; Freedly v. Hamilton, 17 Id. 70; Jaques v. Weeks, 7 Watts, 270. But this must be predicated of a mortgage, which under the law as it stood before the Act of 1830, might have been discharged by a sheriff’s sale under a prior judgment. • Where the mortgage is of such a nature that it could, under no circumstances, come into competition with the judgment for the proceeds, but must attach, if at all, upon the land in the hands of the purchaser, a different rule prevails. In the last case, the question is exclusively between the mortgagee and the purchaser, and notice to the purchaser supplies the place of recording. The paper book contains neither a copy of the deed from Ralph Bovier, -to James Bovier, nor a full copy of the instrument called the mortgage. But from the extract given, it would seem to be something more than a mortgage. In addition to the provisions for the support of Ralph Bovier, and his wife, they have vested in them by the instrument, an estate for life in a part of the premises, with a right of possession. The provisions for their support are uncertain in amount and in duration, and not susceptible of calculation so as to be paid out of the proceeds. A sale under a junior judgment could not, even before 1830, have discharged such an interest. Nothing could extinguish it but a sale to a purchaser without notice. The purchaser had full notice in this case, and therefore took subject to it.

Taking for truth all the evidence in relation to the arrangement of 27th September, 1844, it did not extinguish the interest of the plaintiff below ; the plaintiff in error has no cause to complain of what was said in the charge on that branch of the case.

Eulalia Smith had no interest in the case at the time she gave her evidence. The provision intended for her, was the voluntary act of her father. A recovery of the land by him would not give her a right of action. Besides the provision was only to continue while she remained single. She was married long before she was offered as a witness.

In this view of the case, the validity of the sheriff’s sale is not material. But we are inclined to think that the purchaser is not affected by the irregularities complained of. All that was necessary to authorize a ven. ex. to sell the land in both counties, was that the inquisition required by the Act of 1840, be returned and approved of by the court. Elliot v. MDowell, 10 Harris, 201.

Judgment affirmed.