LOWERY v. MORTON

Supreme Court of Georgia1946-01-10No. No. 15329

200 Ga. 227

Summary · law.co

Holding. The trial judge did not err in refusing to accept the initial jury verdict and instructing the jury to retire and return a revised verdict addressing only the issues properly submitted to them. The judgment was affirmed.

A trial judge received a jury verdict on the question of property title but found that the verdict improperly addressed matters beyond what had been submitted to the jury—specifically, tax liability over a thirteen-year period and monetary claims between the parties. The judge instructed the jury to return and revise the verdict to address only the issue actually presented. The defendant did not object to this action at trial. The court held that judges have both the authority and responsibility to reject ambiguous or improper verdicts and direct juries to reconsider them, provided proper instructions are given, rather than accept a defective verdict that would likely require a new trial afterward.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a trial judge may reject an ambiguous or improper verdict and require the jury to reconsider it
Whether a verdict covering unsubmitted issues must be accepted as rendered
Proper scope of jury submission versus jury verdict

Procedural posture

The trial judge rejected the jury's initial verdict as addressing matters not submitted to the jury and directed the jury to return with a corrected verdict; the defendant did not object at trial and now appeals.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Wyatt, Justice.

The Code, § 110-101, provides: “The ver- diet shall cover the issues made by the pleadings, and shall be for the plaintiff or defendant.”

This court has held many times that it is not error for a trial judge not to receive an improper or imperfect verdict, and to cause the jury to retire and put their verdict in proper form. See Van Leonard v. Eagle & Phœnix Manufacturing Co., 60 Ga. 544; Blalock v, Waldrup, 84 Ga. 145 (10 S. E. 622, 20 Am. St. R. 350); Vance v. Roberts, 86 Ga. 457 (5), 463 (12 S. E. 653); Baker v. Thompson, 89 Ga. 486 (5) (15 S. E. 644); Jordan v. Downs, 118 Ga. 544 (2) (45 S. E. 439); Lee v. Humphries, 124 Ga. 539 (2) (52 S. E. 1007); Seaboard Air-Line Railway v. Howe, 139 Ga. 429 (2) (77 S. E. 387). In Smith v. Pilcher, 130 Ga. 350, 355 (60 S. E. 1000), Mr. Justice Holden, speaking for the court and discussing the question now under consideration, said: “When ever a verdict is ambiguous and uncertain in its meaning or does not cover a substantial issue made by the pleadings in the case upon which proof is offered, it is proper to have the jury retire again for the purpose of rendering another verdict, under proper instructions from the court. It is better to do this than to receive the verdict, which would probably have to be set aside on a motion for a new trial, resulting in the expense and trouble of another trial.” In Jordan v. Downs, supra, Chief Justice Simmons, speaking for the court, said: “We think that it is not only the right but the duty of the trial judge, when a verdict as returned is ambiguous or indefinite, to call the attention of the jury to the faults of the verdict, ask them what they mean by the verdict or answers returned, and, upon ascertaining what is meant, to direct them to return to their room and correct the verdict so as to make it speak their meaning. A judge has supervision of. the whole case, and is not merely a figurehead to sit by and see injustice done or to allow the reception of an ambiguous and indefinite verdict which is likely to give rise to more litigation or to result in another long and weary trial.”

We think the language above quoted applicable to the instant case. The jury had one question, and one only, submitted to them- — title to the property in controversy. The verdict first returned undertook to decide and determine questions which had not been submitted to tbe jury, to wit, liability for taxes on tbe property for a period of thirteen years, and the adjudication of monetary claims as between the parties. "We are not called upon in this case to determine whether or not the first verdict returned was a valid verdict. When it is determined that the verdict was ambiguous, uncertain, or did not cover the issues in the case, that is as far as the inquiry need go, for the reason that when this is made to appear, it is not error for the trial judge to require the jury to return to their room, under proper instructions, and make their verdict certain. Especially is this true when it appears, as it does here, that the complaining party made no objection at the time the judge declined to accept the verdict and sent the jury back to their room for further deliberation.

We conclude that there was no error in the action of the trial judge.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.