Taylor et al. v. Abbott et al.

Supreme Court of Georgia1946-09-06No. No. 15528

201 Ga. 254

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment dismissing the equitable petition on demurrer was affirmed because the court of ordinary had primary jurisdiction and assumed jurisdiction of the estate administration, the defendant had previously invoked that jurisdiction on the same issue, and the subsequent equitable petition failed to allege fraud or other grounds justifying equity's intervention.

This case addresses jurisdictional authority over estate and marital status matters. The opinion establishes that courts of ordinary jurisdiction hold primary authority over probate, administration of estates, and related matters concerning deceased persons. While courts of equity have concurrent jurisdiction over certain matters like settlement of administrator accounts, the court that first assumes jurisdiction generally retains it absent good cause for equity to intervene. A court of equity will not void a marriage on grounds recognized by law as divorce reasons, though in limited circumstances—such as when the decedent lacked mental capacity to marry—a claim by next of kin against someone claiming as widow may proceed without a prior divorce decree, primarily in the court of ordinary.

In this case, the court of ordinary had already assumed jurisdiction over the estate administration. The defendant had previously invoked that same court's authority by requesting it to direct the administrator to distribute assets to her as widow and sole heir. When the defendant later filed an equitable petition in superior court raising the identical jurisdictional question but without alleging fraud or other equitable grounds warranting intervention, the trial court properly dismissed the petition. Because the dismissal rested on sound jurisdictional grounds, the court did not need to address other arguments raised in the demurrer.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Primary jurisdiction of court of ordinary over estate administration
Concurrent jurisdiction between courts of ordinary and equity over estate matters
Whether a court of equity may void a marriage or contest widow status based on grounds recognized as divorce reasons
Effect of invoking one court's jurisdiction on subsequent petitions to another court

Procedural posture

The defendant filed an equitable petition in superior court challenging the plaintiff's status as widow and sole heir; the trial court dismissed the petition on demurrer, and the appeal reached the appellate court.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Jenkins, Presiding Justice.

1. “Courts of ordinary have authority to exercise original, exclusive, and general jurisdiction of the following subject-matters: (1) Probate of wills. (2) The granting of letters testamentary, and of administration, and the repeal or revocation of the same. (3) All controversies in relation to the right of executorship or administration. (4) The sale and disposition of the property belonging to, and the distribution of, deceased persons’ estates. (5) The appointment and removal of guardians of minors and persons of unsound mind. (6) All controversies as to the right of guardianship. (7) The auditing and passing returns of all executors, administrators, and guardians. (8) The discharge of former, and the requiring of new surety, from administrators and guardians. (9) The issuing of commissions of lunacy in conformity to law. (10) All such other matters and things as appertain or relate to estates of deceased persons, and to idiots, lunatics, and insane persons. (11) All such matters as may be conferred on them by the Constitution and laws. (12) Concurrent jurisdiction with the judge of the county court in those counties where there are such courts, in the binding out of orphans and apprentices, and all controversies between master and apprentice.” Code, § 24-1901.

2. “A court of equity shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the ordinary over the settlement of accounts of administrators.” Code, § 113-2203. See, in this connection, Manry v. Manry, 196 Ga. 365, 372 (26 S. E. 2d, 706); Morris v. Nicholson, 198 Ga. 450 (31 S. E. 2d, 786). However, “Where law and equity have concurrent jurisdiction, whichever first takes jurisdiction shall retain it, unless a good reason shall be given for the interference of equity.” Code, § 37-122.

3. A court of equity will not declare a marriage void for any reason which is recognized by law as a ground for divorce. However, a previous decree of divorce may not always be essential as a matter of law to the establishment of a claim by the next of kin of the decedent against the widow, where it is shown that at the time the marriage was consummated between the decedent and the one claiming as his widow the decedent was mentally incompetent to contract marriage. This may be done primarily in the court of ordinary, or in the superior court where proper equitable principles are shown by the petition to be involved. Bell v. Bennett, 73 Ga. 784; Medlock v. Merritt, 102 Ga. 212 (29 S. E. 185) ; 76 A. L. R. 772 (II(a) ).

No. 15528.

September 6, 1946.

4. In the instant case — since the court of ordinary had primary jurisdiction, and assumed jurisdiction of the administration, and the defendant in the equitable petition previously invoked the jurisdiction of the court of ordinary as to the identical question raised by the subsequent equitable petition, by asking that the court of ordinary require the administrator to turn over to her, as the widow and sole heir at law of the decedent, the assets of the estate, and since the subsequent equitable petition in the superior court failed to make any allegations of fraud in the consummation of the marital contract, or to show any other equitable ground why the superior court should deprive the court of ordinary of its jurisdiction — the lower court properly dismissed the petition on demurrer. This judgment being proper for jurisdictional reasons, it becomes unnecessary to determine the questions raised by the other grounds of demurrer.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

A. Leopold Alexander and Marvin O’Neal, for plaintiffs.

Brannen •& Clarice and Oliver, Oliver & Davis, for defendants.