Bruce et al. v. Strickland

Supreme Court of Georgia1946-11-13No. No. 15625

201 Ga. 526

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the dismissal of the trespass action, holding that the deed's property description was too indefinite to convey title, that extrinsic evidence of a subsequent verbal agreement could not cure the defect, and that without actual possession or valid title, the plaintiffs could not maintain the action.

The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendant from trespassing on property they claimed to own through a deed. The deed's property description was extremely vague, referring only to a general location in a district and section, identifying it as two acres of lot number 1101 on one side of a road near the center of the lot. The court found this description so indefinite that it could not identify the specific land intended to be conveyed, and therefore the deed was insufficient to transfer title to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs also argued that even if the deed's description was defective, the parties had subsequently marked off the property and agreed on its boundaries, which should cure the defect. The court rejected this argument, holding that extrinsic evidence of a verbal agreement about property boundaries cannot be used to fix an inadequate written description in a deed. Because the plaintiffs had no actual possession of the property and their only claim to title rested on the defective deed and the inadmissible verbal agreement about boundaries, the action could not proceed.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether an indefinite property description in a deed can convey legal title
Whether extrinsic evidence of a verbal boundary agreement can remedy a defective deed description
Whether a party lacking actual possession can maintain a trespass action based solely on a defective deed

Procedural posture

The defendant demurred to the plaintiffs' petition seeking injunctive relief against trespass, and the trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the action.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Duckworth, Justice.

1. To maintain an action for trespass, where the petitioner is not in actual possession, he must show legal title in himself. Ault v. Meager, 112 Ga. 148 (37 S. E. 185) ; Downing v. Anderson, 126 Ga. 373 (55 S. E. 184) ; Alaculsy Lumber Co. v. Gudger, 134 Ga. 603 (2) (68 S. E. 427); James v. Riley, 181 Ga. 454 (2) (182 S. E. 604).

2. While a deed to land is not void for uncertainty of description if it furnishes a key by which the land can be definitely located with the aid of extrinsic evidence (Prudential Insurance Co. v. Hill, 170 Ga. 600 (2), 153 S. E. 516; Holt v. Tate, 193 Ga. 256 (4), 18 S. E. 2d, 12; Deaton v. Swanson, 196 Ga. 833 (1), 28 S. E. 2d, 126), yet, in the absence of a key, if the description is too indefinite to identify the land, the deed is insufficient to convey title. Laurens County Board of Edu cation v. Stanley, 187 Ga. 389 (200 S. E. 294); Holloway v. Key, 188 Ga. 423, 426 (4 S. E. 2d, 167); Gould v. Gould, 194 Ga. 132, 135 (21 S. E. 2d, 64).

No. 15625.

November 13, 1946.

Wood & Tallant, for plaintiffs. Hotvell Brooke, for defendant.

3. The description in the deed upon which the petitioners relied in seeking to enjoin the defendant from trespassing, being “All that tract or parcel of land lying and being in 3rd district and second section of said county, 2 acres of land, of lot No. 1101 (eleven hundred one), on the east side of Orange and Roswell Road, near the center of said lot,” was wholly without a key by which to locate with extrinsic evidence the land intended to be conveyed, and obviously too indefinite to identify the land, and under the above-cited authorities the court did not err in sustaining the defendant’s ground of demurrer challenging the pleaded description in the deed as insufficient to convey title.

4. Where the petitioners claimed title under a reversionary clause in the above-described deed, the further allegations of the petition that, immediately upon the execution and delivery of the deed, the grantees and the grantor entered upon the property and laid oft the two acres of land conveyed by the deed and placed markers to identify the property — the new description being quoted in the petition — were subject to the defendant’s ground of demurrer that the description of the property as set out in the deed could not be aided by such allegations seeking to add • a verbal agreement as to the description of the property. Huntress v. Portwood, 116 Ga. 351, 355 (42 S. B. 513) ; Oglesby v. Volunteer State Life Ins. Co., 195 Ga. 65, 67 (23 S. E. 2d, 404).

5. The description in the deed relied upon being too vague and indefinite to convey title, and the facts alleged as an aid to the description not being admissible, and no actual possession being alleged, but the sole basis of the petitioners’ title and right to maintain the action being the described deed and the alleged subsequent agreement as to the proper description, the court did not err in dismissing the action after sustaining the above-stated grounds of the defendants’ demurrer.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concwr.