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Armando CAMPOS-RUIZ, Petitioner, v. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit2003-10-20No. No. 02-70998
79 F. App'x 265

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Opinion

majority opinion

MEMORANDUM

Armando Campos-Ruiz petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of his motion to reopen. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), (c). We deny the petition.

When presented with a motion to reopen, the BIA may reject it for lack of a showing of a prima facie case, on the basis that evidence was not previously unavailable, or on the basis that relief would not be granted anyway. See INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323, 112 S.Ct. 719, 725, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992); INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 912, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988).

In the ease at hand, the BIA did consider the new “facts” placed before it by Campos, and determined that addition of those facts to the others already in the mix when it ruled on the direct appeal did not change the compound enough to spell out a prima facie case for relief. We cannot say that its decision was reversible error.

Petition DENIED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

. In that respect, the BIA’s actions were different from those that we deprecated in Ramirez-Alejandre v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 858, 878 (9th Cir.2003), where it refused to consider new information.

dissent opinion

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge,

dissenting.

I do not believe that the BIA considered the new evidence under the proper standard. Campos-Ruiz had an absolute right to have his new evidence accepted in the same manner as all the other evidence placed before the BIA, not reviewed under the grudging rules applicable to motions to reopen.