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David T. Compton vs. Inhabitants of Revere

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court1901-06-19
179 Mass. 413

Summary

Holding. The court sustained the defendant's exceptions and determined that judgment should have been entered for the defendant town, as the plaintiff assumed the risk by knowingly traversing a street he recognized as unfinished and unfit for public travel.

A plaintiff injured while traversing a street under construction sued the town of Revere for damages arising from an alleged highway defect. The plaintiff fell on Beach Street, which was undergoing grade elevation work ordered by county commissioners and being performed by a railroad company. At the time of the accident in March 1897, the street remained in rough, unfinished condition with dumped earth and no leveling, having been abandoned for winter months when the ground froze.

The court found that the plaintiff was familiar with the street's condition, having visited the area multiple times over the preceding eight months, and knew the street was unsuitable for public travel. The plaintiff chose to use the street despite knowing its dangerous state and having alternative routes available. The court determined that the visible condition of the street itself provided sufficient notice of danger without need for barriers, and that occasional use by risk-takers did not establish the street as open to public travel.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether a property owner is liable for injuries on a street undergoing construction when the plaintiff has knowledge of the defective condition
  • Whether visible dangerous conditions provide adequate notice without physical barriers
  • Whether occasional use of an obviously unfinished street establishes it as open to public travel

Procedural posture

The plaintiff obtained a jury verdict for personal injuries, and the defendant town appealed by filing exceptions to the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that judgment should be entered for the defendant.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Lathrop, J.

The plaintiff seeks to recover for personal injuries sustained by him on account of an alleged defect in a highway in the defendant town. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff; and the case is before us on the defendant’s exceptions. There were eleven requests for instructions, only one of which need be considered, and that is the last, which is as follows: “ That, upon all the evidence in the case, the verdict should be for the defendant.”

The undisputed facts in the ease are that in consequence of an order of the county commissioners, made on September 1, 1896, it became necessary for the Boston, Revere Beach and Lynn Railroad Company to build a bridge over which Beach Street was to pass, and to raise the grades of Beach Street and of Ocean Avenue, two highways running at a right angle with each other. The railroad company, by the order, had a year in which to do the work. At the request of the railroad company, the board of selectmen of the defendant town voted to grant permission to the company to close the streets, and the selectmen had nothing to do with the work that was being done on these streets during the fall, winter and spring of 1896 and 1897. The work of changing the grade began about the last of September, 1896, and continued until some time in December of that year. The ground then became frozen, and the work had to be abandoned until the next spring. When work ceased in December, Beach Street was in a very rough condition.. The dirt lay as it had been dumped from the tip-carts, and had not been levelled off; and it was obvious to every one who saw it that it was not in a condition for public travel.

The plaintiff lived on Kimball Avenue, a street west of the bridge on Ocean Avenue, and running diagonally into that avenue. On the morning of March 1, 1897, the plaintiff left his house, crossed the bridge, which was then incomplete, went into the middle of the street, and made his way along Beach Street, until he came opposite the grocery of one O’Brien. There was a bank of earth there three or four feet above the sidewalk. In attempting to go down this he slipped and fell, and sustained the injuries complained of.

The plaintiff testified that he had been to O’Brien’s many times during the eight months preceding the accident, and that the general condition of things had existed for over a month; and that the street was nothing but a dirt heap ; and that there was another way of getting to O’Brien’s, but it was more roundabout.

It is obvious that the plaintiff knew all that there was to know about the condition of things ; and, in attempting to use the street, did it at his peril. The case cannot be distinguished from Jones v. Collins, 177 Mass. 444, unless the question of a want of barriers makes a difference. There was a conflict of evidence on the point whether barriers had ever been placed on Beach Street. B.ut we do not regard the question as material in this case. The object of a barrier is to notify the public that it is unsafe to proceed; but where the condition of the street is such as is shown by the evidence in this case, the condition itself is as strong a notice as any that could be given.

Nor do we regard it as material that prior to the accident, some wagons were driven over the street. There are always persons who take risks, if a short cut can be made, and who will go over a street even if it is obviously not open to public travel. There is not enough in this case to show that at the time of the accident the way was open to public travel.

This is not the case of a person entering upon a street in the night-time, which he has no reason to suppose defective, but of a person entering a street in the daytime, the grade of which he knows is being changed and which he also knows is not graded, or fit for public travel.

Under these circumstances we are of opinion that the eleventh request should have been given. See Commonwealth v. Boston & Lowell Railroad, 12 Cush. 254, 259.

Exceptions sustained. .