LONG v. THE STATE

Supreme Court of Georgia1947-05-15No. No. 15818

202 Ga. 235

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court reversed the judgment and held that the 1937 statute, as amended, unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to county commissioners by authorizing them to prescribe speed limits and define misdemeanor violations, contrary to the Georgia Constitution's vesting of legislative power solely in the General Assembly.

A Georgia county attempted to enforce parking and speed regulations adopted by its Board of Commissioners under authority granted by a 1937 state statute (as amended in 1941). The statute permitted county commissioners in certain counties to create rules regulating vehicle parking and speed on unincorporated roads, with violations designated as misdemeanors. The defendant challenged these regulations through a demurrer to the criminal accusation and a certiorari petition.

The court held that the statute unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to county commissioners. While the General Assembly may authorize administrative bodies to adopt rules implementing legislative policies or enact local-option laws subject to voter approval, it cannot permit county officials to independently define the elements of criminal offenses or modify existing penal statutes. The court reasoned that allowing counties to set their own speed limits would enable them to alter other criminal laws arbitrarily, creating inconsistent enforcement of state criminal statutes across different counties and undermining the constitutional vesting of legislative authority in the General Assembly.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether a state statute may delegate authority to county commissioners to define criminal offenses and set speed limits
The distinction between permissible administrative rule-making and impermissible legislative delegation
Whether county commissioners may modify the terms of existing state penal statutes

Procedural posture

The defendant demurred to a criminal accusation brought under county regulations, and the trial court overruled the demurrer and dismissed the certiorari petition.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Atkinson, Justice.

(After stating the foregoing facts.) The demurrer to the accusation should have been sustained, and it was error for the Superior Court to overrule and dismiss the certiorari.

The act approved March 18, 1937 (Ga. L. 1937, p. 780), as amended by the act approved March 27,1941 (Ga. L. 1941, p. 422), applies only to a county in which there is situated a city with a population of 200,000 or more. Section 2 .of the original act provides: “The Board of Commissioners of Roads and Revenues or other county authority .having charge of the roads and revenues of such counties Shall have full power and authority to prohibit, limit, restrict, and otherwise regulate the parking of vehicles on the public roads of the county outside of the incorporated limits of. municipalities and to. define and declare what are congested areas andrestricted territories relative to,speed of vehicles, parking of vehicles, and such other provisions as may be found by said Boards to be necessary to effectively provide for the -safety and convenience of the citizens of the county as to the use of the public roads of the county outside of the incorporated limits of municipalities.” By section 3 it is made a misdemeanor to violate any rulés and regulations so adopted by the county authority.

By the act approved March 24, 1939 (Ga. L. 1939, p. 295; Code, Ann., § 68-301), the automobile speed limit in this State is fifty-five miles per hour.

Article 3, Section 1, Paragraph 1, of the Constitution of 1877, which was in force at the time of the passage of this act, provides: “The legislative power of the State shall be vested in a General Assembly which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.” Code, § 2-1201.

Only the General Assembly has the right to legislate and prescribe the laws of this State. In our Code may be found many laws of a local-option nature, where the law is defined by the General Assembly but is to take effect in a county upon an election by the people, by the recommendation of a grand jury, or some other defined manner. We also have another type of laws which are enacted by the General Assembly but authorize some designated authority as an administrative body to exercise quasi-legislative functions, and to adopt rules and regulations to carry the law into effect and to provide details therefor. A full and interesting discussion of such laws will be found in Southern Ry. Co. v. Melton, 133 Ga. 277 (65 S. E. 665). See also Abbott v. Commissioners of Fulton County, 160 Ga. 657 (3) (129 S. E. 38); 87 A. L. R. 534, and annotations on p. 546.

But the question here presented does not fall in the category of either of the foregoing. In the instant case, the act attempted to authorize the county commissioners to make a law, by defining the act, the violation of which would be a misdemeanor, and was a plain attempt to delegate the legislative authority of the General Assembly to the county commissioners. See Moseley v. Garrett, 182 Ga. 810 (2) (187 S. E. 20). The act in question sought to give the county commissioners authority to change and modify the terms of an existing penal statute, by permitting them to prescribe a speed limit according to their discretion. This would be a clear delegation of legislative power, and would be tantamount to substituting the discretion of the county commissioners for that of the General Assembly in prescribing the terms of a law. To embark upon such a relaxation of our constitutional provision, as applied to our criminal statutes, would permit a crazy-quilt operation of the speed law and other criminal laws throughout the State. If the law as to the speed limit outside of municipalities can be prescribed by the county commissioners, then the law as to houses which are the subject of burglary can be changed, and even the rules of law defining the various grades of homicide could be redefined. In fact the elements of every criminal statute could be thus changed, thereby permitting the laws of the State to be prescribed according to the whims of the governing authority of each particular county.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur.