Miller vs. McGlaun

Supreme Court of Georgia1879-09

63 Ga. 435

Summary · law.co

Holding. The trial court properly excluded parol evidence of a verbal boundary agreement because the original deeds clearly described the true dividing line without dispute, and transferring land outside those written boundaries requires a written conveyance under the statute of frauds rather than parol proof of an agreed-upon alternative line. The judgment is affirmed.

McGlaun sought to recover approximately twenty-five acres of land forming part of lot 206 in Chattahoochee County, which lay north of a creek. Miller held title to an adjoining lot 211, which lay north of lot 206, with a creek running diagonally across both properties. Miller attempted to introduce parol evidence showing that the original owner of both lots had verbally agreed with his brother (McGlaun's predecessor in title) that the creek would serve as the dividing line between the properties, and that this understanding was later reaffirmed when the property changed hands again. The trial court excluded this parol evidence, and Miller appealed.

The court held that parol evidence of a boundary agreement is admissible only when the parties dispute where the true dividing line between two lots actually runs and agree to fix a specific line as the correct one. Here, no such dispute existed. The original deeds called for the true dividing line between the lots without ambiguity, and both McGlaun's and Miller's written titles covered the soil only to that original line. To convey land beyond the boundaries stated in McGlaun's deed would require a written conveyance under the statute of frauds. A verbal agreement to create a different line than that described in the deed, unsupported by any enclosure, cultivation, or written documentation, cannot bind subsequent property owners and therefore cannot be enforced against McGlaun's title.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Admissibility of parol evidence to establish boundary lines between adjoining lots
Application of the statute of frauds to oral boundary agreements
Whether verbal boundary agreements bind subsequent property owners absent written documentation

Procedural posture

Miller, the defendant in the trial court, appealed from a judgment in favor of McGlaun after the trial court excluded parol evidence of an alleged verbal boundary agreement.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Jackson, Justice.

McGlaun sued Miller for some twenty-five acres of land which lay north of a certain creek, but was part of lot of land number 206, in tbe 32d district of Chattahoochee county. The plaintiff showed written title to 200, and the defendant to 211, an adjoining lot lying north of 206. A creek cut the two lots diagonally into two parts, leaving part of 206 nqrtli of the creek and part of 211 south of it. The defendant, Miller, offered to show that the owner of the two lots in 1853, being in possession of both, sold the north half of 206 to his brother, through whom the plaintiff derived title, and that it was then agreed between the brothers that the creek should be the line; it was carried into execution and remained so for four years while the brothers held the two places : and when the north half of 206 was sold by the brother so holding it to one Webb, through whom also the plaintiff held title, it was agreed that the creek should be the line. There was nothing in either or any deed going to show such line, and the land in dispute was never enclosed or cleared, being swamp, until defendant cleared it in 1877. The deeds called for the dividing line of the two lots without more.

The court ruled the parol proof inadmissable, and the defendant excepted.

If there had been any dispute on the point where the true dividing line-of the two lots ran, and by agreement of the coterminous owners thereof a line had been fixed on as such true line, whether the creek or any other, it cannot be doubted that the parties could do so by verbal ■ agreement, and such agreed line would bind subsequent holders under either, and that proof thereof could be made in pai’ol; but where there is no dispute, and never was any in respect to the true line between the lots, and the deeds called for that line, and the plaintiff’s written title covered soil up to that line, and defendant’s written title covered the soil only up to the same line, not a line agreed upon by any body or in dispute as to location between any parties,but the original line between the lots, then we think that to convey land above or below such true original line so as to bind purchasers without any notice, or any enclosure or cultivation thereof, would require written conveyance under the statute of frauds, and tie proof of the verbal agreement by parol was properly excluded. The plaintiff owned and held lot 206 up to its boundary, and to divest his title thereto a grant must be shown in writing by some of his grantors, and a verbal agreement, not as to where the line of his deed truly ran, or in compromise or settlement of a dispute about that line, but to make a new and totally different line than that described in his deed, cannot be enforced against him. The case in 17 Ga., 141, does not militate against the above ruling, but rather confirms what is here decided.

See also 1 Greenleaf, 145 ; 7 Ga., 228; 24 Pick., 71, cited by counsel for defendant in error, and 11 Mass., 296 ; 19 Wis., 210, cited by plaintiff.

Judgment affirmed.