STATE EX REL. TWIN CITY & SOUTHERN BUS COMPANY v. DISTRICT COURT OF OTTER TAIL COUNTY AND OTHERS

Minnesota Supreme Court1929-06-21No. No. 27,579

178 Minn. 72

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus directing transfer of the case to Hennepin County, holding that the existing statutory construction discriminated against foreign corporations in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and that foreign corporations must receive equal venue treatment with domestic corporations when sued on transitory claims.

A foreign bus corporation operating in Minnesota challenged a district court's denial of its motion to transfer a lawsuit from Otter Tail County to Hennepin County, where the company maintained its principal offices and records. The plaintiff had initiated the action in Otter Tail County under a venue statute permitting plaintiffs to designate any county for suits against foreign corporations, even though the defendant had no operations, agents, or business presence in that county. The defendant sought transfer under a separate statute allowing removal to a county where the foreign corporation maintained an office, resident agent, or place of business.

The court concluded that the existing statutory framework, as previously interpreted, unconstitutionally discriminated against foreign corporations in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause by affording them less favorable venue treatment than domestic corporations. The court overruled its prior decisions endorsing this interpretation and adopted a new construction of the venue statutes that grants foreign corporations sued on transitory causes of action the same venue rights as domestic corporations—namely, the ability to remove suits from counties where they have no business presence to counties where they do maintain operations or representation.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Constitutionality of venue statutes under the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause
Rights of foreign corporations to change venue in transitory actions
Discrimination between foreign and domestic corporations in venue selection

Procedural posture

The defendant foreign corporation petitioned for a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel transfer of the district court files from Otter Tail County to Hennepin County after the district court denied the defendant's motion to transfer venue.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Per Curiam.

Order to show cause why a peremptory writ of mandamus should not issue directing a transfer of the files and records of the cause from the district court of Otter Tail county to Hennepin.

From the petition and the return it appears that defendant is a foreign corporation authorized to and doing business in this state, having the main and head office in Minneapolis, and having no office, agent, place of business, bus or bus line in the county of Otter Tail; that plaintiff’s cause of action is predicated upon a collision with defendant’s bus in the state of Wisconsin; and that defendant’s officers, agents, books and records are in Hennepin county, making it a matter of considerable inconvenience for defendant to try the action in Otter Tail county. The district court denied a motion to transfer the cause from the last named county to the county of Hennepin, defendant having previously made a demand for such change under G. S. 1928 (2 Mason, 1927) § 9215.

Plaintiff laid the venue in Otter Tail county, relying upon this provision found in G. S, 1923 (2 Mason, 1927) § 9211, relating to venue:

“If none of the parties shall reside or be found in the state, or the defendant be a foreign corporation, the action may be begun and tried in any county which the plaintiff shall designate. A domestic corporation other than railroad companies, street railway companies * * shall be considered as residing in any county wherein it has an office, resident agent or business place.”

Defendant cannot be brought within the concluding sentence of the section as properly suable in Otter Tail county, for its transportation line does not reach that county.

Olson v. Osborne & Co. 30 Minn, 444, 15 N. W. 876, and Eickhoff v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. 74 Minn. 139, 76 N. W. 1030, determined that, under the provision cited, a plaintiff may select the venue in a transitory action against a foreign corporation and retain it there for trial except there be a change directed under G. S. 1923 (2 Mason, 1927) § 9216. We are now persuaded that the part of the statute relating to foreign corporations as construed in the cases cited offends the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution, in that it unreasonably discriminates against foreign corporations in favor of domestic, according to Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 490, 47 S. Ct. 678, 71 L. ed. 1165. The statute of Arkansas, there involved, was virtually the same as ours and was given the same effect by the supreme court of that state as in our decisions mentioned. They must therefore be considered as overruled and an interpretation placed upon the whole of said § 9214 which entitles a foreign corporation, sued in this state upon a transitory cause of action in a county where it has no office, resident agent, or place of business, to have it removed under the provisions of § 9215 to a county where “it has an office, resident agent or place of business,” thus according it the same treatment as to venue as a domestic corporation. This result is foreshadowed in State ex rel. Oakland M. C. Co. v. District Court, 176 Minn. 78, 222 N. W. 524.

Let a peremptory writ of mandamus issue as prayed.