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The Georgia Railroad and Banking Co. v. Crawley

Supreme Court of Georgia1891-05-06
87 Ga. 191

Summary

Holding. The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial, because the jury verdict exceeded the amount of damages alleged in the plaintiff's complaint without amendment or court action to adjust the excess amount.

Crawley sued a railroad company for negligently killing his two mules, claiming $200 in damages. A jury returned a verdict in his favor for $278.25, exceeding the amount alleged in his complaint. The railroad moved for a new trial on multiple grounds, including that the verdict exceeded the pleaded amount of damages. The trial court denied the motion.

The court held that a verdict exceeding the amount claimed in the original complaint is improper unless the plaintiff amends the complaint to cover the excess or the court requires the plaintiff to reduce the verdict accordingly. The railroad company argued that the excess represented accrued interest rather than additional damages, but the court rejected this distinction, noting that in tort cases involving property damage, interest cannot be awarded separately as such; any interest component is absorbed into the damages award. Since no amendment was made and the court took no corrective action, the verdict was improper.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether a jury verdict exceeding the pleaded amount of damages is improper
  • Whether interest on damages can be awarded separately from the principal amount in tort cases
  • Whether lack of amendment to cover excess damages requires reversal and new trial

Procedural posture

The defendant appealed from the trial court's denial of its motion for a new trial following a jury verdict in the plaintiff's favor.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Simmons, Justice.

Crawley sued the railroad company for the killing of two mules, alleging in his declaration that the defendant had damaged him $200. . The jury found in his favor $278.25. The defendant made a motion for a new trial, on the grounds that the verdict was contrary to the evidence; that the evidence showed that the defendant exercised all ordinary and reasonable care at the time the mules were killed; that the verdict was for a larger sum than that sued for ; and that no amendment was made covering the excess, and no order passed requiring the plaintiff to write it off The trial judge refused to grant the motion upon either or any of the grounds, and the defendant excepted.

We think the court erred in refusing a new trial. The declaration alleged that the plaintiff bad been damaged in the sum of $200, by the negligent killing of the mules by the defendant.; and the jury by their verdict gave him a larger sum than he claimed in the declaration. The amount of damages claimed in the declaration is the limit of the plaintiff’s recovery, and where the verdict is rendered for a greater sum, the court should set it aside unless the plaintiff amends his declaration to cover the excess. In this case there was no amendment, and no offer to amend, either before or after the verdict, to cover this excess of damages ; nor did the court require the plaintiff to write off the excess, as he should have done if he was otherwise satisfied with the verdict. Giles, ord’y, v. Spinks, 64 Ga. 205 ; 2 Sedg. Dam. (7 ed.) 614 ; 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. of L. 53 ; 3 Estee Plead. §4909 ; 1 Tidd’s Prac. 697 ; Decker v. Parsons, 11 Hun, 295 ; Corning v. Corning, 6 N. Y. 97 ; Manson v. Robinson, 37 Wisc. 339 ; Kelley v. Third Nat. Bank, 64 Ill. 541.

It is claimed, however, by counsel for the defendant in error that this case has been pending nearly ten years; that the proved value of the mules was $175, and that interest on this amount up to the time of the verdict, at seven per cent., would make the sum found by the jury ; that the jury did not find as the principal debt more than the amount laid in the declaration, but added the $78.25 as interest, and therefore the verdict was for no more than was claimed in the declaration. While the jury in a case like this may add interest to the value of the property which has been injured, if they do so it is really not interest but damages. They cannot find so much principal and so much interest — . as they could upon a promissory note, but their verdict must be for so much damages, although it may include interest against the defendant. And if the amount thus found is in excess of the amount claimed in the declaration, the verdict is illegal and should be set aside, unless the declaration is amended or the court requires the excess to be written off.

The court, therefore, should have granted a new trial upon this ground. And we will say that if he had granted it upon the other grounds set out in the motion, we would have sustained his judgment in so doing. The evidence upon the last trial was not materially different from what it was when this case was here before (82 Ga. 190), and it was then held that a verdict against the defendant was contrary to the evidence, and the grant of a new trial by the court below was approved on this ground.

We reverse the judgment, with direction that the ease be tried again in the court below, unless the plaintiff should elect to dismiss his. action.

Judgment reversed, with direction.