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McLeod et al. v. Swain

Supreme Court of Georgia1891-04-20
87 Ga. 156

Summary

Holding. The trial court properly admitted testimony regarding declarations made by the deceased occupant of the land, as such statements disparaging the declarant's own interest in the property are admissible under statutory and common-law principles and may be used for or against third parties. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Mrs. Swain brought an ejectment action to recover land in Emanuel County against McLeod and others. A former occupant of the property, Mrs. Wiggins, had been established as Swain's tenant through Swain's own testimony. The court permitted evidence of statements Mrs. Wiggins made while occupying the land, in which she acknowledged holding it as Swain's tenant. The defendants objected to admission of these hearsay statements.

The central legal question concerned whether declarations by a deceased occupant describing the nature of her possession could be admitted to establish ownership claims. The court examined statutory authority and established common-law principles governing declarations against proprietary interest. Such statements, when made by a person in possession and disparaging their own title interest, are admissible not only against the declarant and those claiming through the declarant, but also against third parties and strangers to the transaction. The rationale rests on the principle that possession presumptively indicates absolute ownership, so any statement limiting that interest is inherently self-limiting and therefore reliable.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Admissibility of declarations by deceased occupants concerning the nature of their possession
  • Whether such declarations are limited to use against the declarant and those in privity, or may be used against third parties
  • Application of the 'declarations against interest' exception to hearsay

Procedural posture

The defendants appealed from a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment action, challenging the trial court's admission of hearsay testimony regarding declarations by a deceased tenant.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Lumpkin, Justice.

Mrs. Swain brought an action of ejectment against McLeod et al. for the recovery of a tract of land in Emanuel county. The evidence was conflicting, and sufficient to sustain a verdict for either side. The jury found for the plaintiff. After Mrs. Swain had proved by her own testimony that a certain Mrs. Wiggins, who at one time was in possession of the land and remained in possession for many years until her death, was her tenant, the court, over defendants’ objection, admitted proof of declarations made by Mrs. Wiggins, while in possession of the land, to the eflect that she held it as the tenant of plaintiff, and that it was the laud of plaintiff.- The only question of law presented in this case for our determination is, whether or not this testimony was properly admitted.

Section 8776 of the code declares that “The declarations and entries of a person, since deceased, against his interest, and not made with a view to pending litigation, are admissible in evidence in any case.” It was contended in the argument that such declarations should be received only against the declarant and those in privity with or claiming under him, but this view does not seem to be sustained, by the authorities. It was held in the case of Peaceable v. Watson, 4 Taunt. 15, that “The declarations of a deceased occupier of land of whom he held the land, are evidence of the seisin of that person” ; and in Davies v. Pierce et al., 2 Term Rep. 53, that “Declarations by tenants are admissible evidence after their death to show that a certain piece of land is parcel of the estate -which they occupied.” In both these cases, the declarations admitted were made by persons not in privity with any of the parties to the record, nor did any of such parties in any way claim title through or under the declarants. Again : “ Statements of a deceased occupier touching his title are admissible in evidence generally, without reference to the particular effect they may produce in the cause.” Carne v. Nicoll, 27 C. L. Rep. 446. See, also, Barry v. Bebbington, 4 Term Rep. 514.

We find the following in 1 Taylor on Evidence, §684 : “Under the head of declarations against proprietary interest, may be classed the statements made by persons while in possession of land, explanatory of the character of their possession ; and it is now well settled that such declarations, if made in disparagement of the declarant’s title, are receivable, not only as original admissions against himself and all persons who claim title through him, but also as evidence for or against strangers. Whether in this latter eveut they are admissible in the lifetime of the declarant, or only in cases where his death can be proved, is a point which does not appear to have been distinctly decided. In most of the cases where the evidence has been received, the declarant was dead; but on two occasions, at least, the evidence was admitted though the declarant was living.” Wharton also lays down the rule that such evidence is admissible, not only against privies, but strangers. “The reason for this conclusion is, that possession implies, prima facie, an absolute interest, and any statement which would tend to limit it to a less interest is self-dissevering.” 2 Whart. Ev¿ §1156. The same principle is stated in 1 Greenl’f on Ev. §109, and the same reason for the admissibility of such declarations is there given.

These authorities abundantly sustain the correctness of the ruling made by the court below, and its judgment is therefore Affirmed.