S. S. Norris, plaintiff in error, vs. P. S. Miller and others, defendants

Supreme Court of Georgia1856-08No. No. 99

20 Ga. 563

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed that the copy deed should not have been withdrawn from the jury, and the plaintiff is not entitled to recover possession of the premises because, as a stranger to the original deed, the plaintiff lacks standing to enforce a condition in the conveyance from the Jones family to the trustees.

The plaintiff sought to recover possession of land from the defendant. The defendant had originally consented to the introduction of a copy deed into evidence but later moved to have it withdrawn, claiming the witness who produced it was one of the plaintiff's lessors. The court declined to withdraw the document, reasoning that the defendant's counsel had voluntarily admitted it, the defendant failed to raise the conflict of interest promptly despite it being apparent from the case documents, and the plaintiff had relied on the defendant's consent by not securing the original document.

On the merits, the court held that the plaintiff could not succeed in claiming possession based on an alleged breach of a condition in the original deed from the Jones family to the academy trustees. Even if the condition had been broken, only the original grantors (the Jones family) or their heirs could take advantage of the breach through entry or ejectment. The plaintiff, as a stranger to the original conveyance, had no standing to assert the condition's breach. The plaintiff entered the property either as a tenant of the trustees or as a squatter, and in either case remained subordinate to the trustees' title at the time of entry.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether the court should have withdrawn a copy deed from jury consideration after defendant's initial consent to its introduction
Whether a party not party to a conveyance may enforce a condition subsequent in that deed
Distinction between conditional estates and estates with limitations regarding forfeiture

Procedural posture

This was an appeal from a jury verdict in a possessory action brought by Norris against Miller and others, with the defendant challenging both evidentiary and substantive rulings.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

By the Court.

Lumpkin, J.

delivering the opinion.

Ought the Cburt to have withdrawn from the Jury the copy deed from the Jones’ to the trustees of the academy?

We think not. It had gone to‘the Jury by the consent of defendant’s Counsel. What induced them to give that consent does not appear. It may have been from the fact that the original deed; if insisted on, could have Been produced. .Neither could the Court judicially know what inducedthem to call upon the Court to revoke their consent to the introduction of this copy. They stated it was because they had discóvered that the person who produced the deed, undera ‘ subpoena duces técum, was one of the lessors of the plaintiff. ..And chis may be true. But how could the Court know it ? And suppose it was, was not the party guilty of culpable negligence in overlooking a matter apparent on the face of the ‘ declaration ?

Besides, the plaintiff had acted upon the consent of the deifendant, that the copy deed should be read in evidence; and ¡¡perhaps Mr. Wadsworth, who had possession of the original ■deed and who had been in attendance on the Court, prepared do produce it, it may be if found necessary, had left, so as to ■make it impossible to supply the -primary proof, should the ¡secondary be withdrawn.

Were the plaintiffs entitled to recover possession of the premises under the testimony ? Even upon the view taIken of the case by the defendant’s Counsel, they would be entitled to recover one-half of the land. His position is, that ¡the paramount title was out of the trustees, having reverted -ito-Wm.-R. and John B. Jones, the feoffors of the trustees,,on ■account ¡of a forfeiture of’tbe condition upon which they held: ¡that is, that it should be used for school purposes. Now ad- ¡íüitting this to be true, still, as John B. Jones is one of the ’ ¡grantors of the trustees and lessors of the, plaintiff, the ver(dietimust be for half of the land.

But what áre the facts ? Norris went into possession . ■ either as a squatter or as the tenant of the trustees. For, although the testimony do.es not disclose how he go,t in, the ¡prpof is, that he went in while the possession of the trustees -.•continued; If he went in as their tenant, he cannot dispute his landlord’s title. If, as a squatter, he held in subordination to the title of the true owner, which at the time, was the • trustees. In any evént, they were entitled, therefore, to eject ¡him. ■ ■

But what has Mr. Norris to protect himself, upon the ground that the condition in the deed from the Jones’ to the trustees is broken ? He, as a stranger, cannot take advantage of it. For a condition does not defeat the estate, although it be broken, until entry by the grantor or his heirs. And conditions can only be reserved for the benefit of the .grantor and his heirs. And this constitutes the distinction .between a condition and a limitation. By the latter, the estate is determined when the period of limitation arrives with.out entry or claim. And no act is requisite to vest the right in him who has the next expectant interest. But in conditional estates like this, there must be an actual entry or an .action of ejectment brought as a substitute by the grantor or his heirs, and by them only. We repeat, a stranger cannot take advantage of the breach of the condition. And this is the sole defence set up by Norris.