James E. REDUS, Appellant, v. Harold R. SWENSON, Appellee

United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit1972-10-04No. No. 72-1215

468 F.2d 606

Summary · law.co

Holding. The court affirmed the District Court's denial of habeas corpus, holding that Redus entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily upon competent legal advice, and that even if his prior confession was coerced, this did not render the guilty plea involuntary where counsel competently advised him at the time of pleading.

James Redus appealed the denial of federal habeas corpus relief following his guilty plea to second-degree murder in Missouri state court. Redus challenged his conviction on multiple grounds, claiming his confession was coerced, his counsel was ineffective, and his guilty plea was involuntary as a result of the allegedly coerced confession. The District Court rejected these claims, and Redus appealed to the Eighth Circuit.

The central question on appeal was whether Redus entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily based on competent legal advice. The court concluded that even assuming the confession was coerced, a guilty plea remains valid if the defendant receives competent counsel at the time of pleading. Here, Redus's attorneys actively sought to suppress the alleged incriminating statements and, after that motion failed, advised him to plead guilty to the lesser charge of second-degree murder rather than risk the death penalty at trial for first-degree murder. The court found this advice was not incompetent merely because Redus later disagreed with the strategy in hindsight.

Regarding the ineffective assistance claim, the court established that to prevail, Redus would need to demonstrate his attorney's deliberate abandonment of ethical duties, not simply that counsel's advice proved unpalatable upon reflection. The court affirmed that the District Court properly denied the writ without an evidentiary hearing, noting Redus had received a full hearing in state court and the trial judge's findings were supported by the record.

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Key issues

Whether a guilty plea is invalid if preceded by a coerced confession
Standard for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment
Whether competent counsel must provide advice that withstands hindsight scrutiny
Proper scope of federal habeas review of state court convictions

Procedural posture

Redus appealed the federal District Court's denial of his habeas corpus petition, which had affirmed the state trial court's and Missouri Supreme Court's prior rejections of his motion to vacate his guilty plea conviction.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from a denial of habeas corpus by Judge William H. Webster, District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri. Petitioner, Redus, is presently serving a 20 year sentence after pleading guilty to second degree murder in the Circuit Court of the City St. Louis on November 3, 1966. On March 17, 1970, petitioner moved to have the judgment and sentence vacated in the Circuit Court of St. Louis alleging his constitutional rights had been infringed setting forth that:

(1) Involuntary statements were extracted from him during questioning ;

(2) Ineffective assistance of counsel;

(3) His plea of guilty was involuntary since it was the product of a coerced confession.

The trial court denied petitioner’s requested relief, and the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the denial. Redus v. State (Mo.1971), 470 S.W.2d 539.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court which was denied by Judge Webster under date of February 29, 1972, 339 F.Supp. 571. Petitioner then sought a certificate of probable cause which the District Court denied on March 15, 1972. On April 14, 1972, we granted petitioner’s application for a certificate of probable cause.

The question dispositive of this appeal is whether the record demonstrates that petitioner understandingly and voluntarily entered his plea of guilty to second degree murder on the competent advice of counsel. Even if it were assumed that petitioner’s plea was brought about by a prior coerced confession, such a plea would not be rendered invalid per se so long as when entering the guilty plea, petitioner received competent advice from counsel. McMann v. Richardson (1970), 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763. Here, petitioner’s attorneys both sought suppression of the allegedly incriminating statements said to have been recorded by the Circuit Attorney’s office. In view of the motion’s denial and for fear that a plea of not guilty might result in the death penalty, petitioner,, upon counsel’s advice, plead guilty to 2nd degree murder — a reaction not uncommon to one harboring suspicion of the unforeseeable outcome of a trial for 1st degree murder.

As we stated in Robinson v. United States (8th Cir. 1971), 448 F.2d 1255, 1256, in order for a Sixth Amendment assertion of denial of effective assistance of counsel to lie, the attendant circumstances must be such that counsel must demonstrate a “deliberate abdication of [his] ethical duty to his client.” There must be “such conscious conduct as to render pretextual an attorney’s legal obligation to fairly represent the defendant.” The mere assertion by petitioner that he retrospectively considers counsel’s advice to have been ungainly does little more than tilt at windmills. See McMann v. Richardson, supra, 397 U.S. at 771, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763. Furthermore, that a guilty plea must be intelligently made does not contemplate that all advice offered by counsel withstand the scrutiny of hindsight in a postconviction proceeding. Although the Constitution guarantees the right to competent counsel, we cannot expect counsel to be omniscient or clairvoyant. In view of the attendant circumstances and with particular emphasis placed upon the uncertainty which faced petitioner had he pleaded not guilty, we cannot label the advice rendered by counsel as incompetent.

We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that the record demonstrates that petitioner understandingly and voluntarily entered his plea of guilty to the charge of 2nd degree murder upon advice of competent counsel.

It is also our view that the District Court proceeded properly in denying the writ without an evidentiary hearing. The transcript of the post-conviction evidentiary hearing indicates that petitioner was granted a full and fair evidentiary hearing at which petitioner was represented by appointed counsel. The findings of fact and conclusions of law filed by the State Trial Judge denying a writ and resolving the factual issues involved are amply supported by the record. Parrott v. Brewer, 421 F.2d 1386 (C.A.8, 1970).

Affirmed.