HENRY LOBNITZ AND OTHERS v. D. L. FAIRCHILD

Minnesota Supreme Court1932-05-27No. No. 28,813

186 Minn. 215

Summary · law.co

Holding. The trial court erred in declining to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel and in refusing to amend its findings. The case is remanded for a new trial, as the evidence requires a finding that the plaintiffs are estopped from claiming title to the ground covered by the building.

This boundary dispute arose from a foundry building constructed in 1921 on what the parties believed to be lot seven. A mechanic's lien claimant named Dahl obtained a lien on the property, and in a stipulation made openly in court, all parties agreed the building sat entirely on lot seven. Based on this understanding, Dahl relinquished any claim to lot six. However, it later emerged that the building actually extended onto the southern portion of lot six. The defendant acquired title to lot seven through a sheriff's sale following Dahl's lien judgment, while the plaintiffs acquired lots six, seven, and eight through a mortgage foreclosure. The trial court determined the boundary according to the official city plat and refused to apply the equitable doctrine of estoppel.

The appellate court concluded that the solemn stipulation in open court constituted an equitable estoppel preventing the plaintiffs from later claiming title to the portion of lot six covered by the building. All parties had relied on the agreed-upon boundary, and Dahl had voluntarily relinquished his potential claim to lot six in reliance on that representation. The plaintiffs, having acquired title with knowledge that the defendant's grantor possessed the building and standing in the shoes of the original parties to the mechanic's lien action, must be bound by the earlier conduct and representations.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether equitable estoppel applies when parties stipulate to a property boundary in open court based on a solemn representation
Whether successors in title are bound by equitable estoppel created through their grantors' conduct
Whether the trial court must make findings on uncontradicted factual claims supporting an estoppel defense

Procedural posture

Defendant appealed from the trial court's order denying his motion for a new trial in an action to determine the boundary line between city lots.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Wilson, C. J.

Defendant appealed from an order denying his motion for a new trial.

The action is to determine a boundary line between city lots, and the trial court determined the line according to the city plat, declining to apply the doctrine of estoppel and later refused to amend the findings.

In 1921, while the Minnesota Implement Company owned lots one to ten, inclusive, of a certain block in an addition to Willmar, it built a foundry building 40 x 60 on what ivas supposed to be lot seven, which lies between lots six and eight. One Dahl furnished labor and material therefor. He filed a mechanic’s lien on lots five, six, and seven. The company gave a mortgage on all the lots to the Mineapolis Trust Company and T. O. Gilbert, trustees. It then became insolvent, and Edwin F. Fink was appointed receiver. The Standard Lumber Company also filed a lien, and it later instituted an action to foreclose its lien, joining the usual and necessary parties. The Standard Lumber Company’s claim for lien was denied, but Dahl was given a lien for his claim for about $1,810.75, and it was adjudged superior to said mortgage.

In the mechanic’s lien action the question arose as to the description of the tract of land on which the foundry building was located. After some investigation it ivas stipulated in open court, and because thereof the court found as a fact, that the building was located on lot seven. Because thereof lots five and six with the consent of Dahl were dropped out of the proceedings. Pursuant to the judgment entered in the mechanic’s lien suit lot seven was sold by the sheriff to Mr. Dahl for $1,920. The sale was confirmed. No redemption was made. Dahl so acquired title and sold it to the defendant herein.

On a foreclosure of said mortgage the premises were sold to Victor Bergquist. No redemption was made. Bergquist later conveyed to plaintiffs. This included lots six, seven, and eight, but of course was ineffectual as to lot seven.

The building was not all on lot seven. It in fact extends over onto and covers the south 60 feet of the west 14 feet of lot six. This was unknown to any of the parties until after defendant acquired title.

Dahl had the right to claim a lien on all the ground the building covered. His lien did cover it. In reliance upon the stipulation so made in open court, he relinquished all claim to that part of lot six upon which the building was located. The solemn stipulation in open court was a representation that the building was entirely on lot seven. All parties acquiesced therein. It was understood and agreed by all of them that the lien claimant Dahl was acquiring a judgment for the sale of the ground upon which the building was located. This and other things were pleaded in the answer as constituting an estoppel. Such conduct of the parties does constitute an equitable estoppel to claim later that the building was not upon the property as all the parties supposed. Plain tiffs stand in the shoes of the Minnesota Implement Company and its successors who were parties to the mechanics lien action. They are its privies, and upon the record before us they must abide by the conduct of their grantors. 9 C. J. 240; Thompson v. Borg, 90 Minn. 209, 95 N. W. 896; Bolton v. Eggleston, 61 Iowa, 163, 16 N. W. 62; Mowers v. Evers, 117 Mich. 93, 75 N. W. 290; 7 Minn. L. Rev. 569.

When plaintiffs acquired their title they were informed that they did not get the building or any part of it. They had in substance the same knowledge as their grantors. When plaintiffs negotiated for and purchased their title defendants grantor was in possession of the building. We are of the opinion that the evidence requires a finding that plaintiffs are estopped from claiming title to the ground covered by the building. It is clear that defendant claims but a 56-foot lot. What plaintiffs lose from lot six they gain from the westerly side of lot seven. They own the land on both sides of defendant’s premises. Of course if either party desires to stand on his legal rights there will be a 14-foot jog 60 feet back. This should be easily adjusted.

It was error for the trial court not to make findings as to the facts, which seem uncontradicted in the record and which defendant claims support the doctrine of estoppel. It was also error to refuse to amend the findings covering the same element; hence a new trial is granted.