Essex RAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Harry FRITZ, Superintendent, Auburn Correctional Facility, Defendant-Appellee

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit1972-10-19No. No. 115, Docket 72-1455

468 F.2d 586

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Holding. The court remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that because Ray's lawsuit sought only monetary damages and no state administrative or judicial remedy was adequately available for such claims, the exhaustion requirement did not bar his federal § 1983 action and the district court erred in dismissing it.

Essex Ray, a prisoner, filed a federal civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking monetary damages after alleging that prison officials unlawfully deprived him of good time credit and placed him in punitive confinement. The district court dismissed the case, reasoning that Ray had failed to exhaust state administrative remedies before bringing his federal action. The appellate court reversed, finding that the exhaustion requirement did not apply to Ray's claim because he sought only damages rather than relief affecting the conditions or length of his confinement. The court noted that New York's administrative remedies for prisoners do not address damage claims, and that significant questions existed about whether Ray would have had an adequate state judicial remedy available to him as an active prisoner seeking damages against prison officials.

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Key issues

Whether exhaustion of state administrative remedies is required before filing a federal § 1983 suit by a prisoner seeking damages
Whether a prisoner's damage claim against prison officials is subject to different exhaustion standards than claims challenging conditions of confinement
Availability of state judicial remedies for prisoner damage claims under New York law

Procedural posture

The district court dismissed Ray's § 1983 complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and Ray appealed.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

PER CURIAM;

Essex Ray, an inmate of Clinton Correctional Facility, Dannemora, New York, sued in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that prison authorities had deprived him of good time credit and placed him in punitive confinement, thereby violating his constitutional rights. Relying upon Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841, 91 S.Ct. 82, 27 L.Ed.2d 75 (1970), Chief Judge Foley dismissed the complaint because plaintiff had failed to exhaust state administrative remedies before filing his section 1983 action. Oddly enough, although appellant was allegedly deprived of a substantial good time allowance, his complaint seeks only damages. New York State administrative remedies for prisoners do not apply to damage claims. Therefore, whatever effect the Supreme Court decisions in Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 92 S.Ct. 407, 30 L.Ed.2d 418 (1971) (per curiam), and Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669, 92 S.Ct. 1232, 31 L.Ed.2d 569 (1972) (per curiam), may have upon the Eisen requirement that administrative remedies must be exhausted, that doctrine is inapplicable here.

We would thus remand without further ado were it not for the grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court in Oswald v. Rodriguez, 407 U.S. 919, 92 S.Ct. 2459, 32 L.Ed.2d 805 (1972), decided by this court en banc sub nom. Rodriguez v. McGinnis, 456 F.2d 79 (1972). In that ease, two members of this panel took the position that applications by state prisoners seeking a change in the length or conditions of confinement should be regarded as petitions for habeas corpus no matter what they were called, and subject to the requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) that state judicial remedies be exhausted. However, that view would not affect a prisoner’s suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking only damages. Moreover, there is a serious question whether appellant — according to the record before us, still a prison inmate — would have an adequate state judicial remedy for damages in any event. In the most recent case on the question, the New York State Supreme Court ruled that the section of the Correction Law (now section 24) regulating actions for damages arising from the acts of prison employees did not repeal the general provisions of section 79 of the New York Civil Rights Law, McKinney’s Consol.Laws, c. 6, O’Brien v. McGinnis, 63 Misc.2d 170, 311 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1970); contra, Cataliotti v. State, 61 Misc.2d 204, 305 N.Y.S.2d 28 (Ct.Cl. 1969). Section 79 provides that a prisoner serving a sentence for any term less than life is deprived “during the term of the sentence” of his civil rights (presumably including the right to institute suits against prison officials). Thus, the latest New York view seems to be that a suit for damages under the Correction Law is not now available to appellant. All the members of this panel agree that in the absence of an adequate state administrative or judicial remedy, a federal court must hear a suit by a prisoner under section 1983. Under these circumstances, we do not think it appropriate to delay disposition of this case, as appellee suggests, until the Supreme Court decides Rodriguez.

Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

. When the lawsuit began, appellant was confined at Auburn Correctional Facility, Auburn, New York.

. Prior to 1970 the statutory provision limiting suits against commissioners, officers and employees of the Department of Corrections was codified in section 6-b. In 1970 the section was amended in minor details, N.Y.Sess.Laws c. 476 § 3 (1970) (McKinney), and renumbered as section 24. N.Y.Sess.Laws c. 475 § 5 (1970) (McKinney). In 1971 the provision was repealed, N.Y.Sess.Laws c. 1104 § 1 (1971) (McKinney), and this year a new section 24 was enacted. N.Y.Sess.Laws c. 283 § 15 (1972) (McKinney). The new law forecloses private damage suits against prison employees for actions “within the scope of [their] employment and in the discharge of [their] duties,” but, like its predecessors, permits the injured party to sue the state in the Court of Claims.