COLSTON et al. v. HUTCHINSON et al.

Supreme Court of Georgia1951-11-13No. No. 17647

208 Ga. 559

Summary · law.co

Holding. The trial court erred in granting the interlocutory injunction because the plaintiffs had adequate remedies at law available through mandamus or appeal to the State Board of Education. The judgment is reversed.

County boards of education possess exclusive control over public school management under the state constitution, and courts generally will not interfere with their decisions unless they violate law. The plaintiffs, as residents and taxpayers, sought an injunction to prevent the county board from transferring students out of Adrian School to other schools within the county. However, the court found that the plaintiffs had adequate legal remedies available to them under the same statute they relied upon in their complaint.

The statute at issue provided two explicit remedies for addressing the board's failure to arrange school attendance: parents could either compel the board through mandamus proceedings or appeal to the State Board of Education. Although the plaintiffs brought suit as taxpayers rather than parents, citizens and taxpayers possess sufficient interest in the performance of public duties to pursue mandamus actions. Because these adequate remedies at law existed, the court determined that equitable relief through injunction was inappropriate.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether county boards of education have exclusive control over school management
Whether equitable relief is available when adequate remedies at law exist
Whether taxpayers have standing to pursue mandamus against school boards
Whether statutory remedies for school attendance disputes preclude injunctive relief

Procedural posture

The trial court granted an interlocutory injunction in an action brought by residents and taxpayers challenging the county board of education's transfer of students from Adrian School to other county schools.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

Duckworth, Chief Justice.

The Constitution of 1945 (Code, Ann., § 2-6801) declares that “Each county, exclusive of any independent school system now in existence in a county, shall compose one school district and shall be confined to the control and management of a County Board of Education.” Thus, by the Constitution, is the control and management of the public schools, other than independent school systems existing in 1945, placed under the exclusive control and management of the county boards of education. By statute (Code, Ann. Supp., § 32-910; Ga. L. 1919, p. 324; 1947, pp. 1189, 1190), rulings by the county boards of education are reviewable by the State Board of Education. See Boney v. Bd. of Educ. of Telfair County, 203 Ga. 152 (45 S. E. 2d, 442). Repeatedly and uniformly this court has held that the control and management of the public schools is in the county boards of education, and will not be interfered with by the courts except in cases where that control and management is contrary to law. Keever v. Bd. of Educ. of Gwinnett County, 188 Ga. 299, 301 (3 S. E. 2d, 886); Fordham v. Harrell, 197 Ga. 135 (28 S. E. 2d, 463); Boney v. Bd. of Educ. of Telfair County, 203 Ga. 152 (supra); Pass v. Pickens, 204 Ga. 629 (51 S. E. 2d, 405); Burton v. Kearse, 204 Ga. 765 (51 S. E. 2d, 796). But the present action alleges that the county board of education has failed and refused to perform duties laid upon it by provisions of Code (Ann. Supp.) § 32-938 (Ga. L. 1919, p. 331; 1946, pp. 206, 208). It is contended that the defendants, under the Code section relied upon, were under a duty to send the children residing in Johnson County and within the Adrian School District to the Adrian School, and the petitioners seek to enjoin them from sending those children to other schools in Johnson County. Counsel for the petitioners rely upon the decision in McRae v. Grace, 179 Ga. 872 (177 S. E. 707), and assert that the defendants can not lawfully withdraw said children from the Adrian School without the consent of the school authorities of Emanuel County. Without here going into the decision in that case, where it appeared that by certain actions of the counties involved, the school was established, in the present case there is nothing to indicate the method of establishing the Adrian School. It might be observed that in Fordham v. Harrell, 197 Ga. 135 (supra), this court upheld action by a county board of education very similar to the action here complained of. However, well-established rules of law prevent our ruling upon the contention made by the petitioners. Equity will grant relief only where there is no available and adequate and complete remedy at law. Code § 37-102. In the identical Code section upon which the petitioners base their case (Code, Ann. Supp., § 32-938), it is provided that, if the county authorities fail to arrange or contract for the attendance of the children in the school in question, parents of those children may compel the county board by mandamus to so provide for such school attendance upon the part of the children, or they may appeal to the State Board of Education, either of which remedies at law would be adequate in the present case, and no reason is shown why those remedies are inadequate or have not been pursued. If it be claimed that the remedies thus specified by the statute are available only to parents, and hence not available to residents and taxpayers, which is the capacity in which the present action is brought, we instantly encounter the rule that a citizen and taxpayer has such an interest in the performance of duty of public officers as will authorize the maintenance of an action at law to compel by mandamus the performance of official duties. Thomas v. Ragsdale, 188 Ga. 238 (3 S. E. 2d, 567).

While it is true in this case that the trial judge failed to rule upon the demurrer which raised the point that adequate remedies at law existed, yet the judgment granting an interlocutory injunction is one granting relief in equity, and is erroneous if an adequate remedy at law was available. Having held that such remedy exists, we therefore hold that the court erred in granting the interlocutory injunction complained of.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur.