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Abner Sutton, plaintiff in error, vs. Duncan McLeod, defendant in error

Supreme Court of Georgia1860-01
29 Ga. 589

Summary

Holding. The judgment is reversed on the ground that the trial court erred by submitting to the jury the question of whether the defendant had satisfied the seven-year statutory possession requirement, when the undisputed evidence established only six years of possession, which failed to support his statutory title as a matter of law.

The case involves competing land grants to the same property—an older grant to Isaac Perry from 1795 and a newer grant issued in 1845. The defendant McLeod held title under the newer grant and claimed seven years of possession under Sheriff's deeds. The court held that the trial judge properly admitted the copy grants and correctly refused to instruct the jury that the land had reverted to the state before the newer grant issued, since the plaintiff provided no evidence to support such a presumption. However, the court found reversible error in allowing the jury to determine whether the defendant had held the land for the statutory seven-year period required for statutory protection, when the evidence showed only six years of possession at most.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Admissibility of copy grants to establish rival land titles
  • Burden of proving land reversion to the state
  • Sufficiency of possession period to qualify for statutory title protection
  • Role of jury versus court in deciding questions of law on undisputed facts

Procedural posture

The defendant in error was the successful defendant at trial; the plaintiff in error appeals from the verdict and seeks review of instructional error.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

— Lumpkin J.

By the Court.

delivering the opinion.

The preliminary proof submitted to the Court, was sufficient, according to the 51st Common Law Rule of Practice, with which we are not disposed to interfere, to entitle the defendant to introduce the copy grants to Isaac Perry.

We see no error in the Court’s refusing to charge, as asked by plaintiff’s counsel, that the presumption was, that the ■title to the land in controversy had reverted to the State before -the younger grant issued. There was no proof offered by the plaintiff to raise such a presumption, and the. burden was upon him. For any thing that appeared to the contrary Isaac Perry, the original grantee, may have been, living in Emanuel county when this case was tried.

The oldgrants bear date in 1795. Had proof been made that the grantee had not been known in that section of the State, from that time down, or for a half century, or any oth.-er Jong series of years, nor his heirs at law or representatives, ■or any one claiming said land as his, the jury would have been justified in presuming that the land had reverted to the State before it was re-granted in 1845. For I hold, that every reasonable presumption should be made against these old land titles. The public peace, as well as justice to private rights which have intervened, demand the enforcement of ■this policy to the fullest extent.

We think the verdict of the jury, as originally rendered in ■this case, was sufficient. There was no impropriety, however, in directing it to be amended. In finding for the defendant the premises in dispute, they find that portion of the land covered by both the old and new grants.

We are of the opinion, however, that it was error in the ■Court to refer it to the jury to find that the defendant would ■be protected by his statutory title, provided he had held possession of the land seven years, under his Sheriff’s deeds, ■when there was not a particle of proof to authorize such a verdict. On the contrary, the utmost limit to which the evidence went, wag that he may have occupied the land six years before the action was brought. This then should not have been submitted to the jury as an open question, but they .should have been instructed, as a matter of law, upon the facts proven andundisputed^ feat the defendáni Haá wholly L-.-í o v,;r :’.c,op.i.’íi!" ti’íüííj.-i v ’ o \ín Tailedto sustain his statutory; title. . ;

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