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Merritt v. Merritt

Supreme Court of Georgia1953-09-15No. 18273
210 Ga. 39

Summary

Holding. The trial court properly sustained the general demurrer to the petition seeking to vacate the divorce decree, as a litigant cannot obtain a judgment and subsequently vacate it based on facts known or knowable at the time of the original proceeding. The judgment is affirmed.

Melvina Merritt sought to vacate a divorce decree previously entered in her favor, claiming she did not understand the legal consequences of her actions. She alleged that she had resumed living with her ex-husband, believing this did not constitute condonation of his alleged cruelty, and that she was unaware of the legal significance of filing for divorce or the meaning of condonation. She also claimed the defendant fraudulently induced her to file the divorce petition. The trial court dismissed her petition by sustaining a general demurrer.

The court rejected her arguments, holding that her lack of knowledge about the law could not justify overturning a judgment she had obtained. The court reasoned that litigants are presumed to know the law and cannot use the courts strategically by first obtaining a favorable judgment and then attempting to vacate it based on facts they knew or should have known when they pursued the original action. Allowing such conduct would constitute an improper use of judicial processes.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Whether lack of knowledge of legal consequences can invalidate a voluntary judicial action
  • Application of the legal doctrine of condonation in divorce proceedings
  • Whether a party may attack a judgment obtained through her own action based on her claimed ignorance of the law

Procedural posture

The trial court sustained a general demurrer to the plaintiff's amended petition to vacate a divorce decree, and the plaintiff appealed.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Wyatt, Justice.

Mrs. Melvina Merritt brought suit against Earlie Merritt, seeking to vacate and set aside a decree of divorce theretofore granted between the parties. She alleged in substance that she had been previously presented with a petition for divorce in behalf of the defendant in error with a request that she waive service in writing; that, because of false allegations in said petition, she refused to sign an acknowledgment of service or waiver of service; that it was then suggested that she file suit for divorce against the defendant in error, which she agreed to do; that the petition for divorce was then prepared for her by the attorneys who had drawn up the petition for her husband, which she verified to be true; that thereafter the parties resumed marital relations; that, just prior to the beginning of the term of the court to which the petition was returnable, the defendant in error became angry with her, used harsh words to her and denied her access to her home, but that she does not consider this to be in any manner a violation of any agreement under which condonation of previous acts had been accomplished; that, upon the trial of her petition for divorce against the defendant in error, she was present in court and testified in support of her allegations, “not knowing that the resumed- marital relations . . : ■ amounted in law . . . to a condonation of the acts of cruelty alleged in her petition”; that she did not know the significance of the request that she file suit for divorce, and did not know the legal effect of condonation or the meaning of condone; that the petitioner now pleads condonation after the filing of her suit for divorce and that the decree of- divorce -previously granted is void and should be so declared by the court; that the conduct of the defendant in error amounted to a fraud against her, and for this reason the decree should be declared ■ void. The defendant in error filed a general demurrer to the petition as amended and the demurrer was sustained. To- this judgment, the ■ plaintiff excepted. Held:

1. While-the facts in the instant case are different from the-facts in Fender v. Crosby, 209 Ga. 896 (76 S. E. 2d 769), the principle involved in the two cases is the’ same, and the instant ease is controlled by Fender v. Crosby, supra. See also Don v. Don, 162 Ga. 240 (133 S. E. 242), and Wallis v. Watson, 184 Ga. 38 (190 S. E. 360). The fact that the petitioner alleges that she did not know the legal effect of her conduct in resuming cohabitation with the defendant in error, and that she did not know the significance of filing suit for divorce can make no difference in this case. She is presumed to know the law and certainly- knew that, when she filed a suit for divorce, a divorce would result, if the suit was maintained. She cannot induce a court to render a judgment in her favor, and then maintain an action to vacate that judgment because of facts of which she was or should have been fully aware at the time she procured the judgment. Litigants will not be permitted to so trifle with the courts. It follows, the judgment of the court below sustaining the general demurrer to the petition was not error.

Argued July 13, 1953

Decided September 15, 1953.

Moore & Oberry, for plaintiff in error.

Grantham & Smith, E. R. Smith, Jr., contra.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Atkinson, P.J., not participating.