JONES et al. v. UNITED STATES

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit1934-10-09No. No. 5209

72 F.2d 873

Summary · law.co

Holding. The judgment of conviction is affirmed. The court held that the formal title of the post office official is immaterial to the crime—what matters is that the victim had lawful charge or custody of mail; appellants' stipulation to facts through counsel was binding and could not be repudiated; the jury's verdict must be accepted where evidence was conflicting and credibility determinations favored the prosecution; and any error in the indictment's multiple counts was cured by submission of only one count to the jury.

Appellants were convicted of assault and attempted robbery of a post office employee in Dahinda, Illinois. They challenged their conviction on three grounds: first, that the victim was not officially an assistant postmaster; second, that the court should have granted their motion for a directed verdict based on conflicting evidence and an alibi defense; and third, that the indictment contained multiple counts but the case was submitted to the jury on only one count. The court rejected all three arguments.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

Whether the victim's formal title as assistant postmaster is a necessary element of mail robbery
Whether counsel can bind a party through stipulations regarding foundational facts
Whether a directed verdict is appropriate when evidence conflicts and jury credibility determinations favor conviction
Whether submission of a single count to the jury, rather than all counts in the indictment, constitutes reversible error

Procedural posture

Appellants appealed their conviction for assault and attempted robbery of a post office employee, raising three grounds for reversal.

Authorities cited

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Opinion · public domain

majority opinion

EVANS, Circuit Judge.

Reversal is sought on three grounds, only two of which, however, were relied on when the appeal was taken.

(a) The first argument is directed to the allegation and proof that the post office official was the assistant postmaster. Appellants urge that there was no such position at Dahinda, Illinois, where the assault and attempted robbery occurred. The indictment charged appellants with “then and there wilfully, unlawfully, forcibly and feloniously assaulting one Percy Woolsey, the person then (and) there having lawful charge, control and custody of certain mail matter, to wit, the mail matter then and there in the lawful charge, control and custody of the said Percy Woolsey, in Ms capacity as Assistant Post Master of the Post Office of the United States of America, in the said Dahinda as aforesaid * 81 When proof was offered of the official character of Woolsey, who was in charge of the mail at the time of the robbery, counsel for appellants stipulated with the district attorney as follows:

“It is stipulated by the counsel for the defendants and the District Attorney that the record may show there is no question raised as to the fact that this was the United States Post Office on the 21st day of February, 1931; that said post office did contain United States mail for transmission by the United States Mail, and that Mr. Percy Woolsey was, at that time, assistant post master in charge of said mail. And it was so ordered by the Court.”

If we correctly understand the contention of counsel for the appellants, it is that Mr. Woolsey was an employee in the post office, but he was not the assistant postmaster, as there was no official assistant postmaster at Dahinda, Illinois.

There are two answers to this argument. It was not necessary that the custody of the mail be in the assistant postmaster to constitute a crime. The allegation of the indictment to the effect that he was an assistant postmaster was surplusage. The essential ingredient of the crime was that the individual upon whom the assault was made had “lawful charge, control or custody of any mail matter.” Whether he assisted the postmaster or was an official known as the assistant postmaster is immaterial. Randazzo v. U. S. (C. C. A.) 300 F. 794.

We likewise are persuaded that the accused, through their counsel, could properly stipulate the facts as above shown. No reason has been advanced, and we have not been able to adduce one, which would justify a court’s permitting substituted counsel to repudiate fact admissions solemnly and deliberately made by a party, or by counsel when made in the presence of the party or with authority so to do.

(b) Appellants’ motion for a directed verdict was properly denied. The evidence was conflicting as to appellants’ guilt. Appellants offered an alibi whieh, if accepted as true by the jury, would have resulted in their acquittal. There was other testimony, however, whieh came from witnesses who were disinterested, and whieh the jury evidently believed. This made the rejection of appellants’ alibi inescapable. This appeal presents a clear ease of dispute of fact, and we are therefore compelled to accept the verdict of the jury.

(e) The third contention is hardly worthy of separate consideration. The indictment contained more than one count. The District Court submitted the ease to the jury on only one count. By the elimination of the other count the error complained of was cured.

The judgment is affirmed.