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LILLIAN VORNBROCK v. MARVIN BOLLIG AND OTHERS. GEORGE C. HUSOVSKY, RELATOR

Minnesota Supreme Court1945-04-20No. No. 34,063
219 Minn. 577

Summary

Holding. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to transfer venue from Crow Wing County to Morrison County. The writ of mandamus is denied.

Plaintiff sued defendants for damages from a car accident on a state highway in Morrison County. Although two defendants lived in Brainerd (Crow Wing County) and one in Little Falls (Morrison County), plaintiff filed suit in Crow Wing County where the majority of defendants resided. One defendant moved to transfer the case to Morrison County, arguing that witness convenience and the ends of justice required the change.

The trial court denied the venue change motion. The defendant then sought a writ of mandamus to force the transfer. The court rejected this effort, finding the trial judge had not abused discretion. The distance between the two towns was only about 30 miles, witnesses would not need overnight stays, and any convenience gained was minimal. The defendant's argument that trying the case in Morrison County would help a jury view the accident scene presented only a slight advantage. The court also rejected the suggestion that venue should change because plaintiff's counsel preferred trying the case before a Crow Wing County jury.

Summary generated by law.co from the public-domain opinion. The opinion text itself is public domain.

Key issues

  • Standard of review for trial court decisions on venue change motions
  • Whether witness convenience warrants venue transfer when distance is minimal
  • Whether concerns about jury bias or local reputation support venue transfer
  • Sufficiency of opposing affidavit executed by counsel rather than party

Procedural posture

Defendant applied for a writ of mandamus after the trial court denied his motion to change venue from Crow Wing County to Morrison County.

Authorities cited

No cited authorities resolved to law.co cases yet.

Opinion

majority opinion

Per Curiam.

Plaintiff brought an action to recover damages arising out of an automobile collision which occurred on the state highway between Brainerd and Little Falls, in Morrison county, at a point approximately seven miles north of Little Falls and 23 miles south of Brainerd or 16 miles farther from Brainerd than from Little Falls.

Two of the defendants reside in Brainerd, Crow Wing county, and one defendant in Little Falls in Morrison county. Plaintiff, who resides in Little Falls, pursuant to Minn. St. 1941, § 542.095 (Mason St. 1940 Supp. § 9213-1), brought the action in Crow Wing county, where a majority of the defendants reside.

Defendant Husovsky, under § 542.11 (Mason St. 1927, § 9216), moved for a change of venue from Crow Wing county to Morrison county on the ground that “the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by such change.” The other defendants súpported the motion. The motion being denied, said defendant now applies for a writ of mandamus.

Husovsky contends that, exclusive of the parties to the action, at least seven witnesses, residing in Little Falls or within seven miles thereof, would be compelled to travel to Brainerd for the trial unless a change of venue be granted. Hospital records are also located in Little Falls. Much is made of the inconvenience caused witnesses and the difficulties of wartime travel.

The granting of a change of venue on the grounds that the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice will be promoted thereby rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its action will not be disturbed except for a clear abuse of discretion. Desjardins v. Emeralite Surfacing Products Co. 189 Minn. 356, 249 N. W. 576; 6 Dunnell, Dig. & Supp. § 10127. Here, we find no abuse of discretion. The difference in mileage, time lost, and expense is negligible. In no case will the witnesses be required to stay away from their homes overnight. A change of venue would promote the convenience of witnesses only to a slight degree. Husovsky declares that upon trial he intends to ask for an order permitting the jury impaneled to try the case to visit the scene of the accident, and that for this purpose it would be much more convenient to have the trial at Little Falls, because the jury would be required to travel only seven miles as against 23 miles if the trial were held at Brainerd. It seems that this slight difference in mileage would hardly be a factor if upon trial the court should deem it advisable to have the jury inspect the scene of the collision. There is no abuse of discretion in denying a change of venue where the advantages to be gained are inconsequential. Furthermore, the trial court is in a better position than a court of review to judge of the difficulties of wartime travel between these two cities, both located on a concrete highway and only about 30 miles apart.

The moving defendant emphasizes that a change of venue should have been granted to promote the ends of justice because of remarks alleged to have been made by plaintiff’s counsel at the hearing, to the effect that he desired to have the trial conducted before a jury in Crow Wing county, where the bad record and reputation of one of the defendants were known. Certainly, on the limited showing thus made, there was no abuse of discretion in failing to find that a fair trial could not be held in Crow Wing county.

Contrary to the moving defendant’s contention, it is not the law that in order to resist an application by the defendant for a change of venue the affidavit offered in opposition thereto must necessarily be executed by the plaintiff personally. An affidavit made by the plaintiff’s attorney is sufficient where such attorney has personal knowledge of the matters set forth therein. Here, obviously the affidavit of counsel was based on personal knowledge and as such was adequate. It is good practice, however, to set forth in the affidavit the reason why it is not made by the client, and likewise to allege specifically that the statements made therein are based on personal knowledge. Oliver v. Cunningham, 51 Minn. 232, 53 N. W. 162.

Writ of mandamus denied and order to show cause discharged.